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 Introduction 
 J.C.  Davis  and  Miguel  A. Ramiro Avilés 
 Thomas More inaugurated the modern tradition of utopian writing in 1516. Since then we can i nd in Western literature a vigorous expression 
of ideas about the nature, content and forms of utopian literature. How might 
this exceptionality be explained, and what does it tell us about those societies 
which produced this l owering of what is simultaneously a literary genre and a 
series of explorations of the limits of political and social possibility? 
 After some initial hesitation, Renaissance Europe (about 1300 to 1600 
(1700 in Northern Europe)) witnessed growing coni dence in its ability to 
break down the barriers of distance, ignorance and, to some extent, a sense 
of inferiority, to acknowledge the extra-European world. That world became, 
and continued to be, a kind of mirror for European writers, exposing both 
the potential and the l aws of the societies that had shaped it. Utopian writing 
could turn that into a magnifying mirror in which both potential and l aws 
could be dramatized, highlighted as a spur to reform or used satirically to 
del ate complacency. Europe has examined itself by exploring the lives of 
others, and the liberation of i ction, offered by utopian writing, enabled a more 
systemic and radical self-examination. 
 The technological innovation that gradually equipped Europeans for 
global exploration, trade, colonization and empire also reinforced self-belief. 
Technological development rested in part on the advancement of science and 
the expansion of scientii c knowledge. This, in turn, was a process that reshaped 
their sense of humanity’s relationship with the environment, nature and God. 
Could the discovery of the laws of nature provide new, sounder or even more 
natural, principles upon which well-functioning societies could be built and 
human misery be reduced, if not eliminated? 
 Related to this was a coni dence, slowly and painfully gained, that change 
itself could be mastered, taken out of the realm of fortune and providence to 
be purposefully shaped by human agency. Such coni dence rested on a sense 
that it was possible to see beyond the surface of events and understand those 
unseen, underlying factors of history that shaped human destiny. If such factors 
were to be used for good, there had to be a guide to the good society towards 
which history should be driven. This sense that the unregulated l ow of history 
could be brought under regulation has waxed and waned over the last few 
centuries but we should not underestimate its importance to utopian writers 
like Harrington, Condorcet and Cabet. It co-existed with what might now 
appear to be an alarmingly naïve belief in the possibility of limitless access to 
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the resources which could sustain social change as well as the quest for social 
justice, making deliberately chosen re-orderings of society viable. 
 Wherever we look, in the last i ve centuries, partly because their understandings 
of the world, their environment, nature, space and time have changed, Western 
societies have become immensely richer, more populous, more urban and 
more linked in more ways to the greater world than they ever were. They have 
undergone demographic transformations in terms of, amongst others, population 
size, life expectancy, age distribution and net reproduction rates. They have 
participated in revolutions in mobility, communications, information transfer 
and data accumulation. They have witnessed the convulsions of political and 
social revolution as well as the technological sophistication and enormously 
enhanced destructive capacities of modern warfare. Latterly, the scientii c 
and technological innovation, which underpinned many of these changes and 
a sense of progressive potential, has come to seem rather more threatening. 
Bearing the weight of so much change, Western societies have, on the whole, 
had to adapt by becoming gradually less (but only less) hierarchical, patriarchal 
and dominated by closed elites. (Although there are signs that the pendulum 
may be beginning to swing the other way.) To the extent that these and other 
changes were progress, they were, of course, uneven progress. Nevertheless, 
the mere prospect of such change continuing made it possible to ask not only 
“What are we?” but “What do we want to be?”: a questioning in which the 
utopian imagination has been critically active. 
 As we journey further into the twenty-i rst century, however, such coni dence 
is apparently faltering and problems, which seem unmanageable for even the 
wealthiest and most powerful of Western societies, multiply. To enumerate 
only the most obvious of these – managing our impact on the environment; 
dealing with the i scal implications of the welfare state; caring well for growing 
numbers of the elderly; preventing the future for the young being a bleaker 
prospect than that experienced by their parents’ generation; fashioning more 
inclusive societies; overcoming social alienation and disaffection and dealing 
justly with the violence that may be associated with them – is immediately to 
confront their apparent intractability. Not so long ago, the triumph of the free 
market over the command economies was greeted as unqualii ed good news. 
More recently, the inability of the free market to control i nancial excess and 
the consequences of mounting debt has been exposed. In this century, powerful 
Western nations have been drawn into dubiously motivated wars they have 
found difi cult to ‘win’ and from which they i nd it almost impossible to 
disengage without humiliation. Meanwhile, the corruption of a free press and 
of once trusted social institutions seems worryingly possible. Everywhere we 
see the democratic dei cit of the apathy, indifference or principled withdrawal 
from participation of otherwise qualii ed citizens. Alongside this, we might 
put what we could call an ‘ideological dei cit’; that is to say the absence of 
any ideology that lays claim to being able to address the most intractable of 
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these problems and their underlying causes. And part of this malaise might be 
attributed to a sense that the kind of states that we have developed and which 
preside over us do not have the capacity to deal with these issues. 
 That ‘realism’, which might have served us well in the past, might now 
confront a world so beyond its policy options, let alone its ‘solutions’, that it 
would be easy to despair. New solutions have to be imagined, and given the 
interconnectedness of the problems we face those solutions have to be systemic. 
Such systematic re-imagining of society, politics and humanity’s relationship 
with the natural environment has been offered to us repeatedly over the last 
i ve hundred years by utopian i ction. This volume, with its invitation to look 
again at some of the classics of the modern utopian tradition, has, in this regard 
perhaps, a certain timeliness. The suggestion is not that here we might i nd a 
checklist of solutions to our present problems but rather that, in exploring 
and coming to understand both the possibilities and the limitations of utopian 
thinking, we may be better equipped to nurture the principle of hope in our 
own times and to discipline the imaginative capacities necessary to establishing 
a new, better and sustainable ‘reality’. 
 This book then offers fresh readings of a range of those classic utopian 
texts extending from Thomas More’s  Utopia of 1516 to Ursula Le Guin’s  The 
Dispossessed of 1974. Each essay focuses on a moment in the text and uses it 
to engage with a closer reading of the work as a whole. We have assembled an 
international team of distinguished experts on the works in question and have 
asked them to produce a short and accessible guide to their reading of the text. We 
have kept the scholarly apparatus to a minimum but their responses rel ect the 
cutting edge of current thinking about these utopian writings. Our hope is that 
the result will not only be stimulating in its own right, but will encourage you to 
turn to these utopian texts, and others, and to read them critically for yourself. 
The selection we have made here is necessarily arbitrary and, even with coverage 
of nineteen utopian works, limited. We have, nevertheless, attempted to rel ect 
the value and diversity of utopian literature over the last half millennium and to 
consider those texts that either have had a signii cant inl uence on the tradition or 
have raised the most critical problems of the genre. We have devoted three of the 
essays to More’s  Utopia , both because it is in many senses the foundation work 
of the modern utopian tradition but also because it self-consciously embodies 
and rel ects so many of the continuing issues faced by utopian writing. One of 
the most immediately striking features of assembling a collection of readings of 
utopian works is the diversity of the works in question. There are, nevertheless, 
recurrent themes with which they engage, albeit in different ways. The i nal part 
of this introduction will draw attention to some of them. 
 Over the last thirty to forty years, there has been considerable debate about 
the form and nature of the literary utopia. It is a debate that, as the works 
chosen here illustrate, can be traced back to the utopias themselves. Almost 
all their authors show a searching interest in questions of form and, above all, 
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in the relationship between i ction, reality and an imagined alternative. It has 
been common amongst commentators to see the i ctionality of much utopian 
writing as a strategy to evade censorship, but that rarely tells anything like the 
full story. More pressing reasons are inherent in the nature of the comprehensive 
transformation of social and political relationships which utopian i ction 
envisages. Such transformation is bound to require imaginative leaps. To make 
that alternative world ‘real’ to the reader, the author requires their imaginative 
participation and, as in the cases of so many utopian authors – More, Bacon, 
Harrington, Bellamy, Le Guin, for example – an artfully constructed i ctional 
narrative is the chosen means. That i ctional narrative has to establish and 
bridge the distance between what is and what might be. In the process, it 
exposes the folly of our ‘wisdom’, the self-deluding fantasy that sustains our 
‘normality’, and the i ction that is our ‘reality’. 1 Just as the communities we 
inhabit are imaginatively constructed by us, so the ‘reality’ that adheres to them 
is, to an extent, i ctitious. Post-modern literary theory may have brought us to 
conclusions akin to this, but modern utopian literature’s grappling with form 
and imagination has been informed by them from the beginning. From More to 
Le Guin, these essays tell us, utopian authors have been playing, teasingly, with 
the potentialities of literary form. Central to this has been the fundamentally 
aesthetic question: What can we use to help us grasp an unfamiliar ‘reality’ in 
order to use that grasp to shape better lives and societies? 
 Also apparent through a reading of these essays is that utopian works rarely 
settle for a one-dimensional form but are almost always multifaceted. They are 
demanding of their readers. Often they appear to defy easy interpretation, laying 
false trails, subverting their own claims and questioning their own premises. 
More’s  Utopia is, of course, a masterwork of this kind but Fourier’s studied 
‘bizarreness’, Bacon’s oscillation between display and concealment, the struggle 
of Bellamy’s Julian West caught between two socially shaped psychologies and 
Le Guin’s protagonists’ desire to escape a world of limited, linear possibilities 
for a more open escape from social oppression – all of these exemplify the same 
tendency. Inhabiting a new world – even in the imagination – should be and 
has to be made an unsettling experience. Thomas More’s doubling as Morus 
in  Utopia is echoed in Julian West’s double identity in  Looking Backward . 
In one case, More’s utopians might use their superiority to claim rights to 
use the territory of others as ‘necessary’. In another, the inhabitants of Henry 
Neville’s Isle of Pines have declined so far into arcadian sloth and decay that 
their inferiority to their Dutch discoverers is all too painfully obvious. Utopia 
may only be imagined; it is the other that has to be discovered. Spatially, it 
means an imaginative venturing into the unknown: sailing to the New World, 
to  terra australis incognita , or voyaging to the moon or the centre of the earth. 
But it is also instructive to note the inl uence of the half-known exotic. As three 
of the essays below illustrate, More’s Utopians, Veiras’s Sevarambians and the 
inhabitants of Sinapia all take something from Persia in the shaping of their 
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ideal society. Utopian writing may have been largely a Western phenomenon, 
and it may rest in part on cultural coni dence verging on a sense of superiority 
but, at the same time, that coni dence is qualii ed by a critique exposing the 
profound failures of contemporary Western societies and a willingness to look 
outside of those societies, both in time and space, for better alternatives. 
 These utopias are inescapably political. They begin with a sense of unease 
or dissatisfaction with existing political, economic, social, legal and welfare 
arrangements and a need to imagine a political order that can maintain a 
radically improved society. This means that they must deal with issues of partisan 
advantage and conl ict. They must re-order the relationships between minorities 
and the majority and between the weak and the strong. They must establish 
institutions that work with, rather than against, the new order while increasingly, 
from Wells to Le Guin, seeking to establish a new order capable of change. 
 What is also striking is the number of occasions on which these utopian 
writers seek to penetrate behind the superi cial appearance of things to underlying 
causes. As George Logan argues in the case of More, their analysis of the 
problems is systemic and their responses are likewise systemic. The whole of the 
socio-political order must be recast if the causes, and not merely the symptoms, 
of social misery are to be addressed. For Morelly then the distorting forces of 
history had to be addressed, and by the later stages of the Enlightenment, as in 
the cases of Condorcet and Cabet, science (especially social science), reason and 
technocracy could be envisaged as taming history and bringing it into the service 
of utopia. Such optimism raised again old questions about the relationship 
between the intellectually equipped minority and the majority, precipitating 
tensions like the ones that can be seen in the work of Saint Simon, for instance. 
 Balancing the claims of the individual against those of society could 
be mitigated in utopian thought by the reconstruction of the individual’s 
second nature, habituating him or her to new social norms and behavioural 
patterns congruent with the desired social outcome. This again reinforced 
the utopian tendency towards systemic or holistic solutions. All means had 
to be used to reshape the habitual behaviour and expectations of members of 
the ideal society. In consequence, we i nd throughout these utopian works a 
recurrent insistence on the importance of education. This is complemented by 
an equal insistence on law rigorously enforced as a means of containing and 
conditioning behaviour. If we think of education in a broad sense as equipping 
citizens for society, then the law and the judicial system, along with many 
other social arrangements and customary patterns of behaviour, become as 
much educational tools as the more formal institutions of learning. But law 
and a formally controlled, purposeful system of social education require an 
institutional framework to sustain and manage them. For this reason amongst 
others, the utopian imagination has to grapple with issues of constitutional 
and legal codes. How and by whom decisions are to be taken within those 
frameworks are questions that reinforce this political disposition inherent in 
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utopian writing, and we see those issues rel ected in almost all of the texts 
discussed here. 
 What is also striking is how many of these texts grapple with issues of 
equality and inequality. Even those that do not embrace total material equality 
are looking to modify hierarchical and/or patriarchal structures. In part, this 
may be because inequalities are seen as sources of conl ict or of a materialist 
corruption distracting individuals and society from the true essence of the good 
life. However, it is also perhaps a question of the notion that, in an environment 
of limited satisfactions, social misery and alienation can only be mitigated, 
if not eradicated, by creating the conditions for a more equal society. In the 
process, the ‘rights’ of property begin to appear less fundamental and inl exible 
in utopian societies generally. Indeed the more general question might be 
asked as to whether, in the good society (at least, in the forms envisaged here), 
individual and corporate rights do not become conditional upon the greater 
social good. Is it true that the languages of civil rights, and a  fortiori human 
rights, are conspicuous by their absence in utopian society? On the contrary, it 
might be argued that what to us seem like the natural rights of women or the 
poor were better provided for in Fourier’s or Owen’s vision than in the societies 
from which they sprang. But the question remains as to whether a language of 
rights could really function in the utopian ideal society. 
 Unlike the visions of natural abundance, or of easeful plenty, dreamt of in 
Cockaygne or Arcadia, utopian society and the individuals comprising it are 
to be found in an environment constrained both by the limitations that nature 
imposes on them and by the level of knowledge and understanding of the 
forces of nature which have been or are being achieved in that society. In other 
words, and again we see it illustrated in these utopian i ctions, the relationship 
between humanity, nature and, where appropriate, God, the author of nature, 
remains pivotal. The quest for a ‘practical science’, whether it acknowledges or 
ignores God, appears as a key to social amelioration in Campanella’s Solarian 
astrology, in Andreae’s partnership of religion and science, in Bacon’s natural 
philosophy and in the triumph of science and reason in Condorcet’s writings. 
The elusive promise of progress can be recaptured in a well-ordered, educated 
and technologically equipped society but progress in turn poses the problem of 
the kinetic or ‘non-Euclidean’ utopia as explored by both Wells and Le Guin. 
 The societies that for the last i ve centuries have been most fertile in utopian 
imagination, and which remain amongst the richest on the planet, are now 
experiencing growing social and material inequalities, faltering free markets, a 
i scal/welfare crisis, failed ideologies, incipient corruption, declining educational 
standards, massive personal and public indebtedness and the danger of being 
eclipsed by the non-Western economies they once dominated. Their utopian 
tradition may well not have the answers but it does appear to ask some of the 
right questions. We hope that this collection will encourage you to seek those 
questions out for yourself. 
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Systemic Remedies for Systemic Ills : The 
Political Thought of More’s Utopia 
 George M.  Logan  
 ‘Thus I am wholly convinced that unless private property is entirely 
abolished, there can be no fair or just distribution of goods, nor can the 
business of mortals be conducted happily. As long as private property 
remains, by far the largest and best part of the human race will be 
oppressed by a distressing and inescapable burden of poverty and 
anxieties. This load, I admit, may be lightened to some extent, but 
I maintain it cannot be entirely removed. Laws might be made that no 
one should own more than a certain amount of land or receive more 
than a certain income. Or laws might be passed to prevent the prince 
from becoming too powerful and the populace too insolent. It might be 
made illegal for public ofi ces to be solicited or put up for sale or 
made burdensome for the ofi ce-holder by great expense. Otherwise, 
ofi cials are tempted to get their money back by fraud or extortion, 
and only rich men can accept appointment to positions which ought to 
go to the wise. Laws of this sort, I agree, may have as much effect as 
poultices continually applied to sick bodies that are past cure. 
The social evils I mentioned may be alleviated and their effects 
mitigated for a while, but so long as private property remains, 
there is no hope at all of effecting a cure and restoring society to 
good health. While you try to cure one part, you aggravate the wound 
in other parts. Suppressing the disease in one place causes it to break 
out in another, since you cannot give something to one person without 
taking it away from someone else.’ 
 ‘But I don’t see it that way’, I said. ‘It seems to me that people cannot 
possibly live well where all things are in common.’ 1 
 This passage occurs late in Book I of the two books of  Utopia , in the climactic pages of the broadly ranging dialogue on English and European 
society and politics that constitutes that book. The speakers here are, i rst, the 
i ctitious character Raphael Hythloday (Hythlodaeus in More’s Latin), who 
in Book II reports on the island commonwealth of Utopia, newly discovered 
somewhere off the coast of South America, and, in the second paragraph, More 
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himself – or, at least, a character who shares his name and biography, although 
the dialogue he takes part in is i ctitious, and in some passages of the work 
the author clearly holds his namesake at an ironic distance (as, indeed, he also 
holds Hythloday, whose name, based in Greek, means something like ‘expert 
in nonsense’ – though almost all of what Hythloday says is the opposite of 
nonsensical). The passage provides a key to understanding the most important 
facts about More’s contribution to utopian thought and writing. But seeing 
how this is so requires some prior contextualization. 
 Evidently  Utopia did not originally have a i rst book. In 1519 (that is, three 
years after the initial publication of the work), Desiderius Erasmus – the pre-
eminent humanistic scholar of the era – wrote a brief but extremely interesting 
biography of More, whom he had known well for two decades, in a letter to 
the humanist and religious reformer Ulrich von Hutten. The rapid overview 
of More’s writing included in this sketch reports that he had written Book 
II of  Utopia ‘earlier, when at leisure; at a later opportunity he added the i rst 
in the heat of the moment’. 2 In the mid-twentieth century, J. H. Hexter – the 
most brilliant critic of More’s book – argued persuasively that the period of 
leisure must have occurred in the summer and autumn of 1515, the latter part 
of a period of nearly six months (early May to late October) when More was 
a member of a royal trade mission to Bruges. 3 By 21 July, negotiations were 
stalled and recessed (as More reports in the opening of Book I), and at some 
point More betook himself to Antwerp, where he met another of Erasmus’s 
friends, Pieter Gillis (usually anglicized as Peter Giles), a humanist and practical 
man of affairs, city clerk of Antwerp. In one of the commendatory letters that 
buttressed the i rst and subsequent editions of  Utopia , Giles hints broadly 
that the book originated in conversations between himself and More (120). 
He appears in Book I, whose opening recounts More’s introduction to him 
and, in turn, his introduction of More to Hythloday. Giles is the third, albeit 
minor, speaker in the dialogue that follows, and a letter to him constitutes the 
preface to  Utopia . Hexter also pointed out that the ur- Utopia cannot have 
consisted simply of the current Book II, since that part lacks the scene-setting 
of the opening pages of Book I and thus begins with an unidentii ed speaker 
addressing an unidentii ed audience in an unspecii ed location. So, he postulated, 
the original form of  Utopia must have had an opening similar or identical to 
the early pages of what is now Book I, and More – as an afterthought, back in 
London – must have opened a ‘seam’ in those pages to insert the dialogue that 
became the rest of that book. Almost certainly this seam was at the point where 
More, as narrator, says that he will recount only what Hythloday said about 
the island of Utopia – but then suddenly veers off to the dialogue that occupies 
the remainder of Book I (12 and n. 15). 
 More, as he explains in the letter to Giles, had an extremely busy life in 
London and did not in fact i nish the book until nearly a year after his return 
from Flanders. On 3 September 1516 he sent his manuscript to Erasmus, 
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who was entrusted with seeing it through the press and with gathering 
commendations from fellow humanists and, if possible, also from ‘distinguished 
statesmen’. 4 Erasmus shared the manuscript with Giles, who (as he says in his 
commendatory letter) added to it the marginal glosses – some 200 of them, 
ranging in length from a single word to a sentence – that form a running 
commentary on the book. And someone – one hopes it was More – gave it the 
title (converting from the Latin)  On the Best State of a Commonwealth and 
On the New Island of Utopia (where ‘and’ creates an intriguing ambiguity), 
which is followed by the subtitle-and-puff (presumably by Erasmus or Giles) 
 A Truly Golden Little Book, No Less Benei cial than Entertaining, by the Most 
Distinguished and Eloquent Author Thomas More, Citizen and Undersheriff 
of the Famous City of London . 
 From early on, editors and critics of the book have, in effect, often second-
guessed More’s decision to revise the ur- Utopia by adding Book I. Many of 
the early translations of  Utopia into the European vernaculars either omit 
Book I entirely or abridge it; 5 and in a study of More’s reception, Anne Lake 
Prescott has traced in English editions of the work from the i rst one, by Ralph 
Robinson (1551), through Bishop Gilbert Burnet’s (1664), the process by which 
the elaborate title and subtitle-puff were gradually reduced to the single word 
‘ Utopia ’ – ‘as though the island Hythloday describes in Book II had somehow 
colonized Book I and its discussions and debates: the part has become the 
whole … From the mere object of a preposition in the i rst Latin titles, More’s 
island would eventually become a solitary italicized name:  Utopia ’. 6 These 
developments testify to the fact that readers of More’s book over the centuries 
have generally been more interested in the account of  Utopia than in the 
dialogue that precedes it – a fact that is more a tribute to the special merits of 
Book II than to any dei ciency in Book I, which has, at least for the last century 
or more, been held in high regard by many readers. Still, most criticism of 
 Utopia , from 1516 to the present, has been focused primarily or exclusively on 
Book II. When Book I has come in for attention, it has often been treated – in a 
way that, after all, the compositional history would seem to justify – as largely 
independent of Book II. Hexter, especially, wrote that ‘the published version of 
 Utopia falls into two parts which represent two different and separate sets of 
intentions on the part of its author’. 7 
 It is certainly true that  Utopia can appear to be two largely discrete little 
books, not only in substance but in form. The primary disciplinary afi liation of 
Renaissance humanism was with rhetoric, whose classical Greek and Roman 
form the humanists revived, even as they revived the classical form of the Greek 
and Latin languages. More was a virtuoso rhetorician – his biographer Peter 
Ackroyd says that rhetoric was ‘the basis of all his work. His wit, his ingenuity 
as a writer, his skill as an actor, and his public roles, were all part of the same 
dispensation’ 8 – and the two books of  Utopia constitute, in essence, brilliant 
examples of two quite different rhetorical species. 
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 The dialogue of Book I consists mainly of deliberative oratory, the oratory 
of persuasion and dissuasion, associated especially with debate about public 
policy. The deliberative orator argues either for or against a course of action, 
most often with arguments based on one or both of the two great  topoi of 
deliberative,  honestas (honour/morality) and  utilitas (utility/expediency). 9 The 
framing dialogue of Book I of  Utopia is a debate, structured by these  topoi , on 
the question of whether Hythloday should join a king’s council – and thus, in 
general, whether a humanist intellectual should enter practical politics. Early in 
that debate – which often goes by the name Hexter gave it, the ‘Dialogue of 
Counsel’, and addresses one form of the ancient question of the choice between 
action and contemplation – Hythloday offers, in illustration of his claim, that in 
fact it would be worse than useless for him to become a councillor, a verbatim 
report of a debate (that is, a dialogue within the dialogue of counsel) in which he 
took part, almost twenty years previously, at the dinner table of John Cardinal 
Morton (archbishop of Canterbury and Henry VII’s Lord Chancellor) on the 
efi cacy and morality of the current English policy of capital punishment for 
theft. Subsequently, he gives i ctitious but solidly grounded accounts of the 
deliberations of two royal councils (of the King of France and then of the king of 
‘some country or other’) on, respectively, foreign and domestic policy; that is on 
the French king’s desire to expand his domain by force and fraud, and the desire 
of some king or other (he would have put English readers, especially, in mind of 
the grasping Henry VII) to enrich himself at the cost of impoverishing his subjects. 
In all three of these included episodes, More wrote for Hythloday utterly splendid 
deliberative orations showing the immorality and folly of actual policies of 
European governments, just as he wrote splendid exchanges between Hythloday 
and himself on the topic of the encompassing debate on whether an intellectual 
can make things any better by entering politics. Hythloday’s i nal remarks on 
this subject – which close with the i rst paragraph of the passage quoted at the 
head of this essay – reveal his belief that nothing can effect major improvements 
in human society unless private property is i rst abolished. That shocking 
revelation produces an immediate change of subject in the dialogue and leads 
quickly to Hythloday’s lengthy account of Utopia, whose communistic society 
supposedly demonstrates the correctness of his view. Thus in Book II the form of 
the work abruptly changes from dialogue to monologue – from deliberative to 
demonstrative rhetoric, the rhetoric of praise (or blame) – as Hythloday describes 
in detail the commonwealth that, as he says in his peroration, he regards as ‘not 
only the best but indeed the only one that can rightfully claim that name’ (103). 
 But More’s decision to preface his monologue with a dialogue was really 
neither surprising nor ill-advised. First, the topic of his book – ‘On the Best State of 
a Commonwealth’ (as given at the beginning of its full title) – had been associated 
with dialogue since the prototypical works on the topic, Plato’s  Republic, 
Statesman and  Laws . Second, dialogue was More’s best and most natural literary 
form. In addition to  Utopia , two other of his greatest works –  A Dialogue 
Concerning Heresies and  A Dialogue of Comfort against Tribulation – are 
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in this form. Dialogue came naturally to More because it was natural for 
him to see more than one side to a question (he was a superb lawyer), and 
because  acting came naturally to him. There is a wonderful story on this facet 
of More’s character in the biography by his son-in-law William Roper. At the 
age of about twelve to fourteen, More served as a page in Cardinal Morton’s 
household. Morton was a patron of the early English drama – Henry Medwall, 
the earliest English vernacular playwright known by name, 10 was a member of 
his household – and plays were sometimes presented at his court, during which, 
Roper says, the young More 
 would suddenly sometimes step in among the players, and never studying for 
the matter, make a part of his own there presently among them, which made the 
lookers-on more sport than all the players beside. In whose wit and towardness 
the Cardinal much delighting would often say of him unto the nobles that 
sometimes dined with him, ‘This child here waiting at the table, whosoever shall 
live to see it, will prove a marvellous man’. 11 
 As James McConica has written, ‘a penchant for taking on roles, for adopting 
various voices … was deeply imbedded in his nature’. 12 
 But quite apart from More’s special afi nity for it, dialogue was appropriate 
to a work of this kind because it could, as had been evident since Plato, make 
philosophy, including political philosophy, much more interesting to read. If 
the passage that heads this essay were part of a treatise, it would summarize a 
position that is essentially Plato’s and add in the next paragraph that Aristotle, 
in his critique of the  Republic in Book II of his  Politics (for that is where 
the arguments in this paragraph originated), made the following objections 
to Plato’s position. How much more interesting it is to have the two positions 
attached to two sharply etched characters arguing – just before this passage, 
heatedly, with More expressing impatience and something close to contempt for 
what he sees as Hythloday’s impractical idealism on the matter of counsel and 
Hythloday repaying him in similar coin, for what he sees as More’s advocacy 
of morally unacceptable temporizing. 
 And yet More could not write  only a dialogue, because his huge contribution to 
the study of ‘the best state of a commonwealth’ – the innovation that is dei nitive 
of the genre of utopian i ction – was to describe the alternative commonwealth not 
simply by dialectics but as if it already existed. 13 For this, he needed demonstrative 
rhetoric – here, something close to what we know as ‘travelogue’. 
 Book I of  Utopia is, in a complex and multi-faceted way that is characteristic 
of its author, the introduction to Book II. Its framing dialogue of counsel 
constitutes an astonishingly brilliant and balanced treatment of the problem 
of counsel: the essentially insoluble problem of assuring that rulers both 
get and take good, disinterested advice, in a situation where rule comes by 
inheritance or military conquest, to individuals who are usually habituated to 
sycophantic l attery from early childhood and are not infrequently dei cient 
in intelligence or education or both, and where the self-interest of counsellors 
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leads them to choose and expound their positions on issues with a view not to 
the public welfare but to besting their peers and l attering their superiors. For 
an intellectual of integrity, there are two possible responses in this situation. 
The i rst, powerfully espoused by Hythloday (it is also Plato’s position; 
e.g.  Republic 496c-e), is to keep out of politics. The second, equally powerfully 
espoused by the character More, is to participate but, though retaining one’s 
principles, not to suppose ‘every topic suitable to every occasion’, instead 
cultivating an ‘indirect approach’: ‘you must strive and struggle as best you can 
to handle everything tactfully – and thus what you cannot turn to good, you 
may at least make as little bad as possible’ (34–5) – a solution that Hythloday 
regards as not only morally unacceptable but impracticable. This problem is, 
however, solved in the Utopian republic, in which all ofi cials are drawn from 
a class of scholars, comprising individuals who ‘from childhood have given 
evidence of excellent character, unusual intelligence and devotion to learning’ 
(63), so that  Utopia is an example of the only kind of state where Socrates 
says a philosopher should enter politics: one where the rulers are  themselves 
philosophers (Republic 473c–e, 517b–520d). 
 The situation is the same with the other topics discussed in Book I. In the 
dialogue on crime and punishment that is embedded in the dialogue of counsel, 
Hythloday develops a powerful argument that the ultimate cause of most crime 
is found in the inequitable distribution of wealth in a society polarized into 
paupers on the one hand and, on the other, the idle rich and their hangers-on. 
But in the highly egalitarian society of Utopia, where ‘everything belongs to 
everybody’ and where ‘no one is poor …, there are no beggars, and though no 
one owns anything, everyone is rich’ (103), there is no cause for theft, and such 
crime as remains is committed by a remnant of incorrigibles who act badly 
despite not being driven by need and despite the excellent education that all 
Utopians receive. Similarly, the militarism and greed of rulers that Hythloday 
powerfully satirizes in his accounts of two typical meetings of royal councils do 
not exist in Utopia, where war is ‘utterly despise[d] … as an activity i t only for 
beasts’ (85) and greed for money has been eliminated by the abolition  of money. 
 Most fundamentally, though, Book I of  Utopia introduces Book II by 
developing the method for the analysis of social problems and the formulation 
of solutions to them that underlies the design of the Utopian construct. In the 
dialogue on crime and punishment, Hythloday debates with an English lawyer 
who thinks that the cause of theft is simply the wickedness of thieves, and 
who therefore believes that the solution of the problem is simply to execute 
the thieves – and is thus ‘amazed’ by the fact that, despite the aggressive 
implementation of this policy, with thieves ‘being executed everywhere, he said, 
with as many as twenty at a time being hanged on a single gallows[,] 14 … so 
many thieves [still] sprang up everywhere’ (15). To Hythloday, the explanation 
for this paradox lies in the fact that the primary cause of theft is to be found 
not in the character of thieves but in the polarization of society between rich 
and poor; and since the  problem is thus systemic, the  solution must also be. 
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This is also his view on counsel, and on every other problem he addresses; and 
it is clearly More’s view as well: for the character More, who disagrees with 
Hythloday on the validity of one partial solution to the problem of counsel, 
expresses no disagreement with his social analysis. Hexter, among others, 
recognized the historic signii cance of this analysis. More’s treatment (conveyed 
through Hythloday) of social problems is characterized by ‘his capacity to see 
past the symptoms to the sources of trouble’; he sees ‘in depth, in perspective, 
and in mutual relation problems which his contemporaries saw in the l at and 
as a disjointed series’. 15 This brings us back one last time to the passage at the 
head of the essay, whose primary signii cance is that it contains Hythloday’s 
explicit discussion of the holistic view of social problems that underlies all his 
arguments in Book I and underlies the Utopian construct. The passage also 
states what, for him, is the main implication of this view, namely, that social 
justice can be attained only through the elimination of private property. 
 The metaphor that More has Hythloday use here to characterize this view of 
social problems and their solution is one of systemic disease. ‘As long as private 
property remains’, the largest part of humanity will be oppressed by poverty. 
Good laws can lighten this burden to some extent, but they can have only ‘as 
much effect as poultices continually applied to sick bodies that are past cure’. 
Social evils may be ‘alleviated’ in this way 
 but so long as private property remains, there is no hope at all of effecting a 
cure and restoring society to good health. While you try to cure one part, you 
aggravate the wound in other parts. Suppressing the disease in one place causes it 
to break out in another, since you cannot give something to one person without 
taking it away from someone else. 
 Plato is fond of the metaphor of the statesman as physician (e.g.  Statesman 
293;  Epistle VII 330c–331a), and his prescription is similar to Hythloday’s: 
a complete reordering of society from the ground up, with a thoroughly 
communized ruling class at the top 16 . Indeed More learned the systemic 
approach to social problems and their solutions from Plato, and from Aristotle’s 
 Politics . 17 More’s signii cance as a political philosopher inheres especially in his 
revival of this Greek approach and in his great innovations within it: i rst, 
in presenting his design for an alternative commonwealth as an account of a 
commonwealth that already exists; second (or so at least it seems to me), in 
his recognition that the fact that society is a complex network of mutually-
affecting parts means that there can never be – even in the realm of theory – 
a  perfect commonwealth, because there will always be conl icts between the 
full realization of different desirable social goals. In the case of  Utopia , the 
consequences of these conl icts show up, not surprisingly, most clearly at or 
beyond its borders, that is, in Utopia’s relations with its neighbours. 18 But 
this is not to say that best-commonwealth theory cannot provide a guide, 
both inspirational and practical, to making the social system ‘as little bad as 
possible’ (36). 
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More’s  Utopia : Colonialists, Refugees and 
the Nature of Sufi ciency 
 Susan  Bruce  
 Each city, then, consists of households, the households consisting 
generally of blood-relations … To keep the cities from becoming too 
sparse or too crowded, they have decreed that there shall be six thousand 
households in each … with each household containing between ten and 
sixteen adults. They do not … regulate the number of minor children in 
a family. The limit on adults is easily observed by transferring individuals 
from a household with too many into a household with not enough. 
Likewise, if a city has too many people, the extra persons serve to make 
up the shortage of population in other cities. And if the population 
throughout the entire island exceeds the quota, they enrol citizens out 
of every city and plant a colony under their own laws on the mainland 
near them, where the natives have plenty of unoccupied and uncultivated 
land. These natives who want to live with the Utopians are taken in. 
When such a merger occurs, the two peoples gradually and easily 
blend together, sharing the same way of life and customs, much to the 
advantage of both. For by their policies, the utopians make the land yield 
an abundance for all, though previously it had seemed too barren and 
paltry even to support the natives. But those who refuse to live under 
their laws, the Utopians drive out of the land they claim for themselves; 
and on those who resist them, they declare war. The Utopians say it’s 
perfectly justii able to make war on people who leave their land idle and 
waste, yet forbid the use and possession of it to others who, by the law of 
nature, ought to be supported from it. If for any reason the population 
of one city shrinks so sharply that it cannot be made up without draining 
others, the numbers are restored by bringing people back from the 
colonies. This has happened only twice, they say, in their whole history ... 
They would rather let their colonies perish entirely than allow any of the 
cities on their island to get too small . 1 
 In episode one of ‘The Promise’ (2011), Peter Kosminsky’s uncompromising Channel 4 drama about the Israel/Palestine conl ict, Erin, the naïve English 
woman who’s spending her gap year at the Tel-Aviv home of her rich Israeli 
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friend, is told a brief story by her friend’s brother, Paul, about a lesson his father 
tried to teach him when he was a boy. ‘When I was ten years old’, he tells her, 
 my father took me to see the border. The Jewish side was, uh, green and fertile, 
and the Arab side was brown, with a few goats, and then he said to me – and this 
was this big lesson he wanted me to remember – he said, ‘look what they’ve done 
with the land in 2000 years. Look what we achieved in i fty’. And this is a good 
man, a liberal man. It took me years to learn how to question the assumptions 
behind the things he said to me that day. ‘They are not as deserving as we are. 
They do nothing with the land. They are animals. They hate us.’ 2 
 Juxtaposing More’s passage with this extract from ‘The Promise’ illustrates 
one way in which contemporary readers of  Utopia might want to keep some 
Utopian practices at arm’s length. Utopian foreign policy, as George Logan has 
argued, appears hard to distinguish from imperialism. Logan quotes several 
critics who reached the same conclusion, from the interpretative tradition 
of post-Versailles Germany noted by Russell Ames and Shlomo Avineri, to 
Avineri’s own claim regarding the dependent relations between Utopia and 
its neighbours. 3 More recently, similar claims have been advanced by Andrew 
Hadi eld, who remarks that the Utopians operate as ‘displaced Europeans – 
English even – who have to confront exactly the same problems as their real 
counterparts, including the question of appropriating foreign lands to ease 
domestic pressures’. 4 Thomas Betteridge, similarly, reads  Utopia as an encounter 
narrative which expresses a European fantasy of America as empty space. 5 
 Perhaps these colonialist inclinations are unsurprising given the ways in 
which Utopia is modelled, at least partly, on More’s own England. Utopia is a 
nautical island nation whose main city, Amaurot, has a geography similar to 
that of London’s; it is separated from the mainland by a short channel of water, 
which Utopus created when he conquered the island, overseeing as he did so 
the digging of a i fteen-mile channel between Utopia and the mainland (43). 
The connection of the island’s name with that of its i rst founder is a practice 
characteristic of early modern imperialism (witness Virginia, the Carolinas, 
Pennsylvania some years later, and America itself around the time  Utopia is 
written). Hythloday had sailed with Amerigo Vespucci (10–11); and Jeffrey 
Knapp observes that although More ‘seems markedly ambivalent about the 
very fact of America’s discovery’,  Utopia ‘represents More’s attempt to turn 
England’s classical nowhereness into a way of seeing England and America as 
destined for each other’. 6 More generally, the book is imbued with the dynamism 
of an emergent sense of nation. The myth of a founding moment – the birth 
of a nation – is exemplii ed in Utopus’ act (Louis Marin, for instance, reads 
the destruction of the isthmus as akin to the cutting of an umbilical cord 7 and 
Knapp draws attention to theories that England too had once been attached to 
the mainland 8 ). This sense of a nation founded, politically speaking,  ex nihilo , 
marks the text as responding to the preoccupations of its own time, as does 
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the transcription and transliteration of the ‘Utopian’ poem and alphabet which 
appeared in the 1518 Basel i rst edition of the text. Later ‘rudely Englished’ by 
the putative translator (with, the 1556 edition of the text is at pains to point 
out, ‘simple knowledge and mean understanding in the Utopian tongue’ 9 ) the 
poem and alphabet and its subsequent ‘translations’, i rst into Latin and thence, 
in vernacular versions of the text, into English, Dutch and Spanish, amongst 
others, can be read as a palimpsestic representation of the text’s relation to 
colonialism and to nation. In the poem, Utopia speaks itself, articulating its own 
existence – ‘Uto-pus it was who redrew the map? And made me an island’ – in 
the ‘kingdom of its own language’ as Spenser put it. Helgerson, who drew 
attention to the resonance of Spenser’s phrase, points out that in most literature 
of that nature, the triangle between king, people and language is squared by the 
inclusion of the poet, 10 but in a typically Utopian twist, that role falls here to 
the translator, Utopian authorial agency elided, rendered as absent as the place 
itself. The transliteration and then translation of ‘Utopian’ into, i rst Latin, and 
then a series of vernaculars, echoes the response of real-life European travellers 
to the new languages encountered in the New World: they transliterated the 
vocabulary of these indigenous languages, into European characters, and then 
translated them into English, or Portuguese, or Dutch. 
 In similar fashion, Book I opens by situating its ‘characters’ in national 
terms. Its opening paragraphs herald the spatial and political realities of a 
new, outward-looking European landscape and its burgeoning international 
networks, both humanist and diplomatic. England, Castile, Flanders, Bruges, 
Cassel and Antwerp are all mentioned in the i rst three paragraphs of  Utopia 
(8–9) and the epistolary form of the book’s paratexts perform the triumph 
of communication over distance, expressing a delight in the transcendence 
of national limitations through the power of intellectual exchange which 
is mirrored in the text’s form, composed as it is of a dialogue between two 
foreign travellers (Morus 11 and Hytholoday) and their hosts.  Utopia opens 
and proceeds by way of multi-national conversations, and with the buzz of 
excitement generated by a new internationalism. Yet a delight in overcoming 
the limitations of national boundaries gestures simultaneously to the concrete 
existence of those boundaries: internationalism presupposes the existence 
of nation. Indeed, the tension in  Utopia between, on the one hand, a (new) 
patriotism expressed through the sense that one’s own nation generally does 
things a good deal better than someone else’s might, and, on the other, the 
pleasures afforded by new forms of European unions, is perhaps not worlds 
apart from England’s contemporary relation to ‘the Continent’. 
 To the traditional understanding of  Utopia as linked to the emergence of 
early colonialist experiences, my juxtaposition of this passage with a more 
recent narrative may add other observations. Anachronous though they may 
be, the terms of these respective justii cations of Israelis and Utopians are 
strikingly similar. The ‘unoccupied and uncultivated land’ of one’s neighbours 
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may be made green and fertile, ‘yielding an abundance enough’ for many, if only 
people have the will so to transform it, instead of being left barren, i t only to 
feed a very few. Both passages voice the conviction that with sufi cient labour, 
the most unforgiving of terrains can be made productive; and, by extension, 
that those willing so to exert themselves thereby earn the right to the terrain’s 
use. But what each does  not say is perhaps even more instructive. Both passages 
are deeply ideological accounts, a fact betrayed by what they omit to mention 
(which we will come to shortly) and by the drift of the censure embedded in 
them, from condemnation of the sloth of those who have indulged merely in 
subsistence farming to something more fundamental. Within a few phrases, 
the rhetoric of both passages quietly equates the laws of stronger nations with 
rather more transcendental legitimations. The Utopians insist i rst that the 
inhabitants of the land, ‘live under their laws’, and, if they refuse, ‘drive them 
out of the land they claim for themselves’. Utopian ‘laws’ being those which 
enable agricultural productivity, utopian law becomes i rst co-terminous with, 
and then indistinguishable from, the Law of Nature, which justii es expulsion 
just as, in ‘The Promise’, the Israeli narrative equates agricultural failure with 
the failure to be human, from which follows an irrationality implied to be the 
true source of the Palestinian conl ict. 
 What is elided in language, then, becomes a crucial factor in its meaning, 
but material factors must also be suppressed if such imperialist accounts are 
to serve the ideological work they are designed to fuli l. Unmentioned in the 
Israeli account is any reference to the politics of water: to the technology and 
power necessary to bring water in, to control where it goes, and to ensure that 
its benei ts fall to the Israelis, not the Palestinians. (All this particular story 
lacks, to make its application to Utopia complete, is a reference to its own 
‘River Anyder’ – the waterless river.) And in Utopia, Hythloday’s assertion that 
it is utopian law which enables the land’s productivity obscures the resources 
that allow the Utopians to indulge in this periodic peripatetic population 
management in the i rst place. To that claim, we move in a moment. It will 
illustrate how, despite its ostensible simplicity, this passage exemplii es a 
fundamentally Utopian contradiction. But i rst, we make a brief digression 
back into Book I, which will complicate my reading of this passage as a proto-
colonial moment. 
 This measured Utopian ebb and l ow into and out of neighbouring lands is 
not the only instance in the text of references to movements of populations. 
Book I has its own instances, in the ‘great train … of … servants’ temporarily 
in the employ of the ‘noblemen’ of England who ‘live idly like drones off 
the labour of others’ and who are ‘promptly turned out of doors’ to wander 
through the countryside when they or their masters fall ill; or the mercenaries 
of France who overrun and destroy the land when they are no longer needed to 
i ght (16–18). Most (in)famous of all are the vast throngs of ‘wretched people – 
men, women, husbands, wives, orphans, widows, parents with little children 
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and entire families’ forced into vagrancy by the practice of enclosure (19). 
The itinerant poor populate the margins of Book I even when not explicitly 
invoked, ghostly presences attending the debates about the death penalty, 
the ills of private property, and the counselling of kings. It is the suffering 
of those subjected to the depredations of such ‘hideous poverty’ (20) which 
prompts Hythloday to articulate his account of an alternative social vision 
to that blighted European landscape wherein poverty ‘exists side-by-side with 
wanton luxury’ and vice – the beer halls, gambling and brothels which Utopia 
so clearly does without. 
 Our passage might then serve as Book II’s Utopian solution to Book I’s 
concerns with vagrant populations and the disorderly, shifting impermanence 
they inhabited and were believed more generally to herald. 12 Book I’s images 
of superl uity, overl ow and excess, are countered in Book II with a model 
of managed containment, an economy of bodies forever shifting its surplus 
population somewhere else, or bringing it back again when dei ciency manifests 
itself at home, in the interests of maintaining stasis within the Utopian nation. 
For if Utopia is ‘like’ England, it is also England’s other, the place against which 
England and its ills can be thrown into relief. Situating this proto-colonial 
moment not merely in the historical context of the new imperialism, but also 
against the textual backdrop of an ethics of population control introduced 
(paradoxically) by its absence in the Europe of Book I, makes the meaning 
of this passage less straightforward than I have so far been suggesting. The 
foreign towns that the Utopians establish are not colonial enclaves in the sense 
that – say – Virginia was. They can be evacuated at a moment’s notice, without 
any affective attachment to new landscapes having been established within 
the Utopians who have temporarily inhabited it. Even the founding of Utopia 
itself is not unproblematically colonialist. Utopia is created as a nation, not as 
a tributary or colony of another, and Utopus, although not himself Utopian, 
never goes home to wherever he i rst came from. Instead, like Hythloday, 
whose ‘inheritance he has abandoned, giving it to his brother’ (10), Utopus 
may be a i gure for someone who i nds an adoptive country and leaves his 
old one behind. Hythloday himself, ‘Portuguese by birth’, has abandoned his 
nation as easily as he has his patrimony. When we see him i rst, our attention 
is drawn to his ‘sun-burned face … long beard, and … cloak hanging loosely 
from his shoulders’ (9), and even the phrase ‘Portuguese by birth’ implies that 
his attachment to his native land is no longer as fundamental to his identity 
as it once was. Peripatetic, enigmatic, seemingly now nationless, Hytholoday 
is the original stranger, the consummate wanderer, drifting from Old World to 
New and back again only to promise to repeat the process anew once he has 
i nished the telling of his tale. 
 There is a complex interplay going on in  Utopia then, between the imperialist 
impulse to appropriate the agricultural wealth of other countries, justii ed by 
the concept of ‘nation’ embedded in the invocation of utopian law, and the 
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idealization in the text of i gures able to shrug off their national identities and 
leave that birthright behind them, just as perhaps Morus himself does when 
the conversations of his European companions make him forget the family he’s 
left at home (9). It is not, in other words, merely a question of exporting one’s 
own law into new territory then claimed as an extension of one’s own land. 
‘Growth’, sanctioned though it may be by the Law of Nature when associated 
with agricultural productivity, is not in and of itself a Utopian objective 
or unmitigated ‘good’. In this respect, the governing principle of Utopian 
expansion mirrors other Utopian practices. In Utopia, the desire to accumulate 
quantity is always countered by the notion of sufi ciency, and the temptation 
to covet a commodity for its special qualities is limited by a social engineering 
which, precluding difference, proscribes affective attachment to objects. This 
phenomenon we see in the narrative of the Anemolian ambassadors, mocked 
by Utopian children for their attachment to the ‘gaudy decorations’ of glittering 
stones and to the i ne thread of the wool they wear, which ‘a sheep wore once, 
and still was nothing but a sheep’ (64–5). 
 Another way of putting this is that privileging use – over exchange – value 
and dispensing with money and any other form of property serves the superi cial 
function of protecting the Utopians from succumbing to the pleasures and 
dangers of commodity fetishism. Utopian communism controls the desire to 
accumulate many things, and the desire to possess any one, particular thing. 
But this distinction between Europe and Utopia wherein Europe is the locus 
of excess, the uncontained, the superl uous (and, therefore, the locus of desire) 
and Utopia the place of order, containment and the valorization of sufi ciency 
(and, therefore, the locus of satisfaction), obscures the fact that underneath this 
rational, ordered surface and, indeed, shoring it up, is a very heightened sense 
of the intrinsic rather than conferred value of the commodity, and a constantly 
renewed surplus that Europe could only envy. As Halpern’s brilliant reading 
of the Utopian attitude to gold shows, its logic is contradictory, ‘shot through 
with the logic of the commodity’ even whilst it pretends to eschew that logic. 
The ritual debasement of gold in Utopia, Halpern argues ‘suggests a desire that 
must be repressed … invest[ing gold] with an innate desirability that transcends 
all social contexts … and transform[s] social value … into a quality of the thing 
itself,’ not to speak of the inconvenience of requisitioning all the chamberpots 
in wartime and simultaneously freeing all the slaves. 13 As for surplus: ‘[A]
lthough they know … how much food each city and its surrounding district 
will comsume,’ relates Hythloday, ‘they produce much more grain and cattle 
than they need for themselves, and share the surplus with their neighbours’ 
(45). As Christopher Kendrick has pointed out: ‘Utopian working arrangements 
are not calibrated to produce just enough, but much more’ of the goods that 
they need. 14 Surplus – of corn, or cattle, or ‘precious’ stones – is what enables 
the Utopians to dominate their neighbours. It shores up their independence, 
provides the means to buy the things they lack (notably, iron), 15 and most 
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usefully of all, pays their mercenaries to i ght their wars for them. Perhaps it 
even underscores the subjugation of their neighbours, to whom some of that 
‘overplus’ may periodically be donated. Why produce the surplus yourself if 
someone else is always giving it to you? For gift economies can act to keep your 
inferiors in their places, as many a potlatch king and his losing competitors 
have come in the end to recognize. 
 But all this leads us to a i nal irony, with which it’s time to end. If a hidden 
surplus shores up the Utopians’ ability to conquer their neighbours, that same 
hidden surplus also unsettles the ethical justii cations with which we began, 
undermining the case for embarking on that agricultural appropriation in 
the i rst place. Halpern holds that the contrast between Utopia and England, 
between utility and waste, echoes the class division in English society between 
petty producers and aristocracy. 16 But who are the really petty producers in the 
larger, extended, imperial Utopian landscape? Isn’t it in fact the mainlanders, 
those so roundly condemned in the passage with which we began for their 
undeserving failure to work the land to make it produce more than they need? 
But that is what subsistence farming is: an agriculture that produces no surplus, 
only ‘enough’ to feed the farmers and their families, sufi cient and fruitful for the 
maintenance of an indigenous population. So the really paramount question, 
which remains as pressing today as it was in the sixteenth century, concerns, 
perhaps, the nature of sufi ciency. How much should we say is ‘enough’? 
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 3 
Goodbye to Utopia : Thomas More’s 
Utopian Conclusion 
J.C.  Davis  
 When Raphael had i nished his story, I was left thinking that quite a 
few of the laws and customs he had described as existing amongst the 
Utopians were really absurd. These included their methods of 
waging war, their religious practices, as well as other of their customs; 
but my chief objection was to the basis of their whole system, that is, 
their communal living and their moneyless economy. This one thing 
alone utterly subverts all the nobility, magnii cence, splendour and 
majesty which (in the popular view) are the true ornaments and glory of 
any commonwealth. But I saw Raphael was tired with talking, and 
I was not sure he could take contradiction in these matters, particularly 
when I recalled what he had said about certain counsellors who were 
afraid they might not appear knowing enough unless they found 
something to criticise in other men’s ideas. So with praise for the 
utopian way of life and his account of it, I took him by the hand 
and led him into supper. But i rst I said that we would i nd some 
other time for thinking of these matters more deeply, and for talking 
them over in more detail. And I still hope such an opportunity will 
present itself some day. 
 Meantime, while I can hardly agree with everything he said 
(though he is a man of unquestionable learning and enormous 
experience of human affairs), yet I freely confess that in the utopian 
commonwealth there are many features that in our own societies 
I would like rather than expect to see. 1 
 Following its brilliant reconstruction by J.H. Hexter, 2 George Logan notes in his essay earlier in this volume that the text of  Utopia was probably written 
in a different sequence to that in which it was published. More, according 
to his friend Erasmus, i rst wrote the long and detailed account of the ‘best 
state of a commonwealth and the new island of utopia’, which now comprises 
most of Book II, in the Netherlands during the late summer and autumn of 
1515. On his return to England, he composed the dialogue on counsel, with 
its penetrating indictment of contemporary politics, society and international 
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relations, which was to become the substance of Book I. Finally, he added 
the bridging section between Book I and Book II, and the conclusion, part of 
which appears at the head of this chapter, and which, with its references both 
to the account of utopia and the dialogue which now precedes it, serves as one 
of those things which reunites the separately written sections. Our reading 
therefore takes off from what was probably the last section of  Utopia written 
by More and the last that we encounter in reading it. 
 Almost every reader of a work of utopian i ction must i nish the book’s last 
section and close its pages with the ‘So what?’ question very much in mind. 
Perhaps this is especially true of those visions of an alternative society that 
we i nd appealing or deeply satisfying. We turn from an atractive world to 
the deeply l awed reality we inhabit and ask ourselves to note the apparently 
unbridgeable gap between the author’s i ction and our reality. How should 
we react to what we have read? Utopian authors seldom offer guidance on 
what has just been ‘reported’ to us: how we should read the description we 
have just followed and what meaning we should draw from it. But Thomas 
More apparently does. As we reach the end of  Utopia , the ‘Thomas More’ 
(Morus) depicted in its pages steps forward and pours cold water on what has 
been described to us. Much of it, he tells us, is absurd and ignoble and, even if 
there are some desirable features in it, we can have no sensible expectation of 
their realization. When it is not silly,  Utopia is unrealistic – which is a by no 
means untypical response to reading utopian i ction. So More has anticipated 
the commonplace reaction to much of the modern utopian tradition which his 
masterwork is already inaugurating. 
 But, if we look more closely at these last two paragraphs, we begin to see 
that there is much more than what has become a conventional response to 
utopian i ction here. Morus gives four reasons for seeing  Utopia as absurd. 
The i rst three are not, we are told, as important as the fourth. They are: the 
Utopians’ manner of waging war; their attitude to religion; and the ‘other of 
their customs’. This last is a catch-all, too vague to be helpful. Their religious 
practice, essentially ignorant of Christianity and based on reason and an open-
minded tolerance, might seem unacceptable to the contemporary Christendom 
of 1516 although the utopians have already shown a receptiveness to what 
they had learned of the Christian religion, especially as it appeared to 
endorse their own communism (96). They regard warfare ‘as an activity i t 
only for beasts’ (87; more generally see 87–92). Devoid of honour or glory, 
it is shameful and they only engage in it themselves as a last resort. Self-
defence, driving invaders out of the territory of their allies, the liberation of an 
oppressed people and sometimes the avenging of previous injuries, are seen by 
them as justii ed causes for making war (87–8). Without shame in a shameless 
exercise, they prefer to raise sedition, use assassins or mercenaries to pursue 
international conl ict when they must. 3 Why this is worse than the stratagems 
and ‘crafty machinations’ (29) of contemporary European statesmen outlined 
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in Book I, or the ‘many great cities destroyed, the states crushed, the republics 
beaten down, the towns burnt up’ which Jerome Busleyden bemoaned as evils 
of sixteenth-century Europe (128), Morus does not tell us. It may, however, 
relate to questions of nobility, magnii cence, splendour and majesty to which 
he soon turns. 
 The ‘chief objection’ of Morus to utopian life is their abolition of money 
and their communal living. Earlier in his debate with Raphael Hythlodaeus, 
Morus had rejected communism on Aristotelian grounds, namely that it 
robbed people of the incentive to work or to work well, that it led to confusion 
over ownership or use rights and thereby to disorder, and i nally that equality 
undermined all authority (40). 4 Now these objections are dropped, raising 
the question of whether they have been answered by Raphael’s description of 
Utopian life. The objection to a moneyless communism has shifted to the claim 
that it ‘subverts all the nobility, magnii cence, splendour and majesty (which in 
the popular view) are the true ornaments and glory of any commonwealth’. We 
are suddenly confronted with a double irony. The parenthetical qualii cation, 
‘(in the popular view)’, might be taken to suggest that Morus has abandoned 
the claim to speak to and for an elite of educated and sophisticated humanists, 
whose collaboration  Utopia is a product of, in favour of the popular view. 
Second, nobility, magnii cence, splendour and majesty have already been found 
to be deeply l awed criteria by which to judge society. They are expressed in 
terms of comparative advantage and disadvantage. The magnii cent stand out 
only by contrast with those without the necessary attributes. Striving for them 
involves emulative competition, seeing others as rivals or even as enemies rather 
than as friends. 5 The vice which dominates European life, a ‘pride, which glories 
in putting down others by a superl uous display of possessions’ (56–7; see 
also 109–10), is rendered impossible and absurd by the Utopians’ communist 
egalitarianism. Their scorn for the magnii cence and splendour of material 
display is illustrated by the humiliation and conversion to Utopian ways of 
the Anemolian ambassadors who fail to impress with their richly gilded and 
bejeweled dress (63–4). The Utopians wonder at others’ association of nobility 
with jewelry, dress, and gold and are appalled at the deference shown to the 
rich (65). The self-deluding fantasy of those who think themselves superior 
because of such things damages them because it snares them into the pursuit 
of false pleasure, and blinds them to the nature of true pleasure (71–4). It 
is at its most damaging when associated with majesty because it then leads 
princes to think that they can do anything they wish and nothing that they 
do not want to do (87). Towards the end of his discourse on Utopia, Raphael 
condemns European society as unjust in that it confers status on the idle, the 
greedy and parasitic while ‘it makes no provision whatever for the welfare 
of farmers and colliers, labourers, carters and carpenters, without whom the 
commonwealth would simply cease to exist’. It is ‘nothing but a conspiracy of 
the rich, who are fattening up their own interests under the name and title of 
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the commonwealth’ (108; the marginal note is ‘Reader note well!’). Can this be 
defended as nobility, magnii cence, splendour and majesty? William Budé in his 
letter to Thomas Lupset, which was printed with  Utopia , 6 probed this question 
of justice. Budé, like More, was a practicing lawyer and, like many lawyers 
before and since, worried about the connection, or disconnection, between the 
law and justice. Some, he observed, argued that the law existed to serve and 
protect the interests of the rich, strong and powerful. 
 The result of this logic is that it is now an accepted principle of the law of nations that 
men who are of no practical use whatever to their fellow citizens – so long as they 
can keep everyone else tied up in contractual knots and complicated testamentary 
clauses (matters which appear to the ignorant multitude, no less than to those 
humanistic scholars who live as retired and disinterested seekers after truth, as 
a vulgar combination of Gordian-knot tricks and common charlatanry) – such 
men, it is now agreed, should have each one an income equal to a thousand 
ordinary citizens, equal to a whole city, or even more. And naturally they also 
acquire impressive titles, as of honourable, munii cent men, pillars of society.  
 So injustice, honour and nobility became inextricably linked in contemporary 
society. 
 But the founder and controller of all property, Christ, left his followers a 
Pythagorean rule of mutual charity and community property, not only so, but 
he coni rmed it unmistakably when Ananias was sentenced to death for violating 
the rule of community property. 7 By this arrangement, Christ seems to me to have 
undermined – at least among his own disciples – all that body of civil and canon 
law recently worked out in so many vast volumes. Yet this is the law which we 
see now holding the fort of jurisprudence, and ruling over our destinies. (118) 
 For Budé, it is  Utopia that preserves ‘by marvellous good fortune, access both 
in its public and its private life to the truly Christian customs and the authentic 
wisdom’. 8 It does so by adhering ‘tenaciously’ to ‘three divine institutions’: 
absolute equality; ‘unwavering dedication to peace and tranquillity; and 
utter contempt for gold and silver’ (119). So Budé, whose letter contains an 
interesting description of the circumstances under which he read  Utopia , took 
from his reading of that work not a vindication of the nobility, magnii cence 
and justice of contemporary society but of the justice and Christian quality of 
Utopian society. His reading comes closer then to Hythlodaeus’s admiration of 
utopian society, than to Morus’s dismissal of it. 
 But it is not only Morus’s statement of his i nal conclusion which raises 
questions but his very manner of concluding his discussion with Hythlodaeus. 
His objection begins as a blunt, root-and-branch rejection of  Utopia . Much of 
it is really absurd. Yet not only does he not voice these criticisms but he takes 
Raphael into supper ‘with praise for the utopian way of life and his account 
of it’. The question of openness of mind and frankness of speech, which has 
been a theme throughout the book, is again re-opened. On one level Morus 
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may appear to be engaging in a blameless hypocrisy, saying one thing while 
thinking another in order to avoid upsetting someone wearied after a long 
discourse. But, on another, his evasion reveals further misunderstanding of 
what Raphael with his ‘unquestionable learning and enormous experience 
of human affairs’ had taught him. Two lessons are in fact overlooked. The 
i rst relates to one of the keys of the utopian way of life, plain speaking 9 and 
open-mindedness. In sixteenth-century Europe l attery, envy, competition and 
a fawning condescension to the powerful have virtually eliminated good sense 
and truth speaking, as Raphael illustrates in recounting a discussion that took 
place in the court of Archbishop Morton (15–28). By contrast, the Utopians 
are distinguished by their keenness to learn from others, absorbing Greek and 
Roman knowledge when they have the chance, picking up the technology of 
print and exploring Christian theology (40–1, 77–9, 96–7). ‘This readiness to 
learn’, according to Raphael, ‘is, I think, the really important reason for their 
being better governed and living more happily than we do, though we are not 
inferior to them in brains or resources’ (41). In fact, by withholding his true 
opinion, Morus is judging Hythlodaeus by the standards of Europe rather than 
giving him the benei t of the standards of  Utopia that his experience has taught 
him to admire. Only in the competitive and self-promoting conversations of 
European society would it be necessary to i nd fault with the arguments of 
others in order to enhance one’s own reputation for wisdom (14). In the Utopian 
theatre of plain speaking and open-mindedness, it would be reasonable for 
Morus to voice his concerns, not to conceal them. 
 But the question of whether to be frank or not with Hythlodaeus also 
conceals a broader lesson which reverberates throughout  Utopia . In concluding 
his description of  Utopia , Hythlodaeus engages in a comparison between 
the dysfunctional society of Europe and the ideal society he has just been 
describing. In the former, men speak very freely of the commonwealth but 
pursue their own gain, but ‘in Utopia, where there is no private business, every 
man zealously pursues the public business’. And then he adds the crucial rider: 
‘ And in both cases men are right to act as they do ’ (107; my emphasis). More 
sees the two societies as different theatres, performing different plays with 
different scripts and conventions. No individual could reject those conventions 
without wrecking the play. It is right to accommodate oneself to ‘the drama 
in hand’, acting one’s part ‘neatly and appropriately’ (36). 10 The tragedy of 
More’s England is that it is a theatre of misery, enacting injustice, engendering 
untruth, and productive of wasted lives, unhappiness and empty bombast. It 
may be right for its inhabitants to accommodate themselves to its play in hand 
since the only alternative is to fundamentally recast society, to enter a new and 
unknown theatre with new scripts, stage directions and conventions. Morus 
then responds like a man well accommodated to the theatre of contemporary 
society with its requirements of dissimulation and emulative competition in 
discussion. He would have been incapable of receiving the account of Utopia 
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in an open-minded way and speaking frankly about it. Hythlodaus has already 
rejected that theatre as ineradicably destructive and unjust and has introduced 
us to to an alternative theatre, Utopian life, in which open-mindedness and 
the freedom to speak the truth in a world without emulative competition is 
paramount. Given this underlying confrontation, it is hard to see how More 
could have ended his  Utopia in any other way. 
 So Raphael Hythlodaeus and ‘Thomas More’ (Morus) inhabit two different 
theatres. But before we leave it there, let us add just one note. As More himself 
wrote in his appended letter to Peter Giles,  Utopia is a work well supplied 
with ‘barbarous and meaningless names’ such as, for example, Utopia itself 
(meaning both ‘the place where things are well’ and ‘nowhere’) (113), Anyder 
(the waterless river), Ademus (the prince without a people) and Amaurot (the 
phantom city). These names, comic and self-contradicting, have, at the same 
time, a serious point. They warn More’s learned audience to be on guard, to 
read with utmost care. And foremost amongst the names which served this 
purpose were those of Raphael Hythlodaeus and Thomas More. Knowledge 
of Greek, Latin and the scriptures would have led More’s i rst readers to note 
in the i rst of these names the uneasy juxtaposition of an angelic messenger 
(Raphael) and a teller of idle tales or a talker of nonsense (Hythlodaeus). But 
this also invited further scrutiny of the name of his i ctional disputant, Thomas 
Morus. The apostle Thomas was so doubtful of the reality of the risen Christ 
that he could only be satisi ed of its truth by plunging his hands into Christ’s 
wounds. 11 And Morus would have reminded them of a work which Erasmus 
wrote while he was a guest in More’s home in 1509,  Moriae Encomium (1511) 
or  The Praise of Folly as it was to become famously known in English. The 
Latin title, of course, punned facetiously on the Latin version of More’s own 
surname. So, the book leaves us with two opposed verdicts on Utopian society. 
The positive one is that of a messenger from heaven who might also talk 
nonsense. The negative one is that of ‘Thomas More’, the sceptical fool. Dear 
reader, you have work to do. 
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 4 
So Close, So Far : The Puzzle of Antangil 
Nadia  Minerva  
 An edict was issued stipulating that the fathers of the nobility of all the 
provinces should ensure that the poor be fed, looked after and educated at 
the expense of the rich, at no cost to the fathers and mothers. 
 That the wealthy would pay for their room and board according to their 
fortune ... as valued by the President ... 
 In this way the wealthy are to pay for the sustenance of the poor as a matter 
of course. So much so that the people hardly feels any burden or trouble. 
 As soon as the edict was delivered, everyone brought their children with great 
joy stemming from the desire of the rich to see their children receive a good 
education, at a lower cost than before; as for the poor, they were relieved of the 
burden of their own children, with the hope that one day they would hold, like 
the rich, a respectable ofi ce and rank, without any special treatment among 
them, merit, wisdom and learning being the only criterion among them. 1 
 If the reader of  Antangil anticipates the radical boldness of other utopias, they will be disappointed. Nevertheless, in many respects, this utopia merits 
attention. Set in the context of its time, its innovations still qualify it as the 
i rst great French utopian novel. Inspired by Thomas More’s  Utopia, Antangil 
appeared anonymously 2 in 1616, exactly a century after More’s masterpiece 
and some years before the  New Atlantis by Francis Bacon and  The City of the 
Sun by Tommaso Campanella. 
 In  Antangil, recourse to the utopian modality forged by More – assuming 
and creating a reality opposite and symmetrical to the existing order – is 
combined with the denunciation of the social evils and political contradictions 
of France in the late sixteenth century and early seventeenth. That period was 
marked, i rst by religious war, then, after the assassination of Henri IV (1610), 
by insecurity and instability linked to the renewal of baronial conl ict and by 
the rekindling of religious hostility. 3 Responding to this state of conl ict, the 
narrator of  Antangil offered the story of a nation where peace, security and 
well-being reigned.  Utopia tangibly replaces an unjust and broken structure 
and stands as a place for the fuli lment of collective interests. 
 The story is an account of the daily encounters of the narrator with an 
ambassador of the Kingdom of Antangil, during a visit to the island of Java in 
1598, a date that emblematically recalls the Edict of Nantes and the return to 
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religious peace in France. 4 The work is comprised of i ve books. The i rst was 
dedicated to the geographic location of Antangil, followed by a description 
of the physical characteristics of the kingdom. The second book concerned 
its political and social system. The third was concerned with the organization 
of the army. In the fourth book, education and culture are dealt with (and the 
present chapter will focus specii cally on this). The i fth described the kingdom’s 
religion (surely protestant, although there was still a hint of Catholicism) and 
noted the absence of every form of zealotry. Religion there was not a source of 
conl ict but contributed to the maintenance of a peaceful and ordered society. 5 
 As is usual in utopia, the authenticity of this state is suggested by meticulous 
attention to the details of geographic location. Precise information was a 
fundamental element contributing to a sense of credibility. South of Grand 
Java, Antangil lies between 22 and 50 degrees south (1). 6 Its context is the 
powerful myth of ‘Terra Australis’. In line with contemporary taste for the 
exotic and the legendary, the richness of the kingdom’s natural resources, 
the blessings of God and nature, was described in detail. Another myth, that 
of the Age of Gold, renewed in accounts of voyages of exploration of the second 
half of the sixteenth century, was made tangible, as it was in many utopias. 
 The inhabitants of Antangil had opted for an elected monarchy, in which 
the king had a merely representative function: the antithesis of the absolute 
and hereditary monarchy in force in France at the time. Such a sovereign was 
no longer the incarnation of the deity and his only function was to delight the 
people with the magnii cence of his dress and his residence, and with the pomp 
of his cortège. Legislative and executive power was in the hands of an elected 
body: a Council (in which an equal number of nobles, citizens and inhabitants 
of the villages take part) and a Senate, made up of 100 wise men, chosen not 
by birth or for their wealth but on merit. Private property had been abolished. 
The state owned all land and natural resources. This enabled the state to meet 
public expenses without taxing the population. The family provided the base of 
the social structure, and families were organized in a pyramidal hierarchy. The 
head of each level of family groups (ten, one hundred, one thousand, etc.), was 
responsible for checking the amount of assets of its members and for supervising 
their morality, modesty and industriousness. In Antangil, the poor or vagabonds 
did not exist. The family provided for orphans, widows, the elderly and those 
unable to work, while the care of the ini rm was guaranteed by public hospitals. 
Should the family not be able to provide for its members because of poverty, 
it was the state that met their needs through a system of taxes, proportional 
to the wealth of the nobles and rich members of society. Finally, corruption 
was controlled by a prudent choice of dignitaries and magistrates who were 
required to have great moral integrity. After having shown how the highest 
responsibilities could only be achieved after a difi cult apprenticeship during 
which the merits of each candidate emerged, the narrator concluded: ‘Thus, 
gradually, they reach honours, not through purchases, sales, barter or favours, 
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all of which bring misery, decline and disaster for states and republics’ (156). 
It is an open attack on the venality of ofi ce in force in contemporary France. 
 The theme of education and culture was dealt with in the fourth book: 
‘On nurturing and educating the youth’ (113–56). Education – a concern 
of all creators of alternative societies – often witnessed bold and impressive 
innovations in utopian writing. 
 Great importance was attached to education and culture as a means of 
promoting ethics and social discipline. The challenge of improving humanity 
was assigned to the process of learning: ‘Entreaties, discipline, punishment are 
to little avail to make people better who are not i rst disciplined and educated: 
how indeed could a stupid, uncouth, treacherous or unmanly people, who are 
ignorant and unwise, ever value propriety, virtue and glory’ (113–14). Man 
was not by nature inclined towards virtue. It was only thanks to an education 
system capable of correcting the naturally bad inclinations of humanity that 
people could be disciplined and improved, so enhancing their security, happiness 
and well-being. ‘When she i rst shapes us, nature does not use the most vivid 
colours; nurturing and ruling need to be applied, even with the most willing 
and manageable minds’ (114). Education was the means to accommodate 
citizens to the spirit of society. Anthropological pessimism met pedagogical 
optimism. The negative image of humanity, surely inherited from Judaeo-
Christian traditions, was here balanced by faith in education, a legacy left from 
the Renaissance. Humanity is corrupt; but a good society could redeem it. 
 To this end, all citizens received an education, although the educational 
system was different for the two social classes, noble and rich commoners at 
one end and the common people at the other. The former were educated in 
a national Academy and in colleges in the provincial capitals where the best 
professors taught the arts and sciences (114). 7 They paid a fee according to 
their income and the excess was used to pay the fees of the poor. The length 
of study in the Academy was eighteen years, divided into three phases (126). 
In the i rst, from six to twelve years, the young learned to read and write, 
and studied grammar, poetry, history, music and some elements of geometry 
and cosmography. In the second phase, from twelve to eighteen years, the 
subjects were rhetoric, mathematics, dialectics, physics, metaphysics, medicine, 
architecture and fortii cation. In the third phase, from eighteen to twenty-
four years, the same subjects were taught with the addition, for two years, of 
instruction in the law and the constitution. In this third stage, training in the 
law courts was foreseen. Theology was reserved for those who would have an 
ecclesiastical career. In order to follow such an intense programme, lessons 
absorbed for eleven hours a day, the author took care to provide some relief 
by alternating the teaching of theoretical and applied disciplines. Large classrooms 
and libraries and a rich programme of study made encyclopaedic knowledge 
accessible, while gymnasiums and open courtyards, where the young were 
expected to do hard physical exercises, guaranteed the development of healthy, 
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agile bodies. Teachers emphasized the harmonious and gradual development 
of the young. Exercises were appropriate to the students’ age groups and 
physical activities were chosen for the different age ranges so as not to damage 
young bodies and encourage concordant growth. Only when they reached 
twenty years of age were the students free to venture outside of the Academy 
to visit the city and the court and have their i rst experiences of life. When 
their studies were i nished, the nobles and the wealthy were called to public 
ofi ce, i rst with a year’s training in the provinces, at the end of which they 
received commendation or criticism. Knowledge and know-how were both 
harmoniously developed in  Antangil . 
 The rest of the people, of both sexes (197), 8 were instructed in reading, 
writing, arithmetic, drawing and the catechism. However, the possibility of 
higher education, paid for by the wealthy citizens, was provided for the most 
gifted of them. Class and privilege were modii ed by the recognition of merit 
and a kind of solidarity amongst the social classes, in which the hegemonic class 
nonetheless retained their hold on power: ‘all the chief ofi ces, honours and 
ranks ... without the people objecting, for they are justly and equitably governed 
by them, and there being room for merit to pave the way to such rank’ (156). 
 The Academy was like a city, which contained all that was necessary for the 
community living there, from storerooms, to a hospital and a cemetery. The 
segregation of young people was total, almost as if they were being defended 
from any contact with the outside world before the conclusion of the formative 
process, the aim of which, as has been seen, was to instil knowledge and the 
virtues, those of ‘devotion’ and ‘obedience’ (195), which alone could protect 
the state from bad government and corruption. Internal organization was 
rigorous and challenging and the system of discipline could be suffocating. 
The students’ day was frantically full. Moments when they could relax and 
take their minds off study were rare. Austerity ruled even the food, the dress 
code and the living standards, which were extremely sober and characterized 
by a frugal well-being without any slackness, since ‘what is done is meant to 
teach them frugality and prudence, and to make them intimate and open with 
everyone, without making distinctions except through personal merit, the most 
humble being treated there on an equal footing as the most important man’ 
(132–3). 
 As in the platonic republic, higher education in  Antangil was reserved for 
an elite, even if, with an adequate system of scholarships, the sons of the poor 
could join those of the nobles and the rich in the highest level of education, 
the Academy. On the other hand, in More’s  Utopia the working class had 
opportunities for exemption from manual work and admission to the status of 
intellectuals if they pursued a suitable education – devoting themselves to study 
in their free time. Nevertheless, there is a fundamental difference with More’s 
 Utopia . In  Antangil, admission to the Academy was carefully controlled, while 
in Utopia the courses were free to everyone, including women. 
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 The absence of Latin amongst the subjects taught should be noted; it is a 
sign of modernity. The presence of dialectics and rhetoric nevertheless signs a 
curriculum still marked by tradition. This relates to the controversies of the 
day about colleges and academies in France. At the time of Henri IV, schools 
were attracting growing numbers of students. In the colleges, six hours of 
grammar courses were taught as well as Latin rhetoric, for six long years of 
formal study. The university colleges and those of the religious orders (like the 
Jesuits with 14,000 students in the province of Paris alone) expected teachers 
and students to converse in Latin. In  Antangil, the classics were translated into 
the vernacular. Suppressing Latin, the entire program could be rewritten. 
 Why did the anonymous author choose the formula of the Academy as 
the institution of education? The Academies of colleges, where equestrianism, 
fencing, dancing, mathematics and fortii cation were taught, were greatly 
criticized at the time. It was thought that they were not intellectually proi table 
and did not prepare students for conversation or debate. 9 In  Antangil , instead, 
these skills were greatly prized and the young had various opportunities to 
develop them. 10 For example, it was required that all students should answer 
the teachers’ questions in order to train themselves to be ‘l exible and informed’ 
(131). Everyday, after lessons, students had to give an account of what they 
had learned, ‘to make the mind sharp and perceptive, so as not to be without 
anything to say, but to become secure and determined in the face of objections’ 
(135); they also participated in debates on the arts and the sciences, in fearless 
battles ‘of words and explanations’ (152), which were held around the table or 
during walks. 
 However, a heavy atmosphere weighs on the young of Antangil, who 
are always under scrutiny. Even on Sundays, they are busy with supervised 
activities, ‘since the young ones, in their restlessness … are bound to be up to 
mischief’ (140). Entry into adulthood did not take the inhabitants away from 
the vigilant eyes of the censor who examined their behaviour and attitudes 
with mistrust. In fact, on leaving the Academy, the young Antangilians had not 
i nished their education. They live in common, supervised residences because it 
is thought that otherwise they would become prey to their own wills, and ‘may 
corrupt each other and spoil the good upbringing and discipline they have 
received’ (151). In  Antangil , the entirety of personal life was controlled, and 
appraised or criticized, publicly. Spying and informing were the instruments of 
a regime of suspicion from which none escaped. 
 The modern reader, aware of the rights and inalienable needs of the young, 
may be driven to judge this denial of liberty in general, and of children 
and adolescents in particular, negatively. Another aspect of  Antangil seems, 
nevertheless, to redeem the darkest aspects of its educational imagination. 
Its aim was to make the whole of the existence a continuum of learning, of 
education and personal development. It was the idea of life-long learning, 
already expressed by Plato and Aristotle, and reinforced by More, which gave 
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education a central role, a solid anchorage in the utopian imagination. 11 In this 
utopia, beyond a concern for the equal development of every individual, we may 
i nd the objective of social justice achieved through the offer of opportunities 
to everyone and allowing those capabilities which were not revealed initially 
to blossom. 
 For the poor ... what also helps them greatly is the liberality of their rich colleagues 
and companions who hold nothing as expensive for their friends, since they share 
among themselves almost all possessions. There are no controversies leading to 
duels. On the contrary, there is agreement, benevolence, joy and entertainment … 
when they leave the great schools to listen to rhetoricians, mathematicians, 
philosophers, doctors, lawyers and theologians, whom the king keeps near his 
palace, so that everyone can continuously learn new things, and consolidate what 
has already been learnt. (151–2) 
 Marked by its own blending of old and new,  Antangil remains a moderate, 
bourgeois utopia. It had little of the subversive quality or the corrosive spirit 
which have been generally expressed by the genre since 1516.  Antangil , with 
its sedate tones, still had space for the illusion of a political solution of the 
crises faced by civil society. Its proposed socio-political structure, rather than a 
revolution, offers, with appropriate reforms, to repair a fractured civil society. 
Utopia was therefore nearby and its realization was possible. Thus, as usual, 
the narrative strategies of the literary utopia generate distance: the journey, the 
Antipodes of the southern seas, the favourable natural environment. But there 
is a more profound strategy of distancing. The traveller had never reached 
utopia. He was not a direct witness who knew i rst hand and had experienced 
the otherness of what he reported. What we read is not his story but a story 
told to him by an ambassador. The space represented was in reality a mental 
space. Elsewhere is projected into a nowhere, but it fully retains its capacity 
to construct a socially positive model, here and now. Setting aside the utopian 
stereotypes, the reader’s attention should be captured by the peacemakers’ 
desire to mediate between religions, by the encouragement of participation in 
government, by the protection of the weak, and by public education. Of course, 
this all has a class orientation but it is balanced by equity and solidarity. 
 
CH004.indd   26 17/01/12   9:28 AM
27
 5 
Microcosm, Macrocosm and ‘Practical 
Science’ in Andreae’s  Christianopolis 
 Edward  Thompson  
 The i fth lecture theatre is claimed by Astronomy, which is of no less 
value to the human race than the other arts. For with incredible diligence 
it observes for us the movements and the slow rotations of the heavens, 
the paths followed by the heavenly bodies, and their eclipses and other 
changes, the position of the constellations and their dispositions and 
oppositions, even the number and size of the visible stars and the 
proportion between them. Indeed, astronomy now almost penetrates 
into the heavens themselves and makes them as it were pay tribute to 
this, our own realm … But now let us consider those who look up at 
the skies no more thoughtfully than a beast would. As far as they are 
concerned, the sun might rise in the West, and they would not know 
the proper time to do anything if it was not set down in the calendar. 
If they claim to be above such things, they should be greatly despised 
for being unwilling to know about something which the holy patriarchs 
studied most industriously. Whereas if they claim that astronomy is 
beyond them, we should say of them that though they have been given 
the noble bones of humanity, they are reverting back to earth. Every 
excuse is discreditable which robs man of his humanity, or, if we 
may add this, which robs him of his divinity. 
 Clearly, if God had not lead the way humanity would never have climbed 
up to those superior planes on its own feet, nor would we have perceived 
the order within those most irregular movements. Hence it is that only the 
most noble spirits have an inclination to study astronomy. Ignoble and 
earthborn minds are satisi ed if they have acorns and husks to feed on. 1 
 Johann Valentin Andreae (1586–1654) studied and read widely at the University of Tübingen, and after a hesitant start had a distinguished 
career in the Lutheran Church. He is perhaps best known today as a probable 
joint author of the Rosicrucian  Fama and  Confessio , and for his utopian 
 Christianopolis . His attitude towards many aspects of society anticipated values 
which are current today: he favoured education in bright, warm schoolrooms 
where children would learn by playing games; he preferred reform to revenge 
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and would sooner make fun of human folly than punish it; he was the friend 
of scientists, and a lover of art and music; he took his pastoral role seriously, 
standing up for his parishioners against oppressive ofi cials and using all his 
inl uence to rebuild his beloved town of Calw after its destruction in the Thirty 
Years’ War (1618–1648). 
 At some time towards the end of his period at Tübingen, Andreae joined 
a Christian society whose aim was to reform religion and society. Its name 
varied from time to time – ‘Societas Christiana’, ‘City of the Sun’ and even ‘My 
Christianopolis’ – as did its membership and structure, 2 but out of this came 
a series of short works which he wrote between 1618 and 1628. While they 
varied in style, from the secular to the religious, they shared the utopian hope 
that society might be reformed by the example of a group of people united by 
faith and working together to a common aim. The most important of these for 
present purposes are  Imago and  Christianopolis , both printed in 1619. 
 Reipublicae Christianopolitanae descriptio is an account in 100 short chapters 
of an ideal community of scholar-craftsmen located on an imaginary island in 
a distant sea. It owes something to Campanella’s  The City of the Sun, although 
many other inl uences can also be identii ed.  Christianopolis was published with 
etchings depicting a carefully worked-out plan and sketch of the community, 
with fully detailed measurements. It is square in shape, like the real-life mining 
settlement of Freudenstadt, which was designed by Heinrich Schickhard, uncle of 
Andreae’s friend, the polymath Wilhelm Schickhardt. 3 Inside its defensive walls 
and moat, Christianopolis has three concentric square buildings, nested inside 
one another. These are the workshops of the community (where, for example, 
grain is milled, pottery is i red) and the accommodation of the people. Andreae 
emphasizes again and again that the work carried out here is an examination 
and exploration of the material universe. For example, working with metals 
 is not done by men who are driven to mindless labour like beasts of burden, but 
on the contrary by men who have long been trained in an accurate knowledge 
of natural philosophy … here is practical science … That is, it is their practice 
to look into the operations of chemistry and help to carry out tests by various 
investigations.  (168–9)
 There is a virtuous circularity in this part of the community: the work of 
the people is made lighter and easier for everyone by the application of science, 
and the result is increased leisure time which can be devoted by everyone to 
scientii c study. 
 Inside the area devoted to production and accommodation, which are 
separated by gardens and public spaces, stands a large square building which 
houses the college, the  primum mobile of the community. This has the museum, 
the library and the laboratories of the community on the ground l oor; upstairs 
there is a suite of lecture theatres, where the community educates its young 
men and women; and above that are dormitories for the scholars. The college 
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is taller than the living quarters and workshops of the community, and inside is 
a large quadrangle surrounding the temple, the highest building of all. 
 Clearly the architecture of Christianopolis is intended to symbolize the 
relationships between the various spheres of activity it houses, and their relative 
importance. In this arrangement the college (science and education) is more 
important than the economy, and forms the interface between the material 
economy and religion. Andreae observes that Christianopolis may also be 
understood as a model of the ideal human personality, so its architecture also 
maps his view of the relationships between body, mind and soul. 
 So far as its contact with the outer, material world is concerned, science has 
a relatively modern character. It is experimental, or at least experiential – a 
hands-on activity founded on accurate observation and recording, rather than 
a body of immutable doctrine. So in the college in Christianopolis there is 
a large studio in which the visual arts are studied. In part this is because he 
believed that ideas enter our minds more easily through pictures than through 
words – an idea later taken up by Comenius in  Orbis pictus – and so the 
walls in the college are covered in Campanellan style with instructive pictures 
and diagrams. The studio also functions to ‘bring penetrating eyes to bear on 
everything, and hands that are skilled in copying, and – what is the chief thing – a 
judgement that is already equal to its task and trained’ (214–15). This 
emphasis on observation and experience also explains why the library in this 
part of the community is relatively small. While the scientii c methodology of 
Christianopolis favoured the recovery of lost knowledge, it also deprecated 
and distrusted classical authority and book learning. 
 Science is also a collective enterprise in which all the people of Christianopolis 
are expected to engage. It is not the province of isolated  virtuosi ; it is for 
everyone. Elisabeth Hansot and others have argued that science is not a 
collaborative activity in Andreae (as in, say, Bacon). 4 They are of course correct 
in the sense that for Andreae one may come to God’s design as easily from a 
single leaf as from a forest of trees. This is perhaps implicit in the doctrine of 
the correspondence of microcosm and macrocosm, which suggests that there 
is a common pattern to all objects of study. But this view also requires us to 
ignore Andreae’s other writing in which cooperative work is explicit. In  Imago 
each researcher ‘has such associates as can advance his discipline, and they 
can discuss their common business all the more certainly and more faithfully 
because they have agreed wholeheartedly in Christ to help each other’. 5 
 There are, however, some limitations to science. Science was not a wonder-
working activity for Andreae. Medicines, for example, may be discovered or 
improved, but they do not prolong life beyond its usual limits. Technical progress 
does not extend much beyond improved machinery and decent housing. 
 We may explore further the boundary between science and religion, or 
between the experimental and non-experimental forms of knowledge, by 
considering in more detail his view of astronomy and its related subjects. 
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 Andreae was thoroughly familiar with the astronomy of his day: a friend 
and correspondent of Kepler, he had studied under Maestlin at Tübingen. 
Discussing sunspots in  Mythologiae he refers to such authorities as Johann 
Fabricius, Christoph Scheiner, Adriaan Anthoniszoon, Simon Stevin and David 
Origanus, along with Galileo and Kepler; 6 in 1642 in  Subsidia he listed the 
most eminent modern people in various i elds, and chose the astronomers 
Copernicus, Tycho Brahe and Johann Kepler to represent mathematics, along 
with the Jesuit Christoph Clavius. 7 In his  Mathematical Collection Andreae takes 
an even-handed view of the competing astronomical systems of Copernicus, 
Tycho Brahe, Nicolaus Reimers (Bär) and Helisaeus Röslin; but the outdated 
Ptolemaic system, which he illustrates, was merely of historical interest. 8 
 Astronomy, for Andreae, is essentially a description of celestial bodies – sun, 
moon, planets, comets, stars – and their movements. It rests, like the other 
sciences, on accurate observation, measurement and recording; and of 
course on mathematical analysis. Next door to the studio for visual arts is 
the observatory of Christianopolis, which Andreae describes as ‘an excavated 
place for astronomical instruments’. 9 This is presumably like the Stjerneborg 
annexe to Brahe’s Uraniborg observatory – which Andreae illustrated in his 
 Mathematical Collection (Plate 76) – in being dug into the ground to reduce 
wind-shake. Here 
 we observe the courses of the stars with various instruments, and set them down 
in writing; and it is a marvel that men can have both so much patience and so 
much perseverance as to arrive at various kinds of hypothesis. I shall not set out 
a list of the instruments at this point, since they are almost all to be found in the 
description of the most admirable Tycho Brahe. [In Christianopolis] They have 
added a few others, among which the most wonderful is the recently invented 
telescope.  (215)
 Andreae here shows that in his utopia astronomy is on the cutting edge of the 
new technology, and he separates himself from those who would drag their feet. 
 But why do I describe these things? As if I did not know how ingenious devices 
are despised by the masses, who affect to have no ability to use mathematical 
instruments … throwing away half of science and making themselves useless 
as contributors to human knowledge … When they shall have recognised the 
instruments of science as the embodiment of human thought, and shall have 
used them skilfully for some purpose, then they must be honoured. But if, like 
strangers in a strange land, they contribute to mortal man no assistance, no 
advice, no judgement or explanation, they are contemptible and we shall come to 
the conclusion that they should be handed over to the herdsmen who look after 
sheep, oxen and swine.  (215–16)
 In the adjacent Astronomical Museum, which is designed as an educational 
resource, the heavens are represented, with their primary and secondary 
movements. 
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 Here were displayed a map of the star-strewn sky, and a model of the whole 
heavenly host shining very brightly. Whether you wish to see the two celestial 
hemispheres in their convex form, or concave, or as a plane projection, nothing 
at all is left to be desired. The same is true if you wish to see very accurate 
drawings of individual constellations, or the harmony of the heavens and the 
wonderful proportions between them, or geographical charts of the earth. You 
were allowed to see accurate observations of celestial phenomena, and, what 
is more up to date, observations of spots on the planets, all displayed with 
incredible industry.  (216–17)
 Where the boundary between astronomy and astrology is concerned, 
Andreae held the standard view of educated people in his day that astronomy 
is a descriptive account of the movements of celestial bodies, whereas astrology 
studies relationships between earth and sky, the interdependence of macrocosm 
and microcosm: astrology is applied astronomy. As to astrology, he says, the 
effects on earth of ‘the sun and moon are quite clearly evident’ (237) but those 
of the stars are less certain. Weather forecasting is an instance of astrology, 
and it is in this context that he observes that ‘anyone who does not know the 
use of astrology in human affairs, or who has the nerve to deny its usefulness 
is condemned to the opposite element – I hope he may have to dig and till the 
earth in unfavourable weather, and work for a very long time’ (239). 
 Andreae’s disapproval of those who are ‘unwilling to know about something 
which the holy patriarchs studied most industriously’ (237) was echoed – or 
perhaps quoted – a generation later when Beale wrote to Hartlib: ‘I am of 
this heresy, that astrology is a most serious affaire, if it were handled with 
ancient sanctity, as I conceive, and i nding [ sic ] anciently recorded that the holy 
patriarchs doe’ (Sept., 1657). 
 Andreae’s treatment of astrology does not completely dismiss the possibility 
of celestial events having a bearing on human life. His illustration of his own 
horoscope, and of charts showing the purported relationship between, for 
example, the features of one’s face and various planetary inl uences, comes 
with the advice that ‘the reader must make up his own mind’. 10 
 In  Turris Babel , also published in 1619, where he was trying to draw a line 
under the recent Rosicrucian furore, Andreae couples the Astrologer with the 
Naometrian as both deluded self-deceivers. 11 In the section on ‘Sunspots’ in 
 Mythologiae , however, he comes down on the side of hypothesis testing. A 
dispute is described concerning the effect on earth of these blemishes on the 
purity of the sun. Since the disputants were not able to place enough faith 
in the telescope, ‘various religious, political, scientii c and cultural blemishes 
were observed on earth and compared with those in the heavens’. The outcome 
of this was that no ‘analogous correspondence appeared, and no regularities 
could be identii ed’, leading to the conclusion that faults in human affairs are 
not the product of celestial imperfections. 12 The fault, as Shakespeare’s Cassius 
remarked, is not in our stars, but in ourselves. 
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 In Christianopolis the lecture theatres are arranged in groups of three, 
and it appears that while everyone goes through the two lower classes, the 
third is perhaps restricted to those able to benei t from the most advanced 
teaching. Thus arithmetic and geometry are followed by ‘Mystic Numbers’, 
natural history and civil history are followed by ‘Church History’, and study of 
astronomy and astrology leads up to ‘The Christians’ Heavens’. 
 This leads to the less progressive side of the regime in Christianopolis. 
Knowledge obtained by observation and experience from the Book of Nature 
is superior to that which comes from the written textbook, but it is inferior to 
the knowledge which comes from the Bible or which is obtained by revelation. 
The temple at the centre of the community rises above the college. The real 
reason why Christianopolitans do not fear astrological portents is not the 
l awed methodology of the science, which may be improved by further study, 
but their coni dence that there is a Christian Heaven above, which overrides 
the merely astronomical or astrological plane. 
 In their view it is doubtful that everything depends on the i rst moment of 
existence or birth, and very doubtful that one should accept a judgement of life 
and death based on that. Therefore they are the more strongly inclined to study 
how the stars are ruled, and how they may through faith shake off the yoke of 
the stars, if such there be.  (238)
 Similarly, the reason why science is pursued as a collective activity is not 
so much because of synergy or the economy of massed resources, important 
though these may be, but because in the end ‘Unity is divine, division is born 
of the demon; for there is one God, and countless demons’. 13 And in the last 
analysis the reason for studying the world and adding to scientii c knowledge is 
to arrive at a deeper knowledge of the heavens – and so to come to despise the 
world. Those to take this to the highest level may end by rejecting all human 
knowledge in favour of a sacred simplicity, which he calls ‘Christian Poverty’ 
or ‘Sacred Poverty’. 
 This is for those who ‘unlearn everything, abandon everything and suffer 
everything’ – but they turn away from conventional knowledge only after 
mastering it. ‘No one is safer knowing nothing, than one who has penetrated 
the labyrinths of the sciences’ (247–8). 
 Curiosity about the natural world is proper, then, and leads to an appreciation 
of its creator. Applied to the revealed truths of religion, however, it may become 
‘ curiositas’ and thoroughly improper. Things known by the Light of Grace 
are not to be subjected to scientii c inquiry. So in Christianopolis ‘they do not 
subject everything to logic, least of all God’ (225). 
 If knowledge from revelation is superior to knowledge inferred from 
observation of the world, why do we not rely entirely on revealed knowledge? 
Part of the answer is that Andreae would have his people exercise and make use 
of every talent that they have. Nothing is wasted or unused in Christianopolis. 
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For example, the defensive moat around the walls ‘is full of i sh so that it does 
not lie idle even in times of peace’ and beside the outer walls of the community 
there are open spaces (to deny an attacker cover) which are ‘stocked with wild 
animals, not for pleasure but to be made use of’ (162). 
 A second part of Andreae’s answer is that if someone is given a prophetic 
insight, ‘the Christianopolitans do not reject it lightly. On the contrary, they 
test the revelation. So they have a School of Prophecy … a place where they 
can study the consistency and truth of prophetic inspiration’ (251). The 
methodology may suggest the investigation of sunspots, but Prophecy is one of 
the third-level subjects, following on from Theology and its practice, so testing 
of revealed knowledge seems likely to be only for the most advanced students 
of theology. 
 There are then two sides to Andreae’s utopia. If science lies between society 
and religion, it not only mediates between one and the other, it is also itself 
subject to the tensions that arise from being linked in two disparate directions. 
There are thus elements in Andreae’s approach to science which are non-
scientii c or even anti-scientii c. ‘We really can not turn our backs on human 
knowledge,’ he says, then adds the qualii cation ‘provided that it is kept 
within the bounds of Christian simplicity, and it does not limit the freedom 
of our minds. In fact we should embrace it, if it reveals this universe to us and 
persuades us of the emptiness and imperfection of all things, and sends us away 
reinforced in our desire for heaven’. 14 
 If Andreae’s Christian utopia helped to create a climate of opinion in which 
bodies like the Royal Society could be established and were seen to be operating 
within stable Christian communities, it was perhaps also necessary for some 
aspects of his work to be rejected. Some of the achievement of Hartlib and his 
circle was perhaps that they seem to have succeeded in separating the more 
progressive elements of Andreae’s work from those that would ultimately have 
hindered development. 
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Tommaso Campanella,  The City of the Sun 
and the Protective Celestial Bodies 1 
 Maurizio  Cambi  
 They [the inhabitants of the City of the Sun]  believe that i rst the whole 
of life should be examined and then its respective parts. Therefore, when 
they founded their city, they set the i xed signs at the four corners of the 
world – the sun in the ascendant in Leo; Jupiter in Leo oriental to the sun; 
Mercury and Venus in Cancer, but so close as to produce satellite inl uence; 
Mars in the ninth house in Aries looking out with benei c aspect upon the 
ascendant and the apheta; the moon in Taurus looking upon Mercury 
and Venus with benei c aspect, but not at right angles to the sun; Saturn 
entering the fourth house without casting a malei c aspect upon Mars 
and the sun; Fortune with the Head of Medusa almost in the tenth house – 
from which circumstances they augur dominion, stability, and greatness 
for themselves. Being in a benei c aspect of Virgo, in the triplicity of its 
apsis and illuminated by the moon, Mercury could not be harmful; 
but since their science is jovial and not beggarly, they were not 
concerned about Mercury’s entering Virgo and the conjuction. 2 
 In the sixth of the  Astrologicorum libri , Tommaso Campanella recommended the founders of new cities to consult the stars in order to ascertain with 
precision the most propitious moment to begin their construction, when the 
heavens reveal the most benevolent astral conjunction which would thereafter 
exert its positive inl uence over the cities (and over the life of their inhabitants). 
This process is similar to the one applied by astrologers to determine a human 
being’s astral horoscope (singling out the celestial bodies’ positions in conjunction 
with the zodiacal houses at the moment of conception or birth) in order to 
foretell the subject’s temperament, talents, natural inclinations and destiny. Yet 
individuals cannot choose at which moment (and under which stars) they are 
to be born, whereas the founders of a city can decide to build it, for instance, 
under  Leo in Medium coeli (with the coincidence of the Sun and the Moon in a 
favourable aspect), so as to favourably determine its future. 
 In addition to setting the propitious point in time, the city builder or 
 Aedii cator can also plan the urban map of the city in such a way so that, like 
a talisman in its shape, it would be capable of attracting the benei cial inl uence 
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exerted by Jupiter and so neutralize the nefarious inl uence brought on by the 
‘cold’ Saturn. With this as its celestial map, the city would enjoy long life, wealth, 
honours and whatever might be needed for the well-being of its inhabitants. 3 
 In 1602, a few years after the failure of the anti-Spanish plot he had inspired 
(encouraged by the extraordinary omens he had seen in the heavens announcing 
the world’s renewal, as he would later confess), Campanella found himself in 
the role of the  Aedii cator – albeit only in literary i ction – entirely absorbed 
in the drafting of an ideal city’s outline in the Naples prison cell where he was 
held. In those circumstances, Campanella created the most perfect city possible 
under the most favourable celestial conjunction and fully in keeping with his 
astrological beliefs. 
 A Genoese character – Columbus’s helmsman and for us the narrator of a 
journey in which he happened to come across the community of the Solari – 
described the principles followed by the inhabitants of the City of the Sun when 
they began to build that city ‘divided into seven large circuits, named after the 
seven planets’. In its urban plan, the city was laid out with the cardinal points 
clearly in mind – exactly as prescribed by the Philosopher in the  Astrologicorum 
libri . As a result, entry into the city was gained through ‘four gates facing the 
four points of the compass’ (27). The text thoroughly analyses such details and 
reveals the reasons of why and when the solar city’s inhabitants decided to 
build the city. It is, however, difi cult to understand by anyone not well versed 
in the science of astrology. 
 Thanks to their discerning choice when founding the solar city, the community 
would be looked after by the protective care provided by the celestial bodies in 
every single aspect of its life. It would, however, be naïve to believe that the 
horoscope on its own could completely determine ‘the basic traits’ (of a human 
being as well as of a city) or direct good or bad luck or that it could be fully relied 
upon ‘to foretell coming events’. 4 This position had already been made clear 
in the  Tetrabiblos by Claudio Tolomeo – the main authority in this supposed 
science, without whom, as Girolamo Cardano wrote, astrology would not have 
existed. 
 Campanella often disagrees with Tolomeo, but nonetheless agrees with 
him that the horoscope cast at birth does not determine anyone’s destiny. The 
moment of birth is no more than an indicator of an individual’s natural bent. 
Understanding the position of the stars and the i gures drawn by the constellations 
at the moment of birth represents an invaluable resource by means of which the 
course of imminent events can be advantageously modii ed. 
 It therefore seems that the Calabrian friar behaves with regard to his 
imaginary city in exactly the same way as he would have done when drawing 
up one of the many horoscopes he had been required to make for over a decade 
by the most famous and powerful people of his time, ranging from Pope Urban 
VIII to Anne of Austria for her son (who would later become the Sun King, 
Louis XIV), along with Francesco Caracciolo and Tobia Adami. 
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 The City of the Sun , written in 1602 and published in 1623, is generously 
endowed with astrological references and recalls the close relationship between 
the microcosm and the macrocosm. By observing the city’s layout, one can 
readly see how the predominant role played by astrology lies behind the sites 
where its symbols are placed. 
 Carefully following the city’s description, one notes that in the very centre of 
the city (thus within the smallest of the seven rings) there rises a temple which 
is ‘perfectly circular … [an] astonishing design’. Inside this temple, which is 
also the highest building (in other words, the closest to heaven), there are no 
sacred statues or paintings of traditional images, but only symbols of a higher 
natural religion. Within the place of worship 
 nothing rests on the altar but a huge celestial globe, upon which all the heavens are 
described, with a terrestrial globe besides it. On the vault of the dome overhead 
appear all the larger stars with their names and the inl uences they each have 
upon earthly things set down in three verses … Seven lamps, each named for one 
of the seven planets, are always kept burning. (31)
 One detail of the temple’s structure is highly signii cant: ‘The large dome 
has a cupola at its center with an aperture directly above the single altar in the 
middle of the temple.’ 5 Through this opening, the Solari can gaze at the starry 
sky from the inside. In symbolic terms, it maintains open ‘contact’ between the 
stars and the community of men. Deciphering the signs of the heavens is the 
task of ‘the clergy, who are forty in number’, and who live in the cells located 
‘around the cupola at the top of the temple … and above the cloister’ (31). 
Another twenty-four priests stand quietly above the temple’s dome. Their duty 
is ‘to gaze at the stars and, using astrolabes, note all their movements and the 
effects these produce. In this manner, they learn what changes haven taken or 
are to take place in every country’ (103). 
 The Sun – the city’s main political and religious authority – discusses all the 
information received from the heavens with the priests. Through such news, he 
obtains a universal overview, allowing him to take the most effective decisions 
for the community over which he rules. 
 He has been appointed as the Prince-Priest because he is acknowledged to 
possess superior competence. Well read in metaphysics, an acute theologian, 
well-versed in ‘the theory and practice of every art and every science’, the 
Sun – like Campanella – ‘must study astrology and the prophets carefully’ and 
therefore will be in a position to differentiate ‘the degrees of being and their 
correspondence to celestial, terrestrial, and marine things’ (45). 
 However, not only the most diligent visitors to the temple (the Sun, the 
religious authorities and the priests) have knowledge of the celestial language, 
but all the City’s inhabitants know this very useful ancient science whose 
main principles are available to everybody – as for any other discipline – by 
means of an extraordinary illustrated encyclopaedia entirely written in images 
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drawn on the inner walls of the seven circles which defend the city, making it 
impregnable. Unlike the religious men, the population learn about these occult 
sciences derived from the heavens, but not its predictive aspects (for which 
calculation and advanced technical skills would be required). They learn, 
however, the means to take practical advantage of the correlation between the 
 res naturales and the bodies which animate the celestial spheres in accordance 
with the fascinating procedures of astral medicine set out by Marsilio Fucino 
in the third volume of  De vita . 
 ‘On the inner wall of the third circuit every kind of herb and tree to be found 
in the world is represented ... with explanations as to where they were i rst 
discovered, what their specii c powers are, what their relation is to the stars, 
to metals, to parts of the body, and how they are used in medicine’ – uses also 
authorized for all Roman Catholics by the Council of Trent (35).  
 The Solari read the stars even when they have to make relatively 
unimportant decisions. Before any agricultural task, ‘the winds and propitious 
stars are consulted’, 6 and before providing any kind of medical treatment, they 
previously ‘observe the stars, inspect herbs’ (83, 93). 
 All of them have chosen their occupation ‘because the particular inclination 
of each person is seen in his birth, and in the division of labor no one is assigned 
to things that are destructive to his individuality but rather to things that 
preserve it’ (81). They would thus form an entire people who are laborious, 
kind and inclined to virtue; in a word, a population of well-tempered human 
beings. The reason for their attitude, very different from the real world’s 
inhabitants, can once more be found in the heavenly bodies. 
 As with the city in the act of its foundation, arrangements are made so 
that everyone is born under a favourable star. According to the criteria of a 
‘rudimentary’ eugenics, an experiment is conducted in Campanella’s city to 
enhance the race over the generations. The Solari ask ‘the Astrologist and the 
Physician’ to set the right time to have sex. Together they choose favourable 
alignments and above all avoid adverse ones: 
 ‘Most frequently they seek a time when Virgo is in the ascendant, but they 
take great care to see that Saturn and Mars are not in the angles, because all 
four angles, with oppositions and quadratures, are harmful; and from these 
springs the root of vital power and of fate, which are dependent upon the 
harmony of the whole in relation to its parts’ (55–6). 
 Thus protected by the stars, children will be born i t in body and strong 
in spirit. The aim of choosing with whom (and when) to copulate is intended 
to produce the most robust physical constitution in coming generations. This 
is the main reason why only a harmonious body can generate virtues. ‘The 
Solarians say that a pure nature wherein virtues thrive cannot be acquired 
through study and application, that moral virtue is fostered only with difi culty 
where there is no natural disposition to favor it … Care in mating, is a matter 
of major concern’ (57). 
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 The application of these measures will lead to compatibility of character, by 
engendering a generation of newly born without any great differences and with 
a similar bent for the good (‘since those of the same age are all born under the 
same constellation, they tend to be alike in ability, habits, and appearance. This 
accounts for the concord and stability in the state and encourages the citizens 
to love and help each other’ (59)). 
 To sum up, the people of the City of the Sun are inclined to obedience, solidarity 
and cohesion. They are a population that is easy to rule. Insubordination and 
rebelliousness, due to an excess of passion, are unlikely to manifest themselves 
among these people. They are built similar to one another, sound in mind and 
body, because they were born under the same stars. 
 Having placed their trust in the stars’ protection and the messages from the 
planets, which are ‘translated’ into political choices, the Solari are very different 
from the inhabitants of Thomas More’s  Utopia . Although the Utopians have 
‘learned to plot expertly the courses of the stars and the movement of heavenly 
bodies’ and have even ‘devised a number of different instruments by which 
they compute with the greatest exactness the course of the sun, the moon and 
the other stars that are visible in their area of the sky’, ‘as for the friendly and 
hostile inl uence of the planets and that whole deceitful business of divination 
of starts, they have never so much as dreamed of it’. 7 
 It should be emphasized that Campanella’s thinking did not tend towards 
a strict astral determinism (as asserted by Arabian astrologers), which would 
have denied the free will of man and entered into a direct conl ict with the 
Christian religion. If Campanella had supported the theory of the planets’ 
tyranny, he would have undermined the meaning set out in the descriptive 
relevance of his utopia, leaving the quality of life of the entire community in 
the hands of the stars rather than in the hands of a human political project. 
 In  The City of the Sun , the Italian philosopher also coherently coni rms 
his belief, previously expressed elsewhere in his work, that heavenly bodies 
can only produce tendencies in individuals, who are by no means bound by 
them and can, on the contrary, always correct the course of events by means 
of the arts and science, or by praying to God, who is above all things (fate 
included). Knowing how to read the language of the heavens thus becomes a 
skill which cannot be renounced in order to remedy the misfortunes which the 
stars foretell. 
 Summoned by an anxious Urban VIII, Campanella reassured the worried 
Pope, whose death had been foretold as imminent in various predictions made 
from 1628 to 1630, that even the most fatal of predictions could be avoided as 
‘God allows no evil to mankind without proper remedy’. 8 
 The repeated astral consultations conducted by the solar city’s inhabitants 
to foretell the future, however, were legitimate and in line with Christian 
orthodoxy and even within the limits set by Sixtus V in his Papal Bull  Consitutio 
coeli et terrae (1586). 
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 No trace of superstition can be found in the Solari’s attitude. On the contrary, 
God is the one and only supreme ruler and mankind has but to read the signs 
that can be found in Nature, which reveal God’s plan (as he states in  Senso 
delle cose e la magia, ‘onto the stars God wrote the laws and orders ruling over 
corporeal creatures’ 9 ). The optimum regimen for the people governed by the 
Sun arises from the continuing effort to make human prospects conform to the 
divine plan. 
 Looking at the living universe, in which every single being bears messages 
from God, the inhabitants of the ideal city search for signs and symbols to guide 
their choices and to prepare them for imminent events (‘after the appearance 
of the new star in Cassiopeia, there will be a great new monarchy, reformation 
of laws and of arts, new prophets, and a general renewal’ (123)). From this 
perspective, the stars only constitute privileged signs foretelling what is likely 
to happen ( probabiliter ). In this regard, Campanella writes 
 the earth is a great beast and we live within it as worms live within us. As a 
consequence we stand under the providence of God and not that of the world and 
of the stars because, with respect to these, we exist by chance; but with respect to 
God, Whose instruments they are, we are foreknown and foreordained. Hence we 
are under obligation to Him alone as Lord, Father, and all.  (113)
 This interpretation of the natural universe allows us to purge astrological 
beliefs from any heretical connotations. As a matter of fact, celestial bodies 
do not have within themselves any independent powers. They are merely 
instruments used by God to manifest his might in connection with humankind. 
Is it not written in the Holy Scriptures (Gen. I, 14) that God ‘made celestial 
bodies and stars to be signs over the seasons, the days and the years’? Moreover, 
did not Luke (21, 25) state that there would be ‘signs in the sun, in the moon 
and in the stars’ to foretell the coming of the ‘Son of man’? 
 Those priests who constantly scrutinize the skies on top of the dome actually 
‘serve as mediators between God and humanity’. God’s message reveals itself 
through the stars; the solar priests interpret it and pass it on to the Sun who can 
then decide whether and how to use it for political purposes. In an explanatory 
passage (containing Thomistic hints) the philosopher does away with any 
doubts and makes clear the appropriate correspondence between the cause 
(God), the instruments (celestial bodies) and the inhabitants of the ideal city. 
He states how the latter had understood better than anyone else the role played 
by the celestial bodies in the grand scheme of things. 
 They honor the sun and the stars as living things, as images of God, and as 
celestial temples; but they do not worship them, though they honor the sun above 
the rest. No creature but God do they deem worthy of  latria , and Him they 
serve under the sign of the sum which is the symbol and visage of God from 
Whom comes light and warmth and every other thing. For this reason their altar 
is shaped like a sun, and their priests pray to God in the sun and in the starts as 
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though these were His altars, and they pray to Him in the sky as though that were 
His temple. They say that angels, who dwell in the stars which are their living 
abodes, are reliable intercessors, and they declare that God most clearly revealed 
His beauty in the sky and in the sun, His trophy and His image.  (109)
 What in some passages could have seemed to portray the excessive power 
of the celestial bodies reveals itself, upon a deeper analysis, to be a mild 
and indirect inl uence of distant bodies made powerful only by the use God 
makes of them. They do nothing to diminish the i nal responsibility of man. 10 
The stars, as Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas stated, can exercise an 
inl uence over the body, the animal spirit and its moods, and only incidentally 
on an individual’s free will. 
 Campanella underlines this point further in the last part of his work, 
recalling the dramatic personal experience he suffered when, under torture, he 
pretended to be mad in order to escape the stake. ‘Know this: that these people 
believe in the freedom of the will; and they say that if a man, after forty hours 
of torture, will not reveal what he has resolved to keep secret, them not even 
the stars working so far off can force him to do so’ (127). 
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‘A Dark Light’: Spectacle and Secrecy 
in Francis Bacon’s  New Atlantis 
 Bronwen  Price  
 God bless thee, my son; I will give thee the greatest jewel 
I have. For I will impart unto thee, for the love of God and men, 
a relation of the true state of Salomon’s House. Son, to make you 
know the true state of Salomon’s House, I will keep this order. First, 
I will set forth unto you the end of our foundation. Secondly, the 
preparations and instruments we have for our works. Thirdly, the 
several employments and functions whereto our fellows are assigned. 
And fourthly, the ordinances and rites which we observe. 
 The End of our Foundation is the knowledge of Causes, and 
secret motions of things; and the enlarging of the bounds of 
Human Empire, to the effecting of all things possible. 1 
 The utopia offered in Francis Bacon’s  New Atlantis (1627) alludes to and departs from the earlier models of Plato and More. It signals generic 
hybridity, drawing on the travel narrative genre by beginning with the arrival 
of a crew lost at sea at the remote island of New Atlantis or Bensalem, and 
relating the workings of this unknown society through the unfamiliar eyes of 
its European narrator. 2 Presented as a ‘fable’ in William Rawley’s preface to 
the work (151),  New Atlantis also intersects with the practical concerns of 
 Sylva Sylvarum , Bacon’s collection of scientii c experiments, to which it was 
appended; it evokes Old Testament wisdom, yet its depiction of’ Salomon’s 
House, Bensalem’s ancient institution ‘dedicated to the study of the Works 
and Creatures of God’ (167), is often viewed as offering the projection of an 
advanced scientii c research institute. 3 It is indeed this moment, the ‘relation of 
the true state of Salomon’s House’ (177), anticipated in the preface, referred to 
from early in the narrative and comprising the last and longest part of the text, 
that appears to represent the core of its utopian vision and marks its difference 
from any previous ‘Feigned Commonwealth’ (174). 
 This essay will argue that  New Atlantis pulls the concept of utopia in 
opposite directions, particularly through its representation of Salomon’s 
House, and that this is highlighted through the apparently conl icting modes 
of spectacle and secrecy. 
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 Numerous commentators have noted that while its concealed elements 
contribute to Bensalem’s quasi-religious resonance, they also produce a sense of 
disquiet about its utopian features. 4  However, while this is true, little reference 
has been made to  New Atlantis ’s theatrical attributes and how these underscore 
its areas of secrecy. Although, as Brian Vickers demonstrates, theatrical imagery 
pervades Bacon’s writing, 5 this aspect of  New Atlantis has not been explored 
in depth. 
 Each central episode of the text is indeed punctuated by a sense of the 
performative: from the ‘thick clouds’ that lift like a curtain to reveal the 
unknown island (152), to the detailed accounts of the inhabitants’ clothing and 
gestures; from the description of the ‘spectacle’ of the ‘pillar of light’ viewed by 
Bensalem’s citizens from boats that ‘stood all as in a theatre’ (159), signalling 
New Atlantis’s conversion to Christianity, to the elaborate social rituals and 
ceremonies that underpin Bensalem’s society more generally and its artii cial 
manifestations of all things natural. These features are, moreover, delivered 
to a captive audience, the European crew, which is, in turn, subdivided into 
further sets of selected spectators in a way not unlike the internal audience 
of’ Prospero’s manipulative ‘magic’ in’ Shakespeare’s  The Tempest (c. 1611). 
And, as in  The Tempest , such theatrics, which are given a similarly semi-divine 
air on an island thought by the crew members to be ‘somewhat supernatural’ 
(162), unsettle the efi cacy of what is presented and how it is interpreted by 
the narrator. 
 These theatrical layers of Bensalem’s society prepare for what appears to be 
the text’s central utopian moment when Salomon’s House, introduced as being 
‘the very eye of this kingdom’ (159), at last takes centre stage. Signii cantly, this 
event is heralded by the rare, spectacular visit ‘in state’ by one of its Fathers, ‘the 
cause’ of whose ‘coming’ remains ‘secret’ (175). Only after a fulsome description 
of this public ceremony are the activities performed in Salomon’s House 
revealed in ‘private conference’ to the narrator (176). The inner workings of 
Salomon’s House are indeed only gradually and partially disclosed: it sees, but 
remains largely unseen; it surveys, but its operations are shrouded in secrecy. 
 The Society’s name itself indicates ambivalence. We learn from the governor 
of the Strangers’ House, where the crew members are initially lodged, that its 
founder was the kingdom’s ancient law-giver, King Solamona, whose name 
obviously bears a close resemblance to the Biblical law-giver King Solomon, 
renowned for his wisdom and set up as an example throughout Bacon’s work. 
However, as Susan Bruce indicates: ‘[T]he precise relation between the biblical 
Solomon and King Solamona is left opaque ... as is the relation of the name of 
Salomon’s House to both Solamona and Solomon.’ 6  The governor explains that 
‘Some think’ the Society ‘beareth the founder’s name a little corrupted’ (167), 
but this is never established, thus signalling the uncertain relationship between 
signs and meanings that Bacon himself notes in  The Great Instauration , for 
‘words are the tokens and signs of notions’. 7 
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 Salomon’s House is i rst mentioned during the description of Bensalem’s 
conversion to Christianity when one of the society’s ‘wise men’ interprets 
the pillar of light’s arrival as ‘a true Miracle’ and a sign of God’s sanction to 
allow its members ‘to know thy works of creation, and the secrets of them; 
and to discern ... between divine miracles, works of nature, works of art, 
and impostures and illusions’ (160). They are thus required to distinguish 
between immanent signs of God, which is how the crew members continually 
interpret New Atlantis’s manifestations, and empty or false signs. But the text 
also provokes the reader to ponder over this process of discrimination when 
presented with Bensalem’s workings, particularly those of Salomon’s House. 
While Bensalem is described as ‘the virgin of the world’ (173), being unknown 
to the rest of humanity and untainted by ‘received systems’ of knowledge, 
which for Bacon ‘are but so many stage plays, representing worlds of their 
own creation’, 8 its own operations, as we’ve seen, are repeatedly described in 
theatrical terms. Perhaps this is partly a self-referential strategy, reminding us 
that  New Atlantis is a fable rather than a straightforward scientii c exposition. 
But it also has the effect of inciting the reader to explore the substance of signs. 
 In this regard the spectacle marking the Father of Salomon’s House’s arrival, 
which follows one of the text’s many unexplained interruptions, is especially 
striking. Initially it appears as a solemn, quasi-religious ceremony. Preceded 
by what seem to be two ecclesiastical i gures, one holding a crosier and the 
other ‘a pastoral staff’, the Father himself adopts a priest-like bearing or role 
of divine mediator: he ‘had an aspect as if he pitied men’, holding up his hand 
‘as blessing the people’ (175–6). But the procession also seems to incorporate 
civic hierarchy as ‘Behind his chariot went all the ofi cers and principals of 
the Companies of the City’ (176). In these and other respects, the spectacle 
resembles the lavish state pageants orchestrated by James I, which demanded 
its spectators behold, marvel at and succumb to the patriarchal authority they 
witnessed. Bacon himself connects James I directly with Solomon’s monarchic 
wisdom in, for example, ‘The Epistle Dedicatory’ to  The Great Instauration , 
and draws on this link in seeking James’s support for his scientii c programme. 9 
 But the Father, if a patriarchal i gure, is not of course a monarch and, as 
David Colclough notes, the Fathers’ ‘specii c place in the social hierarchy 
and the precise extent of their authority remains unclear’. 10 Indeed, while the 
precision with which the narrator documents the event both produces the effect 
of verisimilitude and suggests emblematic import, like many of the island’s 
rituals, the reader is left asking exactly what it connotes. Such details seem to 
demand interpretation, but remain enigmatic; connections are signalled but 
left unexplained. 11 The reader is left in the position of continually looking 
beneath the text’s surface in order to gain illumination, but frequently remains 
in the dark. 
 Yet what is perhaps most notable when examining the spectacle is the 
scrupulous attention given to surface detail – the sumptuous clothing and rich 
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materials through which its effects are primarily produced: from the Father’s 
‘shoes of peach-coloured velvet’ to the ‘hats of blue velvet; with i ne plumes 
of divers colours’ worn by his i fty male attendants (175) – all are recorded 
with sensuous precision so that superi cial adornment seems to empty out 
substance. Indeed, when explored in depth, the whole event seems stagey and 
is even described as ‘the show’ (176). 
 It is this show, which seems both to signify and be vacuous, to be sacred 
and glossy, that acts as a prologue to the disclosure of the secrets of Salomon’s 
House and the perspective placed upon them. At this point the performance 
shifts in scene and tone when the Father invites the European crew ‘to his 
presence’ ‘in a fair chamber’. Once again, clothing, furnishing and gesture 
are emphasized: the Father is ‘set upon a low throne richly adorned’ (176). 
He resembles a king without actually being one, while his apparently divine 
role is described in performative terms when he offers the ‘posture of blessing’ 
to the crew (176). All but the narrator then depart and it is within this private, 
but no less theatrical setting, that the reader seems at last to view the ‘Light’ 
represented by Salomon’s House, being privy to the Father’s revelations to this 
exclusive audience of one. 
 It is also within this cloistered context of display that features explicitly 
resonating with the scientii c programme Bacon elsewhere advocates i nd 
fullest expression.  The Great Instauration ’s assertion that ‘human knowledge 
and human power, do really meet in one’ 12 is echoed in the Father’s twinning 
of knowledge and power when he dei nes ‘The End of our Foundation’ as 
being ‘the knowledge of Causes, and secret motions of things; and the 
enlarging of the bounds of Human Empire, to the effecting of all things 
possible’ (177). In identifying each specialist research area within Salomon’s 
House, the Father highlights its overall empirical, inductive approach, in which 
artii cial aids and experiments are constructed to improve sense perception 
and whose underlying purpose is to promote ‘the relief of man’s estate’, 13 
providing the means to enhance nutrition, health, medicine and longevity, as 
well as generating Christian virtue and civic order. Moreover, the activities of 
Salomon’s House appear to follow Bacon’s model ‘of scientii c inquiry as a 
collective, collaborative, and social enterprise’, 14 supported by the State and 
granted divine sanction recommended in  The Advancement . In all of these 
respects, Salomon’s House certainly resembles Bacon’s conception of an ideal 
scientii c community presented in his other writings. 
 However, some details remain ambivalent, especially when viewed from the 
perspective of the theatrical preliminaries. The Father’s disclosures are indeed 
encased within yet another performative process, being initiated by a ritualized 
act of gift-giving. He introduces them by declaring that ‘I will give thee the 
greatest jewel I have’ (177) and, having bestowed this treasure, grants the 
narrator the reward of disseminating his i ndings: ‘I give thee leave to publish 
it for the good of other nations’ (185). Having cloaked Salomon’s House’s 
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operations in secrecy throughout, the fable’s i nal lines entrust the narrator 
with making them public. Furthermore, as if both to symbolize and seal this 
gift, the narrative concludes with the Father assigning ‘a value of about two 
thousand ducats, for a bounty to me and my fellows’ (185). But what exactly 
is being given and in what ways does it illuminate Salomon’s House’s ‘Light’? 
Certainly, the Father’s inventory of its advanced instruments and investigations, 
together with his explanations of their benei cial uses, give the impression of 
both enlightenment and utopian vision. 
 When examining the Father’s disclosures further, however, what is withheld 
is as striking as what is revealed. The materials used in each research area 
are often too vaguely identii ed to be of use to the audience to whom this 
information is imparted. For example, when the Father states, ‘We have also 
great variety of composts, and soils, for the making of the earth fruitful’ (177), 
he gives no indication of the particular types of material employed or how they 
are produced. The effects are highlighted, but the specii c methods of achieving 
them remain unclear. Nor is any information given about how the members of 
Salomon’s House are chosen or selected for particular roles. 
 Elsewhere, the Father makes explicit how some areas remain veiled as the 
Society’s members ‘take all an oath of secrecy, for the concealing of those which 
we think i t to keep secret: though some of those we do reveal sometimes to the 
state, and some not’ (184). However, the premise on which such judgements are 
made are not divulged, nor is the decision-making process for the publication 
of ‘new proi table inventions’ (185). The description of Salomon’s House 
presents a show of revelation, but a sense of uncertainty prevails. Moreover, 
these apparent polarities of spectacle and secrecy are strangely consonant with 
those manifestations of knowing questioned as being ‘Seeming Wise’ in Bacon’s 
essay of the same name. Here he warns: ‘Some are so close and reserved, as they 
will not shew their wares but by a dark light; and seem always to keep back 
somewhat’ and would ‘seem to others to know of that which they may not 
well speak. Some help themselves with countenance and gesture, and are wise 
by signs’. 15 While  New Atlantis never directly queries the Fathers’ wisdom, 
it nonetheless resembles both of these extremes in some respects and thus 
provokes further investigation. 
 Notably, as the Father’s description of Salomon’s House progresses, so 
it becomes increasingly as much an assertion of authority and superiority 
as about imparting ‘Light’ to its expectant audience. The narrator’s early 
observation of Bensalem’s supplementary qualities reverberates in the Father’s 
‘better than’ claims for the inventions of Salomon’s House. Each section of his 
description is prefaced by the cumulative ‘We have ...’ in contradistinction with 
the reiterated negatives ‘which you have not’, ‘to you unknown’ (182), so that 
the surface spectacle of gift-giving is underwritten by an insistent reminder 
of what the audience lacks and cannot reciprocate. Like all acts of largesse 
within Bensalem, the conventions of gratuity are denied to the recipient and 
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thus reafi rm the benefactor’s primacy. Indeed, having previously been in thrall 
to Bensalem’s account of itself, the narrator is now struck dumb until the i nal 
paragraph, subject to the Father’s authoritative discourse, to which he seems 
willingly to succumb. This, again, is supported by a theatrical gesture in which 
the Father stands ‘and I, as I had been taught, kneeled down’ (185), suggesting 
both an act of blessing and submission. 
 It is signii cant, however, that, while surrounded by show, the description 
of Salomon’s House is one of the least empirically-centred parts of the text. 
The narrator does not actually witness the scientii c stage-sets – the artii cial 
re-creations of the natural world – that comprise Salomon’s House’s array of 
specialized areas of knowledge, but relies solely on the Father’s account of 
them. Ironically, while highlighting Salomon’s House’s practical approach, the 
Father discloses its activities through narration alone and, moreover, indicates 
the limitations of this when he explains why he will not provide details about 
the ‘excellent works’ of ‘our own’ ‘divers inventors’, for ‘since you have not 
seen, it were too long to make descriptions of them; and besides, in the right 
understanding of those descriptions you might easily err’ (185). The Father 
himself identii es discursive communication as being partial and unreliable, 
even while giving the narrator licence to publish what he imparts. 16 
 However, as I’ve suggested throughout, the reader is placed in a more active 
role than the narrator. Bruce indeed argues: ‘More and more systematically, the 
text establishes a split between its narrator and its reader.’ 17 Being located at 
one remove from the Father’s address, he or she is enabled to read ‘over’ the 
narrator’s restricted viewpoint and examine his interpretation. This invokes 
the more participatory, but also ‘self-distanced’, 18 reading position that Bacon 
advises in his essay ‘Of Studies’: ‘Read not to contradict and confute; nor to 
believe and take for granted; nor to i nd talk and discourse; but to weigh 
and consider.’ 19 Here the reader is expected to not be wilfully censorious, or 
passively uncritical, or to simply recount what is presented to them, but rather 
to take an approach that is both judicious and probing, one that may recognize 
the merits of Salomon’s House without taking them at face value. 
 It is the insistent repetition of theatrical tropes that highlights this process, 
as they encourage the reader to look beneath surface gloss and discern the 
text’s ambiguities and their refusal to produce a straightforward reading of 
 New Atlantis . In particular, display rarely simply reveals, but rather signals 
what is hidden, obscure and puzzling so as to demand further enquiry. Just as 
the core of Bensalem’s operations, Salomon’s House, is only partially displayed, 
so  New Atlantis as a whole is presented as being ‘A Work Uni nished’ (151), 
offering itself as a starting point for, rather than a comprehensive account 
of, an ideal society. It thus remains open to recreation and transformation. 
Through its theatre of partial disclosure and secrecy, Salomon’s House elicits an 
interrogation of New Atlantis’s utopian vision at the moment of its inscription. 
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Gerrard Winstanley’s  The Law 
Of Freedom : Context and Continuity 
 John  Gurney  
 And indeed the main Work of Reformation lies in this, to reform 
the Clergy, Lawyers, and Law; for all the Complaints of the 
Land are wrapped up within them three. 1 
 The Law of Freedom in a Platform: Or, True Magistracy Restored (1652) was the last of Gerrard Winstanley’s published works, and the one for 
which he is best known. It has generally been regarded as a utopia since 1895, 
when Eduard Bernstein described it as such in the i rst modern account of 
this long-neglected work, although there have been some dissentient voices. 
In recent decades much has been made of the work’s singular nature and of 
the contrasts between it and Winstanley’s earlier writings. For many scholars 
the work is proof that Winstanley’s early optimism had largely evaporated 
by 1652, following the defeat of the Digger venture two years earlier. There 
are, however, grounds for questioning the work’s singularity and the extent to 
which it stood apart both from contemporary debates and from the main body 
of Winstanley’s  oeuvre . 
 Gerrard Winstanley (1609–1676) had come to public attention in 1648 
when he published his i rst four, highly original, theological tracts, in which he 
argued for general redemption and universal salvation and equated God with 
Reason. 2 Following the appearance in early 1649 of his tract  The New Law 
of Righteousnes , Winstanley became briel y famous when he led the Diggers 
on to waste ground at St George’s Hill in Surrey, where they worked the land 
in common and called on all to join them. The Diggers, true to the spirit of 
millenarian excitement which followed the execution of Charles I, hoped that 
through their example humankind might be persuaded to abandon private 
property and buying and selling, and to make the Earth ‘a common treasury, 
without respect of persons’. 3 Winstanley’s writings in 1649 and early 1650 
were concerned chiel y with promoting, defending and justifying the Digger 
experiment. His i nal Digger publication,  An Humble Request , appeared in 
print in April 1650, the same month that the Diggers were driven off the Surrey 
commons. This was the last of Winstanley’s works to be published before the 
appearance of  The Law of Freedom almost two years later. 
CH008.indd   47 13/01/12   9:16 AM
48    UTOPIAN MOMENTS
 It is clear that a signii cant shift in Winstanley’s thinking did take place from 
1650 to 1652. 4 In  The New Law of Righteousnes and in his Digger writings, 
the transformation he envisaged was essentially millenarian, and would be 
brought about primarily through a process of internal regeneration, or ‘Christ 
rising in sons and daughters’, as all submitted to the law of righteousness and 
came to abide by the Golden Rule and to accept the necessity of community. 5 
Although Winstanley’s arguments were never wholly consistent, he was, it 
seems, in no doubt that the impending ‘work of restoration’ would be total and 
that the curse would be lifted from the whole creation: ‘Christ must rise, and 
the powers of the l esh must fall’; there ‘shal not be a vessel of humane earth, 
but it shal be i lled with Christ’. 6 
 In  The Law of Freedom , by contrast, much greater emphasis was placed 
on the need for state action and for proper laws and constitutional arrangements 
to be put in place to preserve commonwealth’s government and to maintain 
‘true freedom’. 7 The work was dedicated to Oliver Cromwell, who was 
urged to make use of his unrivalled power to advance righteous government 
(2: 278–92). Much of the text was taken up with utopian descriptions of the 
complex system of ofi ce holding, education and rewards and punishments 
that would be required in a society from which had departed private property, 
buying and selling and organized religion (2: 315–42, 348–52, 354–63, 366–7, 
368–78). Throughout the work, the need for laws to control the ‘confused 
and disordered’ body of the people, and to counter ‘the spirit of unreasonable 
ignorance’, was insisted on (2: 293, 302, 312, 315). Ofi ce holders should 
enjoy an effective degree of power, for ‘if there were not power in the hands 
of Ofi cers, the spirit of rudeness would not be obedient to any Law or 
Government, but their own wils’ (2: 329). Laws must be faithfully executed, 
for ‘herein lies the life of Government’ (2: 304, 305, 323). Whereas Winstanley 
had, in his earlier writings, denounced ‘imprisoning, whiping and killing’ as 
‘but the actings of the curse’, in  The Law of Freedom he provided for a series 
of penalties for transgressions, including temporary servitude for ‘such as have 
lost their Freedom’ and the death penalty (1: 481, 515, 523; 2: 45, 331, 370–1, 
373–8). There must, he emphasized, ‘be suitable Laws for every occasion, and 
almost for every action that men do’ (2: 304). 
 All commentators would agree that  The Law of Freedom marked a change in 
emphasis in Winstanley’s argument, but there remains disagreement about the 
precise nature of that change and the reasons behind it. One way of approaching 
 The Law of Freedom afresh is to focus less on the extent to which the work 
differs from Winstanley’s earlier writings, and more on the specii c context 
in which it was produced. The key here is Winstanley’s prefatory address to 
Cromwell, in which he insisted that ‘indeed the main Work of Reformation lies 
in this, to reform the Clergy, Lawyers, and Law; for all the Complaints of the 
Land are wrapped up within them three’ (2: 283). It is no doubt signii cant that 
it was in this address that Winstanley – who normally claimed that his ideas 
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came from the spirit within rather than from book learning – made one of his 
rare, positive references to a work by another author. This was to Hugh Peter’s 
 Good Work for a Good Magistrate , which had appeared a few months before 
 The Law of Freedom , and which sought through ‘honest, homely, plain English 
hints’ to offer advice on the advancement and preservation of true religion, 
mercy and justice. 8 
 Peter’s  Good Work for a Good Magistrate was a product of the movement 
for social and religious reform which was such a vigorous feature of English 
political debate in late 1651 and 1652. Peter was an early nominee to the Hale 
Commission on law reform, and from January 1652 he became one the most 
enthusiastic participants in its work.  Good Work for a Good Magistrate was 
published in June 1651, but its message gained added signii cance in the wake 
of Cromwell’s victory at Worcester, an event that helped to increase the stability 
of the commonwealth regime and fuel the conviction among radicals that major 
reforms were imminent. 9 Several writers were encouraged to join the debates 
about how best to proceed, and each offered their own prescriptions for reform 
in the hope that Cromwell, Parliament or the Hale Commission might heed their 
advice. 10 A number of them dedicated their work – as Winstanley was to do – to 
Cromwell, who was praised as someone whose ‘heart was bent for the publique 
good’ and whose ‘Genius runs full and fast that way’. 11 In  The Law of Freedom 
Winstanley expressed his approval of the suggestion by Peter and others ‘that 
the Word of God might be consulted with to i nde out a healing Government’, 
and he acknowledged that it was this that lay behind his decision to complete a 
work which otherwise may have lain dormant (2: 287). There is every reason to 
see  The Law of Freedom , in its i nished version, as a conscious contribution to 
the reform debates in which Peter played such an important part. 
 Peter, in assessing the relative importance of his themes of religion, mercy 
and justice, concluded that the last was ‘more necessarie to the immediate 
subsistence of a Common-wealth then the two former’, for ‘without Justice, no 
Commonwealth can long subsist’. 12 A substantial part of his tract was given 
over to setting out a ‘model for the law’ and rules for justice. 13 Peter also helped 
to further dei ne the terms of the debates by addressing the need for a strong 
militia – for ‘Justice cannot bee executed without Power’ – and the question 
of poverty and idleness. 14 His arguments were backed up by copious biblical 
quotation and by many references to current Dutch practice, which for Peter 
best demonstrated the way forward for a prosperous, commercially minded 
republic. 15 
 In places  The Law of Freedom reads like a commentary on the proposals by 
Peter and other participants in the reform debates, and an attempt to provide 
a persuasive alternative to Peter’s vision of a society driven by commerce and 
wealth creation. The repeated emphasis on laws and government, which to 
some readers seems so striking in comparison with Winstanley’s Digger and 
pre-Digger writings, was consistent with much of the pamphlet literature of 
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the time. Winstanley’s criticism of costs and delays in legal proceedings, his 
advocacy of county courts or senates and his concerns about the effects of 
stopping ‘the current of succeeding Parliaments’ also chimed with what others 
at the time believed to be important. 16 His insistence that laws should be 
‘few and short, and often read’ rel ected the concerns of many that the legal 
system’s complexity encouraged costly suits and benei ted only the lawyers. 17 In 
advocating the use of peace-makers to settle disputes, Winstanley was making 
use of one of Peter’s core proposals, a proposal that was supported by other 
writers keen to free potential litigants from the clutches of lawyers. 18 
 The inl uence on Winstanley of particular writers can be detected. Winstanley’s 
support for successive parliaments, frequent elections and rotation might at i rst 
sight appear to show an awareness of Marchamont Nedham’s celebrated editorials 
in  Mercurius Politicus , which ran from September 1651 to August 1652 (2: 290, 
315–18). It seems certain, however, that the writer whose work Winstanley was 
following most closely was the Independent and future Quaker Isaac Penington 
junior, from whose 1651 tract  The Fundamental Right, Safety and Liberty of 
the People Nedham borrowed heavily and without acknowledgement in his 
 Politicus editorials. 19 Winstanley was evidently familiar with Penington’s tract 
and with his earlier  A Word for the Common Weale (1650): their inl uence can 
be seen not only in Winstanley’s admittedly rather hazy constitutional proposals 
but also in several of his statements on law and government. 20 Winstanley’s 
advocacy of easily comprehensible laws and his insistence on i t ofi cers and on 
the faithful execution of the laws could all be found in Penington’s works, and 
were expressed there in similar words. Like Winstanley, Penington argued for 
laws that were ‘cleare and easy to be known’; he maintained that ‘execution is 
the life of the law’ and that without a due and faithful execution even the best 
laws were to little purpose. 21 He also insisted that those who execute the law 
should be guided by clear rules and not be swayed by their own ‘apprehensions 
and judgements’, and that parliaments too should be bound by clear rules. 22 
Penington was, like Winstanley, anxious to dei ne ‘true freedom’ and in 
 The Fundamental Right set out to list its main components. 23 
 Winstanley had always paid heed to other writers, however reluctant he 
was to refer directly to them or to acknowledge their inl uence. The shifts in 
argument from his earlier to his later Digger writings – including his adoption 
of Norman Yoke theories, his increasing focus on the concept of kingly power 
and his use of arguments drawn from necessity and contract theory – all point 
to his capacity to absorb the arguments of others and to re-use them in highly 
original ways. 24 Commentators have noted how the contents of  The Law of 
Freedom show some engagement with the Hobbesian arguments that were 
making headway in 1651, but they seem above all to rel ect Winstanley’s 
awareness that the current of radical argument had shifted since the days of 
digging, and that radical hopes were now increasingly channelled towards the 
cause of structured legal, religious and constitutional reform. 
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 Winstanley seems to have been quite clear about the value of restating his 
commitment to community in the context of the reform debates of the early 
1650s. Historians have often been puzzled by the appearance in early 1652 of 
quite lengthy extracts from  The Law of Freedom in newsbooks (the precursors 
of modern newspapers) and other publications. These extracts appeared 
anonymously, and were highly selective in the arguments they advanced. 25 It 
is sometimes thought that a pre-publication manuscript may have fallen into 
the hands of unscrupulous publishers who made use of it without the author’s 
consent and in ways that differed markedly from his intentions. 26 What is 
often overlooked, however, is that similar selections had been made of some 
of Winstanley’s earlier Digger writings. 27 It is quite possible that Winstanley 
was fully aware of what was taking place with the publication of passages 
from  The Law of Freedom , and even had a hand in it. This would certainly 
have been an effective way of reaching new readers, and Winstanley may well 
have been pleased when Cromwell unwittingly endorsed some of his proposals 
which were presented to him in April 1652 as a set of anonymous propositions 
for ‘the better regulating of the Law’. 28 
 We should not exaggerate the differences between  The Law of Freedom and 
Winstanley’s earlier writings. The stated aim of the work was to advance the 
cause of community, or ‘commonwealth’s government’, and if we strip away 
those passages which rel ect most the concerns of participants in the reform 
debates, there is much that is consistent with the arguments of Winstanley’s 
Digger and pre-Digger writings (2: 278, 291). In particular, there are several 
hints in Winstanley’s earlier works that the system of law and government set 
out in  The Law of Freedom was not an aberration, and did not necessarily 
represent a major retreat from his earlier principles. Winstanley had always 
insisted that he was not against law or government. 29 The Diggers were, 
he claimed, slandered by the accusation that ‘we deny all Law, because 
we deny the corruption in Law’; ‘True Government is that I long for to see’ 
(2: 83, 198). Even in  The New Law of Righteousnes , the work in which 
Winstanley stated most forcefully and optimistically his belief that righteousness 
would come to rule in everyone, and that all would be persuaded to live 
according to the Golden Rule, he acknowledged the possibility of disobedience 
and recalcitrance. Provision would have to be made to deal with those who 
broke the law of righteousness, those who ‘steal or whore or become idle and 
wil not work’. Such offenders would, he suggested, be set to work as servants 
for others, and they would lose the privilege of sonship until such time as they 
repented (1: 508, 514–5, 520). 
 Winstanley was concerned in  The New Law of Righteousnes with proclaiming 
imminent change and urging action, and there was no good reason why he 
should devote space in that work to elaborating upon the mechanisms needed 
to deal with transgression in a future society; there was similarly little scope 
for this in his Digger pamphlets. But the problems had been noted then, as had 
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the accusation that community of property would inevitably lead to idleness, 
community of partners or lawlessness (1: 507–8; 2: 121–2). 30 Writing  The Law 
of Freedom enabled Winstanley to address in much greater detail questions 
that had been raised in his earlier works, and to offer answers that had been 
anticipated in them. The reform debates provided him with the opportunity to 
make his voice heard once more, and to restate his commitment to community, 
in language that would have been familiar to other participants in the debates. 
Like many other writers he dedicated his work to Cromwell, but it is doubtful 
whether he hoped of more from him than help in advancing commonwealth’s 
government by making available commons, wastes and coni scated lands for 
the use of the poor (2: 291–2). Winstanley’s chief hopes were, it seems, still 
pinned on the ‘spirit of universal Righteousness dwelling in Mankinde, now 
rising up to teach every one to do to another as he would have another do to 
him’. This was the ‘great Lawgiver in Commonwealths Government’. As he 
reminded Cromwell, the ‘spirit of the whole creation (who is God) is about the 
Reformation of the World, and he will go forward in his work’ (2: 280, 311). 
Seen in this context,  The Law of Freedom might appear less of an aberration 
in relation to Winstanley’s earlier works, and more of a determined attempt by 
Winstanley to reiterate his communist message in the changed circumstances 
of 1651–2. It is perhaps the author’s desire to address current radical concerns, 
rather than his utopianism, t hat is most striking about this work. 
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‘ De Te Fabula Narratur ’ :  Oceana 
and James Harrington’s Narrative 
Constitutionalism 
 J.C.  Davis  
 Tantalus a labris sitiens fugientia captat 
 Flumina: quid rides? mutato nomine, de te 
 Fabula narratur. 
 (Horace) 1 
 James Harrington’s  Oceana (1656) is at once one of the most important political and constitutional works to be produced in the course of what we 
commonly call the English Revolution and yet it has proved one of the most 
difi cult to digest and to arrive at consensus on its i nal meaning. 
 Its importance relates partly to its inl uence on constitutional thinking 
in both the American and the French Revolutions and the development of 
both Country and Whig ideologies in eighteenth-century Britain. It was also 
instrumental in the adaptation and transmission of ideas of civil life and 
responsibility developed in classical city states and Renaissance cities or small 
principalities to the larger landmasses of the transatlantic world. 2 Additionally, 
Harrington alerted those who wished to put their political and constitutional 
prescriptions into a historical context to the necessity of looking beyond the 
surface of events, to identifying and analysing the changing social forces that 
shaped political possibilities, limitations and outcomes. Something like that 
outlook and approach came to dominate much of the historical and political 
thinking of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. So, there are strong claims 
to be made for  Oceana ’s importance. At the same time, many of Harrington’s 
contemporaries, and readers since, have found the work overly complex, a 
slog to read and difi cult to digest. Looking for constitutional proposals, they 
expected and expect lists of rules, laws,  ordini . To i nd them they have to wade 
through what amounts to a prose romance 3 and when they do encounter 
 Oceana ’s orders, it is to i nd that they too are more like narratives of scripted 
performances rather than the legalistically informed requirements of traditional 
constitutional documents. It is a work that has inl uenced generations of readers 
while throwing others off balance and engendering irritation. The argument of 
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this essay is that  Oceana should be read as a narrative – ‘ de te Fabula narratur ’ – 
and that, in approaching the text in this way, it is important to understand 
why, in a moment of profound crisis, Harrington chose to tell a story, partly 
historical, partly i ctional, to his compatriots. 4 
 Harrington conceived and wrote  Oceana in the aftermath of the worst civil 
violence his country ever experienced. Casualties and physical destruction 
were, on a per capita basis, on a par with, or in excess of, those of the First 
and Second World Wars. Between 1640 and 1656, England experienced three 
civil wars and three invasions. Like Tantalalus, the nation sought relief but 
found it forever out of reach. Wartime negotiations had proved frustratingly 
fruitless. Bitterly divided political and religious groups multiplied. The Church 
of England had been abolished but mutually intolerant protestant groups 
could not effectively implement a replacement. In 1649, the king had been 
tried and executed, the monarchy and the House of Lords were abolished and 
England was declared a commonwealth or ‘Free State’. But victory, revolution 
and conquest saw peace and stability remain elusive. In the seven years since 
1649, there had been i ve ‘parliaments’ and four parliamentary systems and, 
when  Oceana was in the press, a i fth was under consideration. Tension between 
the military and civilian politicians remained high against a backcloth of high 
taxation, resented, if spasmodic, interference by the soldiers in civil governance, 
and a ‘government in exile’ watching and waiting for the commonwealth’s 
terminal collapse into disorder. 
 The  Instrument of Government , imposed by the army in December 1653, 
had offered ‘co-ordinate’ government with an interdependent Lord Protector 
(Oliver Cromwell), a Council of State and a single-chamber, triennially elected 
Parliament. Hostility towards it was intense. In 1654, its i rst parliament had 
to be purged if there were to be any hope of progress and even so progress was 
not forthcoming. In 1656, a second parliament, due to meet in the autumn, 
saw measures taken to prevent a substantial number of elected members from 
sitting. The  Instrument had failed and needed to be replaced. The question 
was what should it be replaced with, and how could its replacement liberate 
England from the tantalizing, frustrating and destructive cycle it had been 
locked in for over a decade and a half. Like others, Harrington thought he saw 
a way forward to permanent stability. Unlike others, he recognized that yet 
another list of proposals was not enough, that an analysis had to be developed 
which saw beyond immediate events to the underlying forces that held political 
actors captive and rendered them virtually impotent. Above all, unlike them, he 
realized that, if they were to command widespread assent, his proposals had to 
reconcile all parties and enable them to imaginatively participate in a new and 
complicated system. They had, therefore, to be presented in a different way. 
The way he chose was narrative. Why? 
 There were four principal reasons. The i rst was a preference for deeds over 
words. In 1641, the collapse of controls on the press and preaching had led to 
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a dramatic expansion of the quantity and variety of printed material in wide 
circulation, a ‘print revolution’. Coinciding with both physical conl ict and a 
war of words escalating into bitterly partisan politics, the result by the 1650s 
was a pervasive sense that language was exhausted, an anxious perception that 
a language of shared meanings was lost. Behind Harrington’s choice of the 
narrative form lay the assumption that the constitution could be more readily 
stabilized in deeds rather than words; that a good constitution was not what 
we say but what we do. Accordingly, the enactment and stabilization of the 
Oceanic constitution was through an annual series of scripted performances. 
‘To philosophise further upon this art [of constitution making], though there be 
nothing more rational, were not worth the while, because in writing it will be 
perplexed and the i rst practice of it gives the demonstration’ (89–90). Acting 
was, for this purpose, better than writing; deeds better than words. Focusing on 
things acted, deeds, could be seen as not only mitigating the ambiguities inherent 
in words but also as dealing a blow at hypocrisy, the divergence of words and 
deeds. But the best way of conveying deeds and action was through narrative. 
 A second reason for narrative was that constitutional provision adequate 
to the task of ending chronic instability required some radical innovation and 
technical complexity. Describing that in words could be complex and confusing 
but, once citizens became accustomed to acting out the new requirements, 
they would seem like second nature to them. Harrington recognized that the 
technical details of his thirty orders could be daunting but rejecting them 
would be as foolish as sailors neglecting the latest aids to navigation simply 
because they were hard to understand. They might be ‘very many and difi cult’ 
but ‘what seaman casts away his card because it hath four and twenty points 
of the compass? And yet those are very near as many and as difi cult as the 
orders in the whole circumference of your commonwealth’ (145). Every day, 
without a second thought, we perform routine functions which it would be 
time-consuming and complex to have to describe. Harrington wanted to use 
narrative to cut through that barrier. But, thirdly to achieve this he had to 
engage his readers’ imaginative participation. To believe in the possibility and 
practicality of what he proposed they had to ‘experience’ it, if only through 
following the detailed story which Harrington told. So that, for example, 
the annual recreation of civil society through ritual assemblies of citizens in 
parishes, groups of parishes (‘hundreds’) and counties (‘tribes’), scripted by 
Harrington in considerable narrative detail, would soon in practice make the 
‘four days’ election in a whole year (one at the parish, one at the hundred, and 
two at the tribe)’ seem ‘like milk for babes’ (165). Throughout  Oceana , he gave 
priority to collective acting in time and space with a repetitive regularity that 
would lead to the establishment of customary behaviour. Ultimately,  Oceana 
was about the establishment of new local, regional and national narratives 
for a nation whose old collective narratives had been shattered and which 
continued to l ounder in their absence. 
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 But the transition from the old dysfunctional narratives to which people 
would irrationally cling, despite the misery involved, to the new narrative of 
a perfect and immortal commonwealth which  Oceana offered, would require 
access to power and this meant recourse to Oliver Cromwell, and  Oceana 
was accordingly dedicated to him. Enlisting his agency, however, involved not 
only persuading him to back the transition but to do so in a disinterested way. 
Ambiguity governed his contemporaries’ perception of Cromwell. Was he the 
godly servant of the ‘good old cause’ or was he the ambitious and unscrupulous 
agent of his own rise to power? 5 Was he Caesar, waiting his opportunity to 
overthrow the republic and set up his own rule or was he Lycurgus, or even 
Timoleon, the disinterested lawgiver, wanting to lay the basis of stability 
and then withdraw from active politics? Meanwhile, the nation struggled to 
escape two dilemmas. First, was there no escape from the dark alternatives of 
dehumanizing civil war, on the one hand, or a tyrannical and corrupt peace, on 
the other? Second, to enjoy the benei ts of a republican political culture England 
needed the appropriate republican institutions to sustain it; but, to achieve such 
institutions, it needed the appropriate political culture. How was it to escape 
this chicken and egg situation? 6 The Lord Protector’s power and prestige might 
be the instrument to break both these cycles but only if he could be led to efface, 
rather than to aggrandise, himself. Instrumental in Parliament’s victories in three 
civil wars and the conquest of Ireland and Scotland, Cromwell’s prestige after 
the battle of Worcester (3 September 1651) was so great that he was the obvious 
candidate when there was a return to ‘a single person’ under the  Instrument 
of Government . Nevertheless, the narrative of his rise from obscurity, of his 
military prowess and of his providential agency, had run into difi culties as the 
constitutional provisions of the Instrument revealed their weaknesses, and in 
the wake of the defeat at Hispaniola in 1655 when God seemed to have turned 
his face against him. 7 By 1656, Cromwell’s personal narrative of greatness had 
run into a cul-de-sac. Through the narrative of  Oceana , Harrington offered him 
an alternative ending to his story. By setting up the Oceanic commonwealth 
and then retiring from the scene, he would be immortalized as: 
 The Greatest of Captains. 
 The Best of Princes. 
 The Happiest of Legislators. 
 The Most Sincere of Christians.  (266)
 Oceana was divided into four parts: 8 the Preliminaries, giving an analysis 
and a historical account of the principles of government; the Council of 
Legislators, recounting the i ctional setting up of an ideal way of devising 
a new commonwealth; the Model of the Commonwealth of Oceana, 
which was a i ctional account of the constitution and institution of a perfect 
and immortal commonwealth; and the Corollary, which narrated the history 
and consequences of the i rst i fty years of such a government. Within this grand 
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narrative framework, many other stories were told but they were essentially 
held together by two master narratives. The i rst delineated the vulnerability of 
all past governments to the unregulated l ow of history around two principles 
of analysis, Empire and Authority. The second showed how the l ow of history 
could be brought under regulation by the erection of an entirely new polity, an 
Equal Commonwealth, which would be perfect and immortal. 
 Empire, or power, in any substantial rural society (such as England was 
in Harrington’s day), was a function of landownership. If one person owned 
all of the land, absolute monarchy was the natural form of government. Such 
government was always vulnerable to an externally or internally generated coup. 
If a few owned all of the land – and this had been the situation in England from 
the Norman Conquest until the early sixteenth century – aristocracy, or limited 
monarchy, was the natural form of government. Here the great landowners 
would compete against one another for dominance. They might establish a 
monarchical umpire but there would also be recurrent baronial struggles to 
win control of that i gure. Hence, both of these two distributions of Empire 
entailed instability. Since the early sixteenth century, the policies of Henry VII 
and Henry VIII (particularly the latter’s secularization of church property) 
had tipped the balance of landownership on to a popular basis and hence 
democracy was possible. The political ramii cations of this shift of Empire had 
been ignored by the later Tudors and their Stuart successors. They had tried to 
rule through the barons when the balance of Empire of power had shifted to 
the people. Consequently, they had in the end to rule by force without having 
the resources to make such rule effective. The result was instability, violence 
and eventual civil war. Any pretence of minorities – civil, religious or military – 
to rule against the popular balance of Empire could only result in further 
instability/violence. Here was the explanation of England’s tantalizingly 
prolonged suffering. Only if the political superstructures (or constitution) 
were brought into alignment with the popular balance of Empire, could some 
form of stability and peace be restored. But the narrative building blocks were 
not quite yet in place and Harrington turned to examine the principles of 
Authority. What made a good or legitimate authority? Once more the classical 
options of the one, the few and the many were brought into play. The interest 
of the one almost invariably turned out to be a seli sh interest. The interests 
of the few were sectional interests, often divided in seli sh struggles for pre-
eminence. However, the interest of the many came closest to the interest of all 
and therefore to right reason and the will of God. Harrington’s claim in 1656, 
and in the face of a seemingly intractable on-going set of crises, was a truly 
ambitious one: namely, that the distribution of power/Empire within England 
made it possible to establish the most authoritative form of government, a 
popular commonwealth or democracy. 
 At the same time, his comparative analysis of all previous republics or 
commonwealths, including that of Israel, showed that they had, without 
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exception, been l awed and had failed. Something special, something new, was 
required which would, through a feat of political architecture, build on the 
popular distribution of power a stable and authoritative republic rel ecting the 
will of all, a perfect and an immortal commonwealth. This structure, which 
Harrington called an Equal Commonwealth, was a unique combination of 
essential elements and his great contribution to constitutional design. It was 
to be established along two pivotal axes. The horizontal one was its core 
principles of operation. In essence, these were fourfold: an ‘equal Agrarian’; 
the ballot; bicameral legislation with the separation of debate and decision; 
and the rotation of ofi ce. Harrington’s agrarian law was designed to stabilize 
the distribution of property on a popular basis while preserving a leisured 
aristocracy. Only the latter would have the time and resources to travel and 
study and so attain political wisdom. Their representatives would populate the 
Senate and have the exclusive right of debate and proposal. But the popular 
will embodied the common interest and therefore the popular assembly had the 
sole right to decide on the propositions proposed to it by the Senate and it took 
those decisions in silence, without debate. This bicameral specialism ensured 
that the wealthy had a role in politics without being dominant and that the 
people took political decisions in light of the wisdom of an educated and well-
travelled minority. The secret ballot devised by Harrington was essential to 
maintaining this balance, both because it enabled ordinary citizens to escape 
the claims of deference and because it liberated them from the claims of party. 
All ofi ce was elective and subject to limited periods of tenure followed by 
vacation from ofi ce. The effect of this rotation was to prevent the domination 
of any one group or party and to ensure the most extensive experience of ofi ce-
holding. Over a triennial cycle, more than half of the elders of Oceana would 
be called to ofi ce and there were severe penalties for refusal. The absence of 
any political or religious tests meant that Oceana was an invitation to all to 
bury their differences and reconcile themselves to a system in which all could 
participate and which would serve the interests of all. 
 The vertical axis of the new commonwealth was in its annual reassembly 
in performances (scripted in considerable detail) ascending from the parish, 
through the hundred to the county, or tribe, and then on to the national 
level. At these assemblies, those citizens over the age of thirty elected ofi ce-
holders at the appropriate level and deputies to represent them at the next 
level. Those aged from eighteen to thirty had similar assemblies for military 
service, drill and the election of ofi cers. Out of this emerged a national citizen 
militia, which was both committed to the maintenance of the commonwealth’s 
liberties and which bestowed a capacity on the republic which made it an 
expansionist ‘commonwealth for increase’ that could deliver those liberties to 
a wider world. The nation which had been bitterly fragmented by civil conl ict 
was to be re-divided along non-partisan lines and literally re-assembled in 
these performative cycles. In many senses,  Oceana was a utopian vision of 
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reconciliation and inclusivity and it was roundly criticized by other republicans 
for being so inclusive as to risk the whole republican project. 9 But, in its attempt 
to establish a narrative which could lead the English out of the political misery 
to which they had become habituated, in its complex facing of the difi cult 
issues and risks which such an attempt involved, and in its attempt to provide 
the living picture of the new polity in which his fellow countrymen could 
imaginatively participate, Harrington provided in  Oceana a classic example of 
the utopian genre. 
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An Island with Potential : Henry Neville’s 
 The Isle Of Pines 
 Gaby  Mahlberg  
 At length one of our men mounting the Main-mast espyed i re, 
an evident sign of some Countrey near adjoyning, which presently 
after we apparently discovered, and steering our course nigher, 
we saw several persons promiscuously running about the shore, 
as it were wondering and admiring at what they saw: Being now 
near to the Land, we manned our long Boat with ten persons, 
who approaching the shore, asked them in our Dutch Tongue 
Wat Eylant is dit?  to which they returned this Answer in English, 
That they knew not what we said. One of our Company named 
Jeremiah Hanzen who understood English very well, hearing 
their words discourst to them in their own Language; so that in 
i ne we were very kindly invited on shore, great numbers of them 
l ocking about us, admiring at our Cloaths which we did wear, 
as we on the other side did to i nd in such a strange place, so many 
that could speak English, and yet to go naked. 1 
 At i rst sight, the reader witnesses a typical colonial encounter: Western Europeans arriving on the shores of a remote island in the Pacii c meet 
the native population. The nakedness of the natives epitomizes the savage, 
uncivilized and unprotected state of the islanders. Their wonder at and 
admiration of the Dutch visitors immediately establishes a hierarchy of the 
discoverers over the discovered, who had never seen ‘a thing called a Ship’ 
(6). Due to the perceived superiority of the Dutch it is not the islanders who 
command the intruders to declare themselves, but the sailors who ask the 
natives to identify their country. Again the islanders are at a disadvantage 
because they do not understand Dutch, while the sailors recognize that the 
natives speak English, and are able to converse with the islanders in their own 
tongue. Here the familiar colonial narrative ends. Once it has been established 
that the islanders are of English descent, there is a background story to be 
told which connects the discoverers with the discovered. Both England and 
the United Provinces were sea-faring states in the north west of Europe. As 
Jonathan Scott has pointed out, they were to a signii cant extent dei ned by 
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their geographical location and proximity to each other, their shared Protestant 
religion and economic ties. They had shared for several centuries a similar 
maritime culture, although the fortunes of the English and the Dutch turned 
out in rather different ways. 2 The encounter with the Dutch as a narrative 
frame for the story of the marooned English people, read out by the Isle’s 
current ruler, Prince William, is thus loaded with meaning. 
 According to this story, William’s grandfather, the English accountant 
George Pines, had been shipwrecked on the island during Elizabeth I’s reign 
when he was sailing to the East Indies. He managed to save himself together 
with four women, including his master’s daughter, two maids and a black slave. 
Finding themselves alone on an island with a pleasant climate, shelter and food 
in abundance, the i ve began to populate it, and George settled his descendants 
in four tribes on different parts of the island, which served to maintain order 
until after his death. This core narrative of  The Isle of Pines had originally 
been published on its own with a licensing note of 27 June 1668. Its author, 
the Civil War republican Henry Neville, subsequently published a separate 
letter purporting to be by the Dutch ship’s captain Cornelius van Sloetten and 
narrating the discovery of the Isle by the Dutch in 1667, before issuing the full 
version of the pamphlet with a licensing note of 27 July 1668. 3 The publication 
of these pamphlets coincided with Neville’s return to England after a period of 
exile in Italy, where he had sought refuge from the Restoration regime. 
 The Isle’s core text with George Pines’ narration can be read as an 
Arcadian work, in which humans are at one with nature, and civilization and 
domination of the country are implicitly rejected. 4 The framing narrative and 
the description of the Dutch encounter, however, end this romantic vision of 
a state of nature and innocence and bring the Isle back into the context of 
seventeenth-century European competition for overseas’ trading posts and 
possessions, where good government of land and people was the key to success. 
Due to the lack of such a government, subsequent generations of islanders 
had failed to uphold the harmonious co-existence of the initial settlers. 
Their innocence was lost when George i rst took possession of the women 
and entered into sexual relations with all four of them in a recreation of The 
Fall. Yet the consequences of his transgression only became fully visible in 
the third generation when ‘wantonness’ among his descendants had come to 
replace the ‘necessity’ (17) which forced the i rst generation of sons to ‘marry 
their sisters’ (14). This degeneration of society caused by a ‘neglect of hearing 
the Bible read’ and characterized by ‘whoredoms, incests, and adulteries’ was 
temporarily contained by the exemplary punishment of ‘the grandest offender’ 
(17), the second son of the black slave, and the institution of a code of law by 
the new king, Henry. The Fall of Man had made government necessary. It was, 
as Thomas Paine was to say, ‘like dress … the badge of lost innocence’. Loosely 
based on the Ten Commandments, Henry’s laws imposed the death penalty 
on blasphemers, absentees from the monthly religious assembly, rapists and 
CH010.indd   61 13/01/12   4:08 PM
62    UTOPIAN MOMENTS
adulterers, while there were also physical punishments for assault, theft and 
the defamation of the governor. Like More a century and a half earlier, and 
Harrington in the previous decade, Neville acknowledged that law and order 
had to be imposed and maintained if any utopian project was to succeed. Yet, 
Neville’s Isle never reaches a state of organization comparable to either Utopia 
or Oceana because any attempt by the ruler is thwarted by the unruliness of 
the people. George Pines is no great legislator like King Utopus or Olphaus 
Megaletor, and certainly no early modern Lycurgus. Bringing order to the Isle’s 
unruly society happens by piecemeal reform. Without the right foundations, 
the ideal society could not be achieved. 
 The succession of rulers on the Isle roughly corresponds to the governments 
of England. The patriarchal rule of George Pines represents the early Stuarts, 
while Henry as the founder of a new order with its own code of scripturally 
inspired law which follows a period of civil unrest echoes Oliver Cromwell 
and the Interregnum regimes. The present ruler, William Pines, meanwhile, 
a thinly disguised Charles II, faces renewed unrest caused by two competing 
factions inside the State representing the Restoration government challenged 
by a radical underground that continued to disrupt the civil peace. Incidentally, 
Neville himself had left England for Italy after having been implicated in the 
Northern Rising of 1663. The Isle was a warning to Charles that all was not 
well in his kingdom. Factionalism on the i ctional island leads to insurrection 
when a tribal ruler and descendant of the black slave rapes the wife of a leading 
representative of another tribe, thus threatening ‘ruin to the whole State’ (26). 
Only the intervention of the Dutch with their superior arms and authority saves 
the island from a collapse of order. It is the Dutch who reveal the shortcomings 
of the islanders. 
 Their arrival on the island is the dei ning moment that changes the whole 
dynamics of Neville’s  The Isle of Pines . The narrative pitches representatives 
of two European sea powers against each other, leaving the English looking 
increasingly embarrassed. The colonial (as well as the utopian) project is 
concerned with the efi cient government of resources, such as land and people, 
for economic growth and the establishment of civilization. Yet, the i rst thing 
the Dutch notice on their arrival is the islanders’ primitive living conditions. 
The ‘Pallace of their Prince’ is only the size ‘of one of our ordinary village 
houses’, covered with boughs to ‘keep out the … Rain’ (4), while the majority 
of the people live in ‘little … Huts ... under Trees’ (20). The islanders admire 
the Dutch sailors’ dress, but Prince William’s wife only wears ‘rags’, the ‘Relicts 
of those Cloaths … of them which i rst came hither’ (4), despite the fact that 
the textiles production in their country of origin far exceeded demand in 
Restoration times. The islanders offer their visitors food, which is scorned due 
to a lack of ‘materials’ (4) to season it. The Dutch meanwhile are successfully 
involved in the spice trade, exchanging ‘Knives, Beads’ and ‘Glasses’ for ‘Cloves 
and Silver’ in Madagascar (2). The islanders in contrast do not have ‘any 
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ships or Boats’ and are ‘strangers to … shipping’ (5), missing out on trading 
opportunities, even though their English forefathers had been pioneers in the 
East India trade. They also lack the most basic tools and gratefully receive 
from the Dutch ‘some few Knives’ and ‘an Ax’ to cut timber as the axe their 
ancestors had saved from the shipwreck was now ‘quite blunt’ (5). All this 
marked the contrast between England’s former glory and the Island’s regress 
into a barely civilized state. The republicans’ utopian projects of the 1650s 
had been aborted with the Restoration. Instead of realizing a Harringtonian 
‘commonwealth for increase’ England had been thrown back into the coni nes 
of a monarchy. 5 While the English had descended into political and economic 
insignii cance, the Dutch had risen to become the new international sea and 
trading power in Europe. Neville blamed the inertia of the Restoration regime. 
 Given that the colonial encounter between the two nations is set in the 
aftermath of the Second Anglo–Dutch War in the summer of 1667, it is hardly 
difi cult to see the author’s point. That fateful summer for English fortunes saw 
the Medway disaster, in which the United Provinces destroyed much of the 
English l eet at Chatham, the loss of Surinam to the Dutch in the Treaty of Breda 
as well as the ceding of Pola Run, which gave the Dutch signii cant advantages 
in the Spice Trade. The 1651 Navigation Act, originally intended to favour 
English shipping, was also modii ed in favour of the Dutch, now allowing them 
to transport German goods to England. The decline of the English as depicted 
by Neville, however, does not just refer to their trading power, but also to their 
lack of industry and their military weakness. The islanders are naked also in 
the sense of being unarmed. They take to their heels at the mere sound of a gun, 
and even their ruler wonders at ‘the strange effects of Powder’ (25). The military 
and naval insignii cance of the English Pines under Prince William (and the 
later Stuarts) stands in contrast to the military and naval power of the England 
his grandfather George had left late in Elizabeth’s Golden Age, one year after 
the defeat of the Spanish Armada, and in a period known for the exploratory 
travels of Drake and Raleigh. Neville bemoans English military decline under 
the early Stuarts when i nancial constraints and political conl icts at home 
meant that foreign policy took a back seat. His narrative reveals nostalgia 
for the naval success and military greatness, when republicans such as Arthur 
Hesilrige, Henry Marten, Thomas Scott, Thomas Chaloner and Neville himself 
were in charge of the Rump’s diplomacy (1649–53). Then, England could still 
match the Dutch, whom English republicans considered as their natural allies. 
However, the United Provinces’ failure to recognize the regicide regime of the 
Commonwealth provoked England. The republicans broke off negotiations 
and went to war with Dutch in 1652. That war ended with English naval 
victory and the loss of numerous warships and merchantmen on the Dutch 
side. This i rst Anglo–Dutch War (1652–4) was about trading rights as well as 
ideological issues, such as the legitimacy of the English government. Yet, this 
did not prevent English republicans from continuing to see the Dutch as more 
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natural allies than the French. Neville emphasizes this point by referring to the 
Dutch sailors explicitly as ‘friends’ (5). 
 Not only do they build a palace for William Pines, they also help him 
put down an insurrection of his own people. They never contest the English 
possession of the Island, and they present the Pines with useful tools. With 
their model behaviour, the Dutch invite emulation. The contrast between status 
quo and ideal that characterizes utopian writing here is not between England 
and the Isle, but between England/the Isle and the United Provinces. In that 
sense the utopian project of the Isle is uni nished. Yet, the Dutch relationship 
to the English is not one of open hostility, but of friendly competitiveness. 
For English republicans, the Dutch and the English were still natural allies. It 
was in England’s best interest, Slingsby Bethel argued, to ally with the Dutch 
and ward off the threat of French ‘universal monarchy’. 6 Neville stresses his 
preferred alliance in his reference to the Amsterdam merchant Abraham Keek 
– a contact of the English republican underground – who is the ostensible 
author of the ‘Two Letters’ to ‘a Credible person’ in London’s Covent Garden 
which preface the work, reporting on the discovery of the English Pines (f. A2v). 
Like More’s i ctitious epistle to Peter Giles introducing Utopia, the letters are 
to give credibility to the story and authenticate the existence of the island. 
Yet, to an attentive reader familiar with More’s work, the i ctional device 
could equally signal that the Isle was a utopia written to criticize the Stuart 
regime in ways otherwise impossible under restored censorship regulations. 
The same is true for the deliberately vague information on the Isle’s location, 
which Keek initially describes as ‘about 2 or 300 Leagues Northwest from 
Cape Finis Terre’, while later admitting possible mistakes ‘in the number of 
the Leagues’ and ‘exact point of the Compass’. The letters also suggest that the 
ship that ‘fell in’ with the Isle was initially thought to be French, while the 
actual pamphlet reveals its Dutch provenance (f. A2v). Neville thus hints 
that the English were mistaken in their judgement of who their real friends 
were. The Stuart government might think English salvation was to be found 
in an alliance with the French; the republicans favoured a partnership with 
the United Provinces. 
 Charles II’s performance as a monarch disappointed Neville, especially in 
foreign policy terms. Yet, he also made a point that the Isle, and by implication 
the English motherland, had unused potential: its people. As Harrington had 
remarked, the people were the ‘materials of a commonwealth’. 7 In Oceana 
they would help perpetuate the political system through their participation; 
on the Isle they only perpetuate the English race but have no obvious sense 
of purpose or direction. George Pines, the accountant, is obsessed with the 
propagation and numbering of his people. He even has a rota to impregnate 
his four women in turn, and is proud to report that they brought him thirteen, 
seven, i fteen and twelve children respectively. The i rst generation of children 
on the island amounts to 47 people, while the island population counts 1,789 
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at the end of George’s life. Yet, the English islanders neither make anything of 
their geographically convenient situation off the European trading routes nor 
of their growing population. Contemporary economic theory, represented by 
the works of Petty and Graunt, stressed the importance of a strong population 
for national wealth creation. Petty in particular emphasized that it was ‘the 
number, arts, and industry of [a] people, well united and governed’, not the 
extent of a territory, that was responsible for ‘the greatness and glory of a 
Prince’. Both ‘Labour and Industry’ and a country’s geographical location 
held the key to success, while Locke’s ‘labour theory’ would stress that the 
acquisition of land was justii ed by its cultivation and efi cient use. 8 Neville’s 
theory of colonization and wealth creation went beyond the mere possession 
of land. It was also about the efi ciency of its cultivation, the use of labour and 
the trade with its excess produce. The Isle points towards colonial policies the 
Whigs would develop in more detail after 1689. 9 Yet, Neville implies that the 
English are not ready to embrace the task. The Pines suffer from laziness and 
‘idleness’, and their favourite pastime is to ‘lay abroad on Mossey Bankes’ 
(12–12 [ sic 13]), thus fuli lling the common stereotype among republicans 
that warmer climates produced inferior, effeminate peoples, unable to build up 
signii cant military or colonial power. 
 The Dutch in contrast do everything the English settlers have failed to 
do on their arrival at the island or any time since: they survey the land, take 
measurements, and assess the geography for accessibility for shipping, for fresh 
water supplies and natural resources, such as ‘veins of Minerals’ (22) in the 
ground They appreciate the island’s ‘fertile’ (21) soil, trees and fruits, and 
the suitability of the animal population for food provision. Most importantly, 
the Dutch know how to assert authority, discharging just ‘three or four Guns’ 
(26) to restore order on the island. In the light of contemporary works on 
colonialism, the Isle becomes an illustration of missed opportunities, or as Adam 
Beach puts it, a case study for ‘English degeneracy and Dutch supremacy’. 10 
However, Neville’s work is not as profoundly pessimistic as Beach suggests. 
For the Isle of Pines is an island with potential for economic growth. It has 
everything it needs ‘by … Nature’. However, with ‘the benei t of Art … it would 
equal, if not exceed many of our Europian Countries’ (21). The Dutch captain 
reassures the reader in his ‘Post-Script’ that ‘time will make this Island known 
better to the world’, if its inhabitants learn to make use of ‘Natures abundance’ 
(31). As much as the i rst institution of government with Prince Henry’s law 
code brings some degree of political civilization, the ‘art’ of agriculture and the 
production of goods for trade would bring civilization in economic terms. Only 
if the English Pines transform their island to make it properly their own will they 
become known around the world and respected as a great power. The Isle thus 
remains a work in progress, a utopia in the making. Neville meanwhile calls on 
his English readers to reconsider their constitution at home and England’s role 
in the wider world. 
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 In our post-colonial age, the acquisition and economic exploitation of 
foreign territories has rightly come to be seen in a critical light. For seventeenth-
century republicans, colonization was a way of propagating wealth, spreading 
ideologies of civilization, and of experimenting with alternative forms of 
government and utopian settlements. The competition for overseas territories 
was also a continuation of inner-European competition on a new scale. If the 
English Pines made this island their own by cultivation, and wholeheartedly 
entered into the colonial venture, the riches of the Island would provide new 
opportunities for the export of agricultural products, shipping and trade. 
Neville’s verdict was simple: the English would have to become more like the 
Dutch, or would eventually be overtaken by them and perish, marooned on the 
wide, open seas. It would be another few decades before English governments 
embraced this controversial challenge. 
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The Persian Moment in Denis Veiras’s 
 History of the Sevarambians 
 Cyrus  Masroori  and  John Christian  Laursen  
 I should grow too prolix, were I to recite here all that is written 
of this great Man, whose wise Conduct, and worthy Actions, 
wou’d furnish Materials for many Volumes. I shall therefore pick out 
some of the most remarkable and essential Parts of the History of 
this happy People, who ascribe all their Felicity to the Care and 
Prudence of their incomparable Legislator. 
 He was Persian by Birth, and of a very ancient Family, being descended 
from the Parses, of whom there are still several branches in Persia, 
distinguish’d by this Name from the Tartars, who possess’d themselves 
of that ancient Kingdom. These Parses are the true Aborigines of the 
Country, and have retain’d many of the Customs of their Ancestors, of 
which, that of worshipping the Sun, and Fire, is one of the principal: For 
they are not Mahometans, as the Sophi, and the rest of his Subjects are. So 
that Sevarias, being born a Parsis, was brought up, from his very Infancy, 
in this Religion of his Fathers. He was called, in his own Country, Sevaris 
Ambarces, being the eldest Son of a Lord, whose Name was Alestan 
Hosser Ambarces, who, among those of his Religion, was acknowledged 
High Priest of the SUN. The Place of his Birth and Abode, was not far 
from that Part of Persia which stretches along by the Gulph; where his 
Family had maintain’d their Credit and Reputation during all the Wars, 
and notwithstanding the Persecutions of the Tartars, till the time of this 
Alestan; when it lost much of its ancient Splendor, by the malice of certain 
Powerful Enemies which Envy had rais’d up against them. 1 
 The founder of the ideal city in Denis Veiras’s  L’Histoire des Sevarambes of 1677–9 was a Persian Zoroastrian. Part Three (1677–8) tells the story of 
Sevarias, a Zoroastrian aristocrat who is subject to persecution in Persia and 
l ees to the south, eventually conquering Sevarambia in what is now Australia, 
settling there, and building a civilization where he rules as the Viceroy of the 
Sun. The questions cry out: Why a Persian? Why a Zoroastrian? What did 
the seventeenth century know about them? Why would a European writer 
attribute his utopia to a Persian? 
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 Given the turmoil of the Reformation and continued religious tension, 
it is not surprising that religion occupies a central part in the early modern 
utopian discourse. Religious violence was going to have to be suppressed if a 
utopia was going to be possible. But where most utopian authors of the time 
took it for granted that a utopia could be constructed within Christianity, 
Veiras offers an alternative religion capable of promoting and sustaining 
social coherence instead of causing the conl icts and corruption frequently 
associated with Christianity. He seems to suggest that while religion cannot be 
entirely rationalized, an ideal society demands a less irrational religion than 
Christianity. 
 This chapter shows how Veiras used exoticism from Persia as a foil for 
a subversive undermining of Christianity. We start with a brief mention of 
the references to Persia in Thomas More’s path-breaking  Utopia (1516), 
which set the model for later writers. Then we explore the travel literature 
available to Veiras, and draw attention to elements of it from which he may 
have drawn. And i nally we expand upon the ways in which Veiras drew 
ideas about Persian religion from the neo-Platonists which enabled him to 
undermine Christianity. We conclude that Veiras’s ideas about religion were 
closest of all to deists such as Herbert of Cherbury, and that he disagreed with 
Spinoza in fundamental ways. 
 Unfortunately, we know very little about Denis Veiras. 2 He was a French 
Huguenot who spent a number of years in England, where he was evidently 
a member of the Duke of Buckingham’s circle and may have been an 
acquaintance of John Locke. The i rst version of Veiras’s utopia was published 
in English as  The History of the Sevarites or Sevarambi in two parts appearing 
in 1675 and 1679 respectively. From 1677 to 1679 the French version of the 
book,  L’Histoire des Sevarambes , was published in i ve parts.  The History of 
the Sevarambians (hereafter  Sevarambians ) is the English translation of this 
French version, i rst printed in London in 1738. That Veiras’s utopia was well 
received is evident from Dutch, German, Italian and English translations and 
the responses to it by dozens of European intellectuals of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries including Bayle, Leibniz, Montesquieu, Hume, Rousseau 
and Kant. 
 The i rst English version claims that the utopia is a part of Paradise 
transported ‘upon the shoulders of Angels’, but in  Sevarambians the utopia is 
established by a Persian as a successor to a dystopia. 3 Its religion centres on 
worship of the sun; there is a Hymn to the Sun (225 f.), and the ruler rules as 
Viceroy of the Sun. And this Persian’s utopia bears little resemblance to the 
real Persia at the time. It is more technologically advanced, such that this work 
has been taken as an early piece of science i ction. Aerial tramways cross the 
mountains and the author shows a special interest in irrigation, hydraulics 
and fountains. It is also a highly regulated society, with special attention to 
marriage and the regulation of sex; clothing that indicates rank; and equal 
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living arrangements for everyone. Dispersed throughout the narrative are 
swashbuckling adventures and stories of romance and human passion. 
 There are only a few references to Persia in More’s  Utopia . In Book I his main 
character, Raphael Hythloday, says that he has travelled in Persia and praises 
some policies of the Polylerits, a ‘well-governed nation’ that paid tribute to the 
king of Persia in return for protection. 4 In Book II, he reports that the Utopians’ 
language ‘resembles Persian’ (125) and that their supreme deity is ‘known by 
all as Mithra’, which many readers would have recognized as a Persian god 
(145). The association between Persians, sun worship and Mithra (or Mithras) 
was established as early as Herodotus (c.490 BC–425 BC), who wrote that the 
Persians ‘worship the sun, moon, and earth, i re, water, and winds, which are 
their only original deities’. 5 Later, the Greek geographer Strabo (64 BC–c.24 
AD) refers to Persian worship of the sun, ‘whom they call Mithras’. 6 Greek and 
Roman understandings of Persian religion often associated it with i re and sun 
worship. 7 
 Note that the Greek and Roman understanding was probably not very 
close to reality. The ancient Zoroastrians believed in Ahura Mazda as the 
Supreme God, and their texts are clear about the superiority of Ahura Mazda 
over Mithra. 8 What probably misled the Greeks was that there was often an 
association of Mithra with the Sun. 9 Also, worshipping the Sun was common 
among various ancient Middle Eastern people. 
 Christians admired Cyrus the Great of Persia for allowing the Jews in 
captivity in Babylon to return to Jerusalem. 10 However, Christians were 
naturally more hostile to Zoroastrianism and its legacy, and More must have 
known this. Justin (103–165 AD) labelled followers of Mithras ‘wicked devils’, 
accusing them of imitating Christians ‘in the mysteries of Mithras’. 11 Archelaus 
(third century AD) added: ‘Barbarian priest and crafty coadjutor of Mithras, 
you will only be a worshipper of the sun-god Mithras.’ 12 Perhaps More did 
not elaborate on his utopia’s Mithraic cult because he did not really mean to 
promote it as a religion: it was only a mirror. 
 Later sources available to More include the pioneering work of the neo-
Platonist Marsilio Ficino (1433–99), who surveyed the ancient sources 
and asserted that Zoroaster was the i rst of six great theologians of which 
Plato was the last and greatest. 13 Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463–94) 
developed some of Ficino’s ideas, using the divine inspiration of Zoroaster 
as a way of proving that pagan philosophy is a way to true wisdom. 14 More 
was undoubtedly inl uenced by the neo-Platonists, but his few and superi cial 
references to Persia and Mithra make it unlikely that he was doing anything 
more than adding a touch of exoticism to the idealized mirror in which his 
contemporaries could recognize their weaknesses and his call for reform. 
 There were at least two bodies of literature on Persia and Zoroastrianism 
from after More’s time that were available to Veiras. One was the travel 
literature, and this seems a likely source for some of his ideas. The second was 
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the philosophical and theological work of erudite scholars such as Herbert of 
Cherbury’s  De religione gentilium (1663). 15 
 The travel literature bloomed in the decades before Veiras. A French 
translation of a Spanish ambassador’s report,  L’Ambassade de D. Garcias de 
Silva Figueroa en Perssee of 1667, observed that 
 there have remained a number of those ancient and true Persians who … have … 
not ceased to hold steadfastly to their original way of life, their customs and their 
religion. Thus they venerate to this day the sun, as did the Persians of old when 
their empire was the greatest in the world, and, following their example, they 
keep a i re always burning in their homes. 16 
 Veiras may also have borrowed from  L’Ambassade de D. Garcias the 
narratives of hunts and animal i ghts as entertainment in both versions of his 
book (84, 97, 174f.). 17 
 In 1671 Jean Chardin referred in passing to the ‘Guebres’, or ini dels – which 
is what the Muslims called the Zoroastrians – as ‘the ancient Persians or Fire 
Worshippers’, observing that ‘they were a miserable sort of People, and under 
great distress’. 18 Chardin’s book,  Le couronnement de Soleimaan, troisiéme 
Roy de Perse de cette nomme , may have provided a model for other things in 
Veiras’s book. The better part of the work is a description of court intrigue very 
much in a Tacitean or Machiavellian mode. Every person’s decisions are made 
with self-interest in mind, and no-one’s word is trustworthy. This is a feature of 
many of the vignettes in Veiras’s work, ranging from the intrigues Sevarias uses 
to gain power (212ff.) to the very realistic and unromantic considerations a 
woman takes into account in becoming one of the wives of the Viceroy instead 
of remaining faithful to her betrothed (296ff.). 
 Other details also could have been lifted from Chardin. For example, the 
idea that in utopia sexual ini delity would be rel ected in a person’s face  (60, 
68) could have been taken from Chardin’s description of venereal disease as 
that ‘nauseous Distemper … [that] displays itself in the Faces of the Diseased, 
and publishes with Ignominy their frequent Converse with lewd Women’ (2). 
Veiras’s Viceroy chooses the most beautiful women for his wives (294–9), 
just as the King of Persia ‘caus’d all the handsom women to be taken up, and 
brought to his Haram’ (114). The Persian King was styled ‘the Lieutenant of 
the true Sovereign [God]’ (34, 66), just as Sevarias does not call himself a 
king but the Viceroy of the Sun (229, 237, 252, etc.). In their inauguration, 
the Persians demand that ‘his Majesty may always appear surrounded with 
glory like the Sun’ (47). The late king of Persia is credited with respecting 
‘the Liberty of mens Consciences’ (48), just as the Sevarambians do (301). 
Finally, the coronation speeches and descriptions of coronation and wedding 
ceremonies in Veiras echo the many such descriptions in Chardin’s work. 
 At times, the Safavid kings imposed compulsory migration policies on 
minorities, including the Zoroastrians. This and other sorts of persecution led 
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some Zoroastrians to l ee to Surat and Gujarat in India, where they prospered. 
Henry Lord wrote about them in  A Display of Two Forraign Sects in the East 
Indies … Part II, The Religion of the Parsees (1630), which was also available in 
French in Veiras’s day as  Histoire de la religion … avec un traité de la Religion 
des anciens Persans ou Parsis (1667). Here we have the spelling of the word 
that Veiras used to describe his Zoroastrians: Parsis (plural: Parses) (203, 205, 
etc.). Those who settled there and in Gujarat found more wealth and power 
than those who stayed home in Persia. The experience of these exiles is such a 
close parallel to Veiras’s account that it may have been his source. 
 The other main body of work on Zoroastrianism available to Veiras was 
the scholarly neo-Platonism after Thomas More, which also drew on Marsilio 
Ficino and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. Some of it remained Christian, like 
the Cambridge Platonists, but some of it eventually became what we now refer 
to as ‘deism’. One of the key early i gures in the latter movement was Edward 
Herbert of Cherbury, whose book,  De religione gentilium (1663), might well be 
a source for Veiras. Chapter 4 is a survey of peoples who worshipped the sun, 
with substantial attention to Zoroastrians. 19 Herbert drew on G.J. Vossius’s 
 De theologia gentilium (1642), which argued that sun worship was the oldest 
form of religion. 20 Herbert also suggested his own minimum core of a universal 
religion, just as Veiras reported of both the public religion of the Sevarambians 
and of the intellectual, Scromenas (301–13, 353–8). The Platonic heritage is 
clear: Scromenas draws on Plato, but also on Pythagoras and other Greek, 
Arabian and Indian philosophers (353). For Herbert, the core beliefs are: 
there is a supreme God; this God should be worshipped; virtue and piety are 
the principal elements of that worship; we should repent of our sins; and we 
will be rewarded or punished in the next life. The core of the Sevarambians’ 
religion is similar (301–13). Richard Baxter observed of Herbert what could 
also be observed of Veiras: there was no place for Christ in these accounts. 21 
But things get worse for Christians: Scromenas’s core beliefs include only the 
i rst four of Herbert’s: there is no next life in his account (355). 
 It is worth observing that the tradition of sun-worshipping utopias also 
had an anti-Christian background: Julian the Apostate tried to make the sun 
the supreme god in order to undermine Christianity. 22 In any case, Herbert is 
credited with being the founder of English deism, and it is clear that Veiras 
follows him closely, if not exactly. 
 The question that the utopian authors of Veiras’s era faced is this: Given 
that modernity has unleashed unprecedented forces and opportunities with 
potential to build a substantially better life for Europeans, why is Europe 
experiencing turbulence unseen since the fall of Rome? It is in response to 
this question that Veiras, like a number of other utopian authors, i nds himself 
compelled to turn to experiences other than those of modern Europe. In other 
words, if Europe, ravaged by war and persecution, is the dystopia, utopia can 
only be in faraway lands and rooted in other cultures. 
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 At least in part, it is to i nd an alternative to this European dystopia that 
Veiras turns to Persia. The choice of a non-Christian and non-European to be 
the founder of the ‘paradise on Earth’ is apparently a vote of no coni dence 
in modern Europeans. Further, the story is a daring rejection of the potential 
of Christianity to establish the ideal city. In More’s  Utopia, there is a mass 
conversion to Christianity upon introduction of that religion, and Bacon’s  New 
Atlantis is a Christian community. In Sevarambia, however, the population has 
been exposed to Christianity since the time of Giovanni but very few have 
converted to it (307–9). In fact, some shipwrecked Europeans choose to convert 
to the Sevarambian religion (358). 
 Our most ambitious claim is that Veiras may be using a Zoroastrian to 
criticize Christianity as a whole. Stroukaras, the ruler of Veiras’s dystopia, 
for example, claims to be the Son of the Sun, the supreme deity of the land. 
Stroukaras and his priests commit acts of deception, debauchery and cruelty 
similar to those that some Popes and Cardinals of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries were accused of by Protestants. But if the analogy of Stroukaras as 
Son of the Sun to the Christian Son of God is intentional (and it is hard to 
imagine otherwise), Veiras’s criticism is directed at Christianity as a whole 
and not just at one or another Christian sect. Also, similar to the way that 
the injustice and intolerance of the Muslim Persians against the Zoroastrian 
minority deprived Persia of a rare talent like Sevarias, persecution in Christian 
Europe had deprived it of many talented individuals like Veiras. In fact, 
Veiras could be comparing Christianity (the religion of Stroukaras) to Persian 
Mithraism (the religion of Sevarias). 
 Neo-Platonism includes Christian Platonism, but that is clearly not what 
Veiras has in mind. Cambridge Platonist Henry More’s  An Antidote Against 
Atheism (1651) cited apparitions of men i ghting on the ground and in the 
sky as proof of a supernatural spirit world, drawing on Maccabees, Josephus, 
English chronicles and contemporary sources. 23 When these ‘reports cannot be 
suspected to be in subserviency to any Politick design, [they] ought in reason 
to be held true, when there have been many profest Eye-witnesses’, he wrote 
(244). Veiras’s narrator reports that the Sevarambians i gured out that such 
apparitions were optical illusions, rel ections from the clouds of distant events, 
and thus not proof of any spirit world (310–11). This sort of observation 
positions Veiras not as a Christian, but as a deist Platonist. 
 Neo-Platonic deism is not the same as Spinozism. Jonathan Israel has asserted 
that Veiras’s story is ‘a Spinozist utopia’. 24 There are elements of agreement, such 
as the critique of miracles and priestcraft. But Veiras is certainly not fully Spinozist: 
Spinoza would presumably not approve of his endorsement of censorship, 
communism, political absolutism and political Platonism. That makes it more 
likely that he is best understood as a neo-Platonist deist, not a Spinozist. 
 Denis Veiras’s  History of Sevarambians is not only one of the longest, most 
innovative and most articulated utopian accounts of early modernity, it is 
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arguably the boldest account of that genre in the seventeenth century. Veiras 
reconstructs Persians and Zoroastrianism not to justify European superiority 
or pave the way for colonialism, but to suggest that non-Europeans are as 
capable as Europeans of creating an ideal society. In doing so, he overcomes 
Eurocentric prejudice. 
 At the same time, as a neo-Platonist Veiras demands that Christianity be 
subject to the tests of reasonableness that were the intellectual spirit of his 
time. While most of his contemporaries either rather unsuccessfully attempted 
to demonstrate the reasonableness of various Christian principles or excused 
Christianity from the test of reason, Veiras implied that in fact Christianity was 
not capable of passing such a test, and therefore was uni t to be the religion of 
a society where reason rules. 
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Nature and Utopia in Morelly’s 
 Code De La Nature 
 Claudio de  Boni  
 The only vice that I perceive in the universe is Avarice; all the 
others, by whatever name they be known, are only variations, degrees, 
of this one; it is the Proteus, the Mercury, the basis, the vehicle, 
of all the vices. Analyze vanity; fatuousness; pride; ambition; 
duplicity; hypocrisy; dishonesty; break down most of our sophistic 
virtues into their component parts, and they all resolve themselves 
into this subtle and pernicious element, the desire to have. 
You will even i nd it at the bottom of disinterestedness. 
 I dare to conclude here that is almost mathematically demonstrable 
that all division of goods, whether equal or unequal, and that 
all private property whatever these portions is, in all societies, what 
Horace calls ‘material for the highest evil’. All moral and political 
phenomena, are the effects of this pernicious cause; through it 
can be explained and resolved all theorems or problems about the origin 
or advancement of, the connection or afi nity between, the different 
virtues and vices, disorders and crimes; about the true motives behind 
good or bad actions; about all the resolutions or perplexities of the 
human will; about the depravity of the passions; about the ineffectuality 
of precepts and laws that are meant to contain them; about the very 
technical faults in these lessons; i nally, about all the monstrous 
productions that come from the aberrations of the mind 
or the heart. I say that the grounds for all these defects can be seen 
in the general tendency of legislators to allow the primary link of all 
sociability to be broken by the usurpation of the resources that should 
belong in common to all humanity. 1 
 Morelly’s  Code de la Nature has long been read in a controversial way, both for criticism and historiography. The work was published in 
1755 anonymously, a common strategy to escape censorship, and with the 
attributes of a i ction, as was also common at the time. But the combination of 
anonymity and i ction led immediately to heated debate about the authorship 
and signii cance of the work. 
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 The Abbé Raynal was of the opinion that the encyclopaedist Toussaint was 
the author, while, for Grimm, it was a work by Rousseau, interpreting the 
criticism of civilization as similar to that in Rouseau’s  Essay on Inequality . La 
France Littéraire identii ed Diderot as the writer of the  Code , noting the text’s 
radicalization of the idea of equality which was then spreading among followers 
of the Enlightenment. Only in the nineteenth century, and more dei nitively in 
the twentieth, was the author established as being Etienne-Gabriel Morelly, 
who at that time was a teacher at a local school in a small town in Champagne: 
Vitry-le-François. 2 
 Within Morelly’s  oeuvre , the  Code opened a new debate, noteworthy in 
the history of utopias, but which can only be touched on here.  Code de la 
Nature was indeed based on a strict communism, but it presented a political 
model different from the one celebrated in Morelly’s other utopian work, 
 Basiliade , published just two years earlier. 3 Some of the themes of Morelly’s 
 weltanschauung were also expressed in  Basiliade : the belief that human nature 
has a drive towards harmony; faith in a form of social organization that would 
make men mutually supportive and moderate in their consumption of the goods 
provided by Nature itself; and a prospect of the end of conl icts between men, 
primarily due to the elimination amongst them of the right to private property. 
Nevertheless, the political government of the ideal society dei ned in  Basiliade 
was not a communist one. According to the most widespread political theories 
of the eighteenth century, the best ruler was an enlightened Prince. The Prince 
was always connected with his citizens, more as an educating father rather than 
as a dictator, and his main task consisted in reducing government to simple 
legislation, in line with natural principles. Within two years, however, and in a 
surprisingly swift manner, Morelly lost faith in the political schemes typical of 
the Enlightenment, and switched to a coherent and total communistic system 
in the  Code de la Nature . At the beginning of the  Code , he explained that 
the fundamental purpose of  Basiliade , which was the same as the  Code , was the 
goodness of all humankind. If in the earlier novel the Prince stood out in 
the character of a prince-hero, it was mainly a matter of genre, because in that 
case, the novel was an allegorical tale. 
 Let us return to the  Code . It is divided into two parts. In the i rst, and 
longest, Morelly presented the key elements of his vision of the world, in the 
form of a philosophical essay. In turn, this philosophical section could be 
divided into two parts: one presenting the elements of the natural order, and 
the other showing that the distortions of history have been the cause of the 
human separation from an original harmony. All of this had a conclusion, 
almost like an appendix, which was the real focus and the real novelty of 
Morelly’s argument: the ‘Model of legislation conforming with the intentions 
of Nature’ (189). Here he presented a perfect society with an ideal system 
of laws which, for the i rst time in the utopian genre, came very close to the 
drafting of an imaginary Bill of Rights. 
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 In line with the utopian tradition, the  Code is constructed as a pedagogical 
text, but it begins by recalling some of the topics the author had already dealt 
with in his early works on education. 4 His aim was to combine empirical 
and utilitarian views of human action in the hope that the individual can 
be motivated to pursue happiness as expressed within a harmonious social 
framework. The starting point of this theory lay in his conviction that both the 
ideas and the behaviour of men depended upon external, sensory impressions. 
Using an image similar to the one coined by his contemporary Condillac about 
an inanimate statue, in both his early writings and in his mature work, Morelly 
argued that, before receiving sensations from external motions, the human soul 
was like ‘a canvas on which the painter has not drawn any sign yet’. 5 Ideas and 
actions did not come from abstract rationality, but from the concrete repetition 
of impressions that affect humans, causing pleasure or pain, according to 
circumstances. The formation of ideas depended on such sensations. As a 
result of human ability to remember and to catalogue the sensations which 
had been previously experienced, we were able to foresee the likely effects of 
our own future actions. The stimulation of feelings also depended on these 
sensations, enabling one to obtain as much pleasure as possible from one’s 
own behaviour, while minimizing pain. Human nature had not only provided 
us with a rational system, but also with passions, which continuously drove us 
towards the pursuit of happiness. 
 This quest for happiness is both common to humankind and productive of 
social cohesion. Love for oneself might be the i rst feeling perceived, driving 
one to protect one’s own existence and to make it as pleasant as possible. 
Nevertheless, humans showed a signii cant diversity when it came to the objects 
that made them happy, depending on their age, mental and physical character, 
tastes, environment and social organization. Such differences are usually a matter 
of primary concern for utopian writers. Morelly, on the contrary, underlined 
the propitious overlapping of unity and variability in human nature. The basis 
of a society founded on a common law was our common desire for happiness. 
Because individuals have different expectations, it is less likely that there will 
not be enough goods to satisfy their diverse wants. In the previous century, 
Hobbes had instead depicted this situation as one of inevitable conl ict for the 
same goods between members of the human race. So, for Morelly, passions in 
themselves are not in themselves bad: Nature had endowed us with them to 
encourage us to take care of ourselves. In the context of the Enlightenment, he 
believed that passions should be moderate, and should not induce behaviours 
adverse to the ones of our fellows and to the social order. 
 Hence people were equal because they all had feelings (the i rst being love 
for oneself) and they all had needs. This egalitarian situation made people 
understand the rightness of the idea of equal rights and the necessity of shared 
work to meet everyone’s needs. The different conditions of people (tastes, 
abilities, strength, etc.) made everyone’s desires vary according to the specii c 
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situation. This, in turn, encouraged a mutual exchange between individuals, 
so that no one should be willing to keep things they did not need. What was 
not useful for one person could be of use to another and vice versa. So it may 
happen that the sum of desires at a certain point might be greater than the 
actual resources available. But this is not a bad thing in itself. It could be the 
key to cooperation among people, who understand that, only by working 
together more and more, can they easily achieve what they need. Nature wills 
that 
 the sorrow and the difi culty of attending to our needs, since when acting alone 
they are beyond our reach, make us understand the importance of turning to 
others for help. It inspires affection, if it is helpful. Hence our distaste for the 
abandonment of loneliness, and our love of the pleasures and for the benei ts of 
being part of community and society.  (25–6)
 In Morelly’s text, the idea of natural harmony combined with the critique 
of history, comparable to that in Rousseau’s  Essay on Inequality , which was 
written in the same period. The natural order, as a combined satisfaction 
of everyone’s needs, may be known by people in a state of nature, but it 
has been swept away by a civilization progressively based on principles far 
from natural ones. As in Rousseau, demographic expansion was seen as the 
basis of such a negative process. Increasing in numbers, humanity had to deal 
with scarce resources and then often left their homes in order to be able to 
survive. But in so acting they discovered and somehow absorbed the spirit 
of competition instead of collaboration. In this way, they lost the concept 
of natural relationships. During this long historical process, the vices of 
individualism replaced feelings of solidarity. In Morelly’s opinion, greed or 
avarice was the worst of these vices. By recognizing private property, greed 
had been consolidated in legal systems. So, in the  Code such greed is subject to 
attack. This was clear in the passage quoted at the beginning of this chapter. 
It could also be seen in the passages where Morelly argued against those 
legislators, past and present, who had failed their task as educators and guides 
to their people. By doing so 
 they have stil ed the causes of affection that are necessary to create the link 
between human beings, as well as having turned mutual agreement and 
mutual aid into undesirable divisions aimed at separating the great body of 
humankind into different parts. Besides they have stoked the i re of a burning 
greed and whetted the appetite of an insatiable and demanding avarice, by 
the several agitations opposing each other stimulated by those confused and 
divided parts.  (35–6)
 As is typical for many Utopians, Morelly’s vision of past history is as a series 
of errors which pit individuals one against the other. Assuming that it would 
be possible to escape from this, the only way out might be a kind of return to 
original Nature as a source of truth. 
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 People are the corrupt ones, not Nature. Man abandons the Truth, but the Truth 
never vanishes. And everything disputed in this respect would never affect my 
thesis; every nation, wild or not, can or could be redirected to the laws of Nature, 
maintaining what they allow and eliminating what they disapprove.  (45)
 In order to improve humankind, such a return to the natural order would 
bring together three tools disastrously separated by history. The i rst of these is 
Politics, as the capacity to lead individuals towards social harmony; the second 
is Legislation, because the truth has to become a codii ed norm; and the third 
is Morality, as a criterion leading human acts to the common good. 
 On the basis of such a critique of civilization contrasted with the natural 
order, Morelly concluded his work with the drafting of a legal system, laying 
the conceptual foundations of a perfect communistic society. At the same time, 
he presented this social ideal through legislation embracing all aspects of the 
usual planning of utopias: government, economic organization, employment, 
the cultural environment and social customs. Three laws, ‘fundamental and 
sacred’, underwrite Morelly’s perfect society. In his opinion ‘they are designed 
to cut the roots of all the vices and evils of society’. They are the abolition of 
private property, except for goods for purely personal use; the consideration 
of every citizen as a ‘public individual, fed, supported and employed at public 
expense’ (190); in return, third, for the duty of work as everyone’s contribution 
to public necessity. 
 On such foundations, the new, natural society was characterized by the 
centralized distribution of the common product and by a common obligation 
to work applied to the production of only those goods specii cally necessary 
for its citizens. Work as a duty had an educational meaning as well as economic 
implications. All citizens, at least for one specii c period during their lives, 
devoted themselves to agricultural production, in a form most suited to the 
needs of the community. Morelly’s ideal society was, however, neither poor, nor 
purely rural, as many cities and artisanal activities are encouraged. Nevertheless, 
any aspiration to luxury was excluded. Every form of social expression had to 
rest on egalitarian values producing a uniformity extending to architectural 
and urban structures, based on the geometric regularity of the road lines and 
of the building sizes. 
 The system of political representation was based on both democratic 
and paternalistic principles. Representation had its origin in the family and 
in the political role of the household leader. It extended to local institutions 
and to the Senate which was identii ed as the focus of the State. The social 
importance of the family was emphasized by legislation specii cally dedicated 
to the marital system, subjecting marriage and divorce to strict regulation. In 
selecting those who would take political roles, the principle of election from 
below was important, but managed in such a way as to give prevalence to 
seniority. Indeed, it was not the function of political authority to outline new 
directions in the management of public affairs, but to preserve what the laws 
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of Nature prescribed. For such a role the wisdom and the prudence bestowed 
by age were regarded as more suitable. Morelly, as a pedagogue, described 
the educational system of his ideal society in depth. Removing young men 
from the family was fundamental. They were i rst to be educated in boarding 
schools and then in the i elds and in the factories. Like many other utopias, the 
 Code described the social welfare services very fully, covering public health, 
care for the elderly, care for the disabled, etc. The result was a social system 
transmitting a feeling of great organic unity to the reader; maybe too much. 
The account of the secondary variability among people given in Morelly’s i rst 
writings seems to give way to a desire for uniformity in which differences of 
status and of preferences between individuals dissolved into a single, general 
idea of happiness. This is a feature of utopian writing that we could observe 
not only in Morelly but even in many other utopias. 
 Morelly dei nitely shares the tendency of utopian writers to an analytic and 
complete planning of a society alternative to the existing one. His effectiveness 
lies primarily in shifting the description of a perfect world into the language 
of legislation, the highest form of morality and politics (whether reformist or 
revolutionary) that is condensed in the writing of a new constitution. It was 
along these lines of thought that Babeuf was to take the  Code de la Nature as a 
model of action (even while believing that Diderot was its author). In reference 
to the social ideas of the Enlightenment, Engels would reserve for Morelly, 
along with Mably, a very important role in the long line of ‘precursors’ of 
contemporary socialism from the authors of Renaissance utopias to the 
contributions of Saint-Simon, Fourier and Owen. 6 In a similar way, a great 
historian of the late nineteenth century, André Lichtenberger, would consider 
the  Code to be ‘the great socialist book of the eighteenth century’. 7 
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 Sinapia , A Political Journey to the 
Antipodes of Spain 
 Miguel  A. Ramiro Avilés  
 Veracity or verisimilitude, this republic is very worthy of praise, since it 
has succeeded better than might have been expected or, at least, has set 
an example for those who wish to succeed. 1 
 T he Description of Sinapia, a peninsula in terra australis (henceforth  Sinapia ) summarizes the anxiety and pain felt by the authors of the Spanish 
Enlightenment contemplating the decadence of their country, its institutions 
and people. It rel ects an Enlightenment interest in the improvement both of 
the human condition and of forms of government.  Sinapia is an account of 
an imaginary Spain located in  terra australis where the best remedies for the 
reform of souls and institutions have been implemented. It is an invitation to 
consider the distance between how things are in Spain and how things might 
be in its antipodes, Sinapia. 
 Sinapia is a rare text because, although it is not the i rst Spanish utopia, like 
More’s  Utopia it uses law and the formal institutions of government as a basis 
on which to build the ideal society. The text was lost until the 1970s when it 
was discovered in the archives of Pedro Rodríguez, Count of Campomanes. Its 
close links with  Utopia , and some other utopian texts, are most obvious in its 
reiteration of common ideas or its reproduction of passages, a practice which 
lessens the sense of its own originality – ‘[the prince] directs surplus population 
to the colonies, and orders the return of colonists when population declines’ 
(91/20). 2 The text’s long disappearance means that even today we do not know 
who the author is or when the work was written. 
 Scholars have discussed whether Campomanes was the author or if one of his 
close circle wrote  Sinapia. 3 We should perhaps recall that utopian writers have 
often been close to power. The discussion in Book I of  Utopia is on precisely 
this: whether philosophers should be the counsellors of kings and princes. 4 
James Harrington and Gerrard Winstanley both dedicated their utopias to 
Oliver Cromwell. 5 Utopian writers often formulate a vision of the best society 
and hope to insinuate their ideas by indirect means, as Thomas More proposed 
in  Utopia. They long to i nd an educated or enlightened prince or patron who 
will assume the responsibility of implementing their proposals. 6 In  Sinapia’s 
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case that might be Campomanes, who was President of the Council of Castille 
from 1786 to 1791 and planned, with Pablo de Olavide, Intendent of Seville, 
the repopulation of the Sierra Morena, restoring a traditional agrarian society 
of small peasants. 7 
 The passage selected above contains, I think, two ideas which may be useful 
in reading  Sinapia afresh. First, it is the author’s intention that a i ctional 
story – the description of the institutions and customs of the republic of 
Sinapia – should be considered a true or plausible account, one possessed of 
verisimilitude. Second, the way in which Sinapia is socially and institutionally 
arranged should be thought of as an example to be followed in undertaking the 
reforms necessary to transform reality in Spain. 
 The author does not want  Sinapia to be read ‘as a novel’ (70/1) in which 
monsters and unlikely situations are described since the aim of the book is 
not to discover man-eating Lestrygonians but something even more strange 
and unusual – one republic wisely governed. 8 His desire is that  Sinapia be 
considered as a true story and a practical model in ethics and politics. Maybe 
he wanted to evade the censorship exercised by the Council of Castille and 
the Inquisition and maybe this is the reason why he made use of the literary 
form – making his utopia look like an avatar for the genre of the novel. 9 In 
those same years, José de Cadalso confessed: ‘[T]he spaniard who publishes his 
works today writes them very carefully, and he trembles when he manages to 
print them … At that point many men, whose compositions would be useful 
for them and confer honour on their country, hide them.’ 10 
 Sinapia could be read as a sketch of a social and political culture turned 
inside-out, one where the author hides behind the mask of an impartial critic 
engaged in the analysis of the customs and practices followed in Sinapia. 
Impartiality was a quality much appreciated by the Spain’s Enlightenment 
authors because they considered, to use Cadalso’s words again, that ‘this just 
balance is what assures us that a man has the full use of his reason’. 11 
 The utopian literary form allowed the author of  Sinapia to avoid presenting 
his readers with reform policies to be legitimated and adopted. Instead, the 
readers were offered a political project already implemented and legitimized 
by the rationality, fairness and justice of its arrangements as they were vividly 
experienced in the lives and characters of the populace. The republic of Sinapia 
was a microcosm set in motion as an entire and functioning society, as complex 
as the real macrocosm, and with a plausible life (verisimilitude). ‘The method 
of describing a functioning society, with all its components and details, only 
emphasizes their practical and realistic intentions: the fabricated authenticity 
makes ideas into concrete, believable facts.’ 12 
 Verisimilitude was achieved both by populating the account with real facts 13 
and by proposing reforms which depended neither on the transformation of 
human nature and the natural environment nor on supernatural force but 
which were solely dependent on human capacity and activity. In this sense, 
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it was a hypothesis about the possibilities of human action. 14 It was possible 
to implement the reforms described, to imagine them as possible options 
confronting the  status quo , even if they could not be accommodated in current 
conceptual language and would not be adopted as active policies in the current 
political climate. 15 The utopian text then inhabits a space in which it was free 
to develop a theory transformative of the material conditions which could 
underwrite fundamental social change. 16 
 Verisimilitude, or plausibility, then went along with  estrangement because 
one object (the kingdom of Spain) was represented in such a way (as republic 
of Sinapia) that it could be easily recognized but, at the same time, it was 
unfamiliar to the readers due to the scale of social, political and legal change. 17 
For example, the author observed that people raised under a system of private 
property (‘mine and yours’) could barely be persuaded that people could live 
in perfect community and perfect equality (70/1). 
 The plausibility of its proposals rel ects the political content of  Sinapia . It 
is a wisely governed republic, with implications for the reform of the social, 
economic, religious, political and legal conditions of contemporary Spain. It is 
a union of diverse peoples – ‘malay, peruvian, chinese and persian’ (72/3) – in 
which ‘the monarch is the law, the nobles are the magistrates and the people 
are the families’ (86/13).  Sinapia ’s author follows the republican formula of a 
perfect government combining the rule of the one, the few and the many, where 
nobility is not hereditary but by election, and magistrates, including the prince, 
are chosen ‘by the nomination of those who are to obey and by the election of 
those who are to command’ (119/28). 
 Founded by the persian prince Sinap, the persian patriarch Codabend and 
the chinese philosopher Si-Ang, 18 the republic of Sinapia, previously named 
Bireia, is not only antipodean to Spain in a geographical sense – ‘the climate 
of this peninsula is like Spain’s but the seasons are reversed, with the longest 
day of the year about Christmas and the shortest about the festival of Saint 
John’ (72/2) – but also socially, economically, religiously, politically and legally. 
The Australasian location facilitates its conversion into the perfectly rel ected 
inversion of its model. 
 That reversal is indicated from the very i rst pages. In Sinapia it is shocking 
that European societies follow the teachings of Tacitus and Machiavelli in 
their politics, forgetting that ‘the practice of Christian virtue is better suited to 
building a l ourishing republic and a blessed nation’ (69/1). Christianity had 
arrived with the Persians, ‘who brought the light of Gospel and true politics 
with it’ (73/3). 
 The prince presides over the Senate and the General Assembly, and the 
patriarch is the head of the Synod. These three institutions are entrusted with 
all important government functions: legislation; the sending and receiving 
of embassies; the making of war, peace and alliances; the naturalization of 
foreigners; the liberation of slaves; approving and monitoring all  ofi ce-holders, 
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including the prince; allowing or forbidding all types of innovation and 
publication; establishing new colonies; and regulating the welfare of the people 
and the shortage or abundance of things (90–1/20, 110/25). The reform of 
the customs, canons and laws shows that in Sinapia the  leggi can be changed 
but the  ordini remain unchangeable; a certain l exibility is possible while the 
fundamental laws remain unaltered. Some practices against the  ordini had 
been attempted ‘but this had been checked by prompt punishment of the few 
who had this opinion, because since childhood they are well-educated in the 
advantages of this form of government’ (134/33). 
 Despite its possible side effects, science is very important in the republic of 
Sinapia: 
 This College has really been of great utility to the nation, because, by their 
means, every day they make advances in natural sciences to a point which will be 
difi cult to believe in Europe, with very useful inventions for the conservation and 
alleviation of human life, closing the doors to harmful innovations and inventions 
that could be spread by communication with foreigners, while, at the same time, 
acquiring an adequate knowledge of all the works of merit of the other nations … 
and, with the help of the translations that are allowed with great prudence … 
saving the republic from every thing that is harmful and useless. 19  (126–7/30)
 One of the distinguishing features of Sinapia is that ‘mine and yours is cast 
out’ because private property is seen as the root cause of every social dispute. 
For this reason, they have formal institutions to provide to the people ‘whatever 
they need’ (91/21). At the end of the book, the author defends the community 
of goods against those who could use Aristotle’s ideas saying that the power 
of education in Sinapia and the example of the parents and magistrates are the 
key elements (132/33). 
 Another important aspect of Sinapia is the reform it has undergone to make 
the Christian religion ‘rational and pious’ (75/3). In particular, the training 
and election of its priests, who must have served as deacons for ten years, 
guarantees their l uency in Hebrew and Greek, and their command of Holy 
Writ and ecclesiastical history (94/22). In Sinapia ‘the christian religion is the 
only faith but one without hyprocrisy, superstition or vanity’ (93/22) and they 
strive to restore primitive Christianity as embodied in ‘the discipline observed 
in the third and fourth centuries’. It is forbidden to probe into the mysteries 
of the faith and people must be content to simply believe them, ‘without 
indulging their curiousity’. Thanks to these reforms, ‘religion [is] free of error 
and superstition. Care is taken to avoid all novelty and tenuousness in the 
doctrines of faith. They escape any kind of violence and excessive roughness 
in their religious discipline and limit the clergy to only the essential, and 
those proven, learned, without private possessions and employed only in the 
ministry’ (133/33). 
 Another principal area of reform is that of the structure and laws of the 
republic: ‘[B]uilding the settlement and laws of their republic, they were 
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prudent legislators introducing reforms not at a blow, which was impossible, 
but step by step’ (76/3). With legal and institutional transformation, the causes 
of many crimes disappeared, but they remain necessary tools. The solution is 
not the absence of laws ( anomia) but new, fairer laws and institutions. The 
utopian solution is to simplify the complexity of the legal system, creating legal 
certainty by a schematic system of laws. The people are instructed in their laws 
every day in the morning (103/24) so that everyone knows the rules which 
govern their lives and to which they owe their social peace (99/23). Sinapia is 
a law-based utopia where there is  eunomia because the system comprises few 
laws, which must be published and clearly written in the vernacular so that 
everybody can understand them. 20 
 The book of Sinapian law, made by the three founders of the state and 
supplemented and amended by the General Assembly of the nation (which alone 
has this authority) is written in the native language, in a pure style, and in free 
verse. The laws are brief, clear, giving no cause for contention but commanding 
and forbidding absolutely and the date of the laws origin is noted in the margin. 
Whenever they add a law, another is repealed, in order not to increase the number 
to be observed. 
 The interpretation of the doubtful laws is done by the Senate but such 
decisions are valid only for one particular case and cannot be appealed to 
in other cases in the future (116/26). Legal rules in the law-based Utopia are 
usually interpreted in the simplest way and literally, ‘the bare letter of the law’. 
 In the administration of justice, they draw a distinction between ecclesiastical 
and civil jurisdictions: ‘Any jurisdiction exercised by prelates, whether over the 
laity or the clergy, is restricted to matters of conscience and the spiritual penalties 
of excommunication or privation of clerical status. In civil cases everyone 
is subject to the magistrates’ (96/22). The tempo of justice is reinvigorated: 
‘[A]ll judgements are summary, circumstantial evidence is taken as proof and 
witnesses are under oath, and for the slightest offence they can be condemned, 
without appeal, to perpetual slavery’ (114/26). The anonymous author has a 
good knowledge of court proceedings because he knows that proof derived 
from circumstantial evidence should not be adequate to condemn anyone, and 
he resolves the problem of perjury with a very hard penalty. Judges cannot 
increase or diminish the punishments set by the laws (115/26). They can only 
apply the law, being, as Montesquieu stated, ‘the mouth that pronounces the 
words of the law, mere passive beings, incapable of moderating either its force 
or rigour’. 
 The rationality of the legal system can also be seen in the proportionality, 
defended by Beccaria, between crimes and punishments, applied by slaves 
and foreigners, and the gravity of the crime also inl uences the right of appeal 
against the penalty’s imposition. They have almost succeeded in dispensing 
with capital punishment and have prohibited torture, judging it ‘inhuman and 
uncertain’ (114/26). 
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 The other cornerstone of the republic of Sinapia is education, on which 
depends ‘the conservation and the well-being of the republic’ (116/27). The 
author professes a belief in the power of education and knowledge to mould 
better people and thus a better society. 21 Sinapia is inhabited by people who, 
in the main, voluntarily and spontaneously follow the rules, leaving only a 
minority of recalcitrants. This kind of general observance of the laws allows 
them to be seen as no more than customary behaviour. Usually, law-based 
utopias do not seek to gain compliance with the laws through force as a 
permanent instrument, because such a strategy could weaken the legitimacy 
and stability of the system in the long term. Its aspiration is rather that the 
people should agree with the content of the laws, an objective which could be 
achieved by developing an educational system infused with the same principles. 
The emphasis here is on the importance of duty: ‘To realise genuine honour 
and true delight … can only be achieved when our conscience is assured that 
all our duty has been done’ (134/33). 
 Moderation, fairness and the subordination of the self to society are the 
norms which are defended in Sinapia. The idea of happiness for everybody, as 
a goal attainable through mutual understanding, prevails. ‘All doubt comes to 
an end when we consider the aim that this republic has in its foundation – to 
live with moderation, devotion and fairness in this world awaiting the promised 
bliss with the glorious coming of our great God, so that no means are more 
appropriate than life in common, equality, moderation and work’ (70/1). 
 Sinapia is, therefore, one product of the Enlightenment but in Spain that had 
not the same reach as elsewhere in Europe – ‘the reception of a more critical 
Enlightenment discourse was not the easy for those who kept abreast of the new 
ideas in Spain. Often alien ideas had to be decontaminated of tranformed’. 22 
 Sinapia illustrates the contradiction besetting Spanish Enlightenment authors: 
intellectual loyalty to the ideals of the Enlightenment as against emotional 
loyalty to the national tradition. The author seems to look outwards from 
Spain in search of critical norms but he is also looking towards Spain as the 
only context where he can i nd some personal and human identity. 23 
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Condorcet’s Utopianism : Faith in Science 
and Reason
 K.  Steven  Vincent  
 If man is able to predict, with almost complete assurance, the 
phenomena of which he knows the laws; and if, even when these laws 
are unknown to him, he is able, because of the experience of the past, 
to foresee, with great probability, the events of the future; why would 
one regard as a fanciful project, tracing, with some pretense to truth, 
the picture of the future destinies of the human species on the basis of 
its history. The sole foundation for belief in the natural sciences is this 
idea that the general laws, both known and unknown, which organize 
the phenomena of the universe, are necessary and constant; why should 
this principle be less true for the development of the intellectual and 
moral faculties of man, than it is for the other operations of nature? 
Finally, while some opinions, formed because of the experience of the 
past, relative to objects of the same order, are the sole rule of conduct 
for the wisest of men, why should the philosopher be prohibited from 
supporting his conjectures on this same basis, provided that he does not 
attribute to them a certainty superior to that which is justii ed by the 
number, the constancy, and the accuracy of his observations? 
 Our hope for the future condition of the human race is able to be 
reduced to three important points: the destruction of inequality 
between nations; the progress of equality within each nation; i nally, 
the real perfection of man… 
 The time will come, therefore, when the sun will no longer shine on 
the earth on any but free men, who recognize no master but their own 
reason; when tyrants and slaves, priests and their stupid or hypocritical 
instruments will no longer exist except in history and in the theaters; 
when one will think of them only in order to pity their victims and their 
dupes; in order to support ourselves in a useful vigilance by thinking of 
the horror of their excesses; in order to recognize and to stil e, under the 
weight of reason, the i rst germs of superstition and of tyranny, if ever 
they dare to reappear. 
 In perusing the history of societies, we shall have had the occasion to 
observe that often there exists a great difference between the rights that 
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the law recognizes for citizens and the rights that they actually enjoy; 
between the equality that is established by political institutions and 
that which exists among individuals: we shall have noticed that this 
difference has been one of the principal causes of the destruction of 
liberty in ancient republics, of the thunderstorms that troubled them, of 
the weaknesses that delivered them to foreign tyrants. 
 These differences have three principal causes: the inequality of wealth; 
the inequality of the conditions between those for whom the means of 
subsistence is assured for themselves and is transmitted to his family, 
and those, on the other hand, for whom the means of subsistence is 
dependant on the length of life, or sooner on that part of life during 
which he is capable of work; i nally, the inequality of education. 
 It will be necessary therefore to show that these three species of real 
inequality should continually diminish, without however disappearing; 
because they have some natural and necessary causes, that it would 
be absurd and dangerous to wish to destroy; and one would not even 
be able to try to make the effects of them entirely disappear without 
opening up even more fertile sources of inequality, without carrying to 
the rights of man more direct and fatal blows … 
 The various causes of equality do not act in an isolated manner; 
they unite, combine, mutually sustain each other, and their combined 
effect results in an action that is stronger, surer, and more constant. If 
instruction was more equal, it would give birth to a greater equality 
in industry, and therefore in wealth; and equality of wealth would 
contribute necessarily to equality of education; while the equality 
between nations and within each nation would be mutually reinforcing. 
 Finally, well-directed education corrects the natural inequality of 
abilities, rather than strengthening it, just as good laws remedy the 
natural inequality of the means of subsistence; and just as in societies 
where institutions have realized this equality, liberty, though subject to 
a regular constitution, will be more widespread, more complete than in 
the independence of the savage life. Thus, the social art has fuli lled its 
goal, to assure and to extend to all the enjoyment of common rights, to 
which they are called by nature. 
 The real advantages that ought to result from this progress, of which 
one comes to have an almost certain hope, are not able to have any 
other end than the absolute perfection of the human species; since, 
to the extent that diverse genres of equality are established to better 
provide for our needs, for a more extensive education, for a more 
complete liberty, the more this equality will be real, the more it will 
embrace almost all those truly interested in the happiness of mankind. 
 It is thus by examining the progression and the laws of this perfecting 
that we shall be able to know the extent or limit of our hopes. 1 
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 Condorcet’s utopianism was built on his faith in the power of human reason and science, on his belief that social and political reform could be placed on 
as i rm a basis as the natural sciences, and on his conviction that modern history 
would witness the inscription of humanity’s dreams and hopes. Condorcet 
believed that the methodology emerging with the scientii c revolution – in 
particular observation and mathematics – would lead to progress of our 
understanding of the world and, beyond this, to inevitable improvement of the 
condition of humans on earth. He had a roseate vision of human nature and 
human rationality, which provided the foundation for a resolute coni dence 
in the cumulative dynamics of progress, and the basis for a future-oriented 
vision of human perfectibility. Frank Manuel cogently captures the utopian 
aspects of such claims when he writes: ‘The leap from a rationalist statement of 
scientii c methodology to wishing is not so rare in the science of society … but 
the ingenuousness of the transition in Condorcet is truly disarming.’ 2 
 Condorcet’s faith in the sociopolitical application of science and reason 
was present from his i rst writings and speeches. In an address delivered to the 
 Académie Française on 21 February 1782, for example, he expressed coni dence 
in the ability of humankind to discover truth and to progressively extinguish 
darkness and error, proclaiming: ‘It is true that ignorance and error still breathe, 
but these monsters, the most formidable enemies of man’s happiness, bring with 
them the mark of mortality which has struck them, and even their cries, which 
frighten you, only prove how sure and terrible are the blows they have received.’ 3 
Such faith in progress grew as Condorcet became familiar with the calculus of 
probabilities and coni dent that this could be used to subject political decisions 
and the contingencies of life to mathematical rule. He came to call this new 
science ‘social mathematics’. 4 As David Williams has pointed out, there was a 
‘crucial linkage between his mathematical researches on probability theory and 
his non-mathematical essays and treatises on political, social, constitutional 
and economic issues’. 5 During the early phases of the Revolution, Condorcet 
attempted unsuccessfully to get accepted constitutional and educational reforms 
based on his understanding of ‘social mathematics’ that, he believed, would 
channel passionate popular political agitation into a hierarchy of assemblies 
that would allow enlightened rational choice to emerge. 6 
 Condorcet’s coni dence in the cumulative dynamics of progress was expressed 
most starkly in his  Sketch for a Historical Survey of the Progress of the Human 
Mind written while in hiding during the radical phase of the French Revolution. 
In this work, he claimed that ‘there is no term to the perfection of human 
faculties; that the perfectibility of man is truly indei nite; and that progress 
of this perfectibility, henceforth independent of any power that might wish to 
stop it, has no other limit than the duration of the globe upon which nature has 
thrown us’. 7 He goes on to argue, as the excerpt from this work printed above 
reveals, that ‘the future condition of the human race can be reduced to three 
important points: the destruction of inequality between nations; the progress of 
equality within each nation; i nally, the real perfection of man’ 8 . 
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 Belief in progress, underpinned by a belief in science and reason, was not unusual 
during the late eighteenth century. Many of Condorcet’s contemporaries of the 
late-Enlightenment had high hopes for science and reason. Most, like Condorcet, 
did not endorse Rousseau’s attack on the arts and sciences, and rejected his 
dystopic view of modern humanity’s descent into inequality and  amour propre . 
Belief in the efi cacy of science was especially strong in the ranks of Physiocrats, 
also known as the  économistes , a group of thinkers who had a deep and enduring 
inl uence on Condorcet. The Physiocrats claimed that they were able to establish 
scientii cally the key elements of economic doctrine, and argued that this science 
proved that only agriculture (rather than manufacturing and trade) produced 
value, and that the function of government was to protect property and limit 
intervention in commerce. Condorcet was deeply impressed with Physiocratic 
scientism, and with the general claim that it was possible to discover ‘perpetual 
and immutable laws’ (the phrase is that of François Quesnay). 9 He was a close 
ally of Turgot, a Physiocrat who, as Controller-General from 1774 to 1776, 
introduced a series of reforms that liberalized the grain trade, suppressed the 
guilds and more generally undermined the historically sanctioned power of the 
 parlements and other traditional bodies of French Old Regime society. 
 Condorcet was exceptional, however, in the degree to which his utopian 
vision became the i lter for assessing historical becoming. In his  Sketch , the 
ultimate signii cance of historical eras and individuals is judged from the 
perspective of the improvements already achieved and, even more striking, 
from the perspective of positive aspects of the utopian future that Condorcet 
imagined. In sum, history is in the service of the utopia whose realization it 
promises and for which it works. ‘It is in arriving at the last degree of the chain 
[of the history of the progress of the human spirit]’, he writes, 
 that the observations of past events, like knowledge acquired through meditation, 
becomes truly useful. It is in arriving at this term, that men can appreciate their 
real claims to glory, or enjoy, with a sure pleasure, the progress of their reason; 
it is only there that one is able to judge the true perfection of the human species. 
This idea, of relating everything to this last point, is dictated by justice and reason; 
but while it would be tempting to regard it as chimerical, it is not. 10 
 Given the surrounding violence of the Revolution during the period in 
which Condorcet was writing his  Sketch (1793–4), and given the personal 
dangers Condorcet was facing (arrested on 27 March 1794, he died in prison 
the following day, probably from taking poison to avoid the dishonour of 
the guillotine), such an assessment of the past, and such optimism about the 
future, is striking. Bronislaw Baczko has observed that the end of the Terror in 
France in 1794 led to an important re-evaluation of the temporal dimension 
by many actors and observers of the Revolution. 11 Before Thermidor, many 
proceeded as if change were a straightforward linear process pointing toward a 
luminous future that would fuli l hopes for human happiness and regeneration. 
After Thermidor, the traumas of the Terror had to be incorporated into any 
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understanding of change; and the result was a more complex framework that 
viewed history as an agonistic process. On this continuum, Condorcet shared 
the pre-Thermidorian mindset, even occupying its radical optimistic extreme. 
As he put it in his ‘Fragment de Justii cation’, written in 1793 while hiding 
from the revolutionary authorities: 
 Persuaded for a long time that the human species is ini nitely perfectible, and 
that this perfection follows necessarily from the current state of knowledge and 
society, and cannot be stopped by the physical revolutions of the globe, I regarded 
the task of hastening progress to be one of the sweetest occupations, one of the 
i rst duties to man who has fortii ed his reason by study and meditation. 12 
 On another continuum, Condorcet is similar to later thinkers like François 
Guizot and Karl Marx, who also viewed history as a secular unfolding that 
would realize the society of their dreams. While these later thinkers viewed 
historical becoming as more troubled than Condorcet, with periods of painful 
regression, they all shared a perspective that assessed the present and the past 
in terms of a future utopia. That is, each judged contemporary possibilities as 
positive or negative depending on whether they contributed to the superior 
society of the future or retarded progress towards it. For a philosopher like 
Hegel, the conl ation of possibility and actuality was retrospective; the ‘owl of 
Minerva’ l ew only at dusk; consequently, past forces could be assessed only 
in terms of what had come to be realized in fact. For Condorcet, Guizot and 
Marx, the conl ation of possibility and actuality was prospective rather than 
retrospective; past and present forces were assessed in terms of the utopian 
society to be realized in the near future. 
 From the perspective of the early twenty-i rst century, Condorcet’s utopia has 
many attractive aspects. It is more appealing than Guizot’s vision of the triumph 
of the middle class; and it is more concrete than Marx’s elusive vision (in the 
 Communist Manifesto ) of an ‘association, in which the free development of 
each is the condition for the free development of all’, and/or Marx’s suggestion 
(in  Capital ) that self-actualization in ‘the true realm of freedom’ will no longer 
require enervating labour. 13 Condorcet imagined more familiar reforms. 
Before and during the French Revolution, he supported the establishment of 
inalienable, inviolable ‘natural rights’; the implementation of just and equitable 
laws; the abolition of slavery; the emancipation of women; the overthrow of 
religious fanaticism; the redistribution of wealth; the creation of a system of 
social insurance. As Stuart Hampshire has pointed out, the  Sketch was ‘the i rst 
and most complete statement of that radical programme which was gradually 
to be translated into fact in the democracies of Western Europe’. 14 
 These commendable modern elements of Condorcet’s stance are juxtaposed, 
however, with more troubling aspects, especially a naïve faith in the triumph 
of science and reason, and a seemingly unbounded faith in an enlightened 
technocratic elite. 15 Keith Baker has referred to these aspects of Condorcet’s 
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stance as the embrace of ‘a technocratic creed: the creed of men coni dent in 
their expertise, easy in the tradition of power, convinced that problems of 
politics are susceptible of rational answers and systematic solutions’. 16 Today, 
science no longer looks so benign; reason no longer appears so triumphant; 
experts no longer inspire such coni dence. To believe otherwise is to ignore 
the evidence of history and to share the hubris of modern technocrats. Writing 
as I am (in March 2011), months after the worst oil disaster in the history 
of the United States, and during the frightening aftermath of an earthquake 
and tsunami that is threatening to engulf Japan with nuclear contamination, 
it is impossible to share such illusions. How many times have we received 
assurances from the ‘experts’ that it is a near statistical impossibility (‘only a 
chance in a million’) that environmental and social disasters would occur as a 
consequence of drilling for offshore oil or generating nuclear power? Humans 
have demonstrated a frightening ability to act with naïve coni dence in their 
scientii c and technological expertise. 
 Humans have also demonstrated that they frequently act out of seli sh 
motives and with evil intentions. Condorcet had a more complimentary 
assessment, believing that rationality, collegiality and ‘the moral constitution 
of man’ 17 were strong enough components of human nature to guarantee the 
coordination of scientii c research, the overcoming of religious factionalism and 
political divisions, and the ultimate triumph of equality, peace and happiness. 
In the i nal pages of his  Sketch , he imagined a world in which rational and 
moral behavior had become the norm.  
 I believe that I have proved the possibility, and indicated the means of resolving 
what is perhaps the most important problem of the human species:  that of the 
perfectibility of the general masses ; that is to say, to render right judgment, 
independent and sound reason, enlightened conscience, and habitual submission 
to the rules of humanity and justice, almost universal qualities; to stress that the 
normal state of man is guided by truth even though subject to error, subordinates 
his conduct to the rules of morality even though sometimes drawn into crime, 
nurtures gentle and pure feelings which unite him to his family, to his friends, to 
the unfortunate, to his country, to the whole of humanity, even though he is still 
susceptible of being led astray by personal passions. 18 
 This is an appealing vision, but to many of us today it appears, rather, 
that destructive passions are inauspiciously tenacious under the thin veneer 
of morality. Contemporary history is unfortunately replete with examples of 
the disastrous consequences of less than generous passions tearing through 
the l imsy covering of ‘civilization’. Human nature, in short, is the ineluctable 
serpent in our garden and, more than Condorcet and other optimists have been 
willing to recognize, its darker side shapes the world we live in to the detriment 
of the one we wish for. While rational utopias offer us a hope and a goal, 
they too frequently do so by ignoring historical evidence of the less attractive 
aspects of our natures. 
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 15 
Women’s Rights and Women’s Liberation 
in Charles Fourier’s Early Writings 
 Jonathan  Beecher 
 Is not a young woman a piece of merchandise put up for sale 
to the highest bidder? Is not the consent that she gives to marriage 
derisory and forced on her by the lifelong tyranny of prejudice? 
People try to persuade her that she is only bound by chains of l owers. 
But can she really doubt her degradation, even in nations that are 
puffed up with philosophy like England? … On this point we 
have hardly made any progress since that crude era when the 
Council of Macon, a true council of vandals, debated whether 
or not women had a soul and decided in the afi rmative by a 
majority of just three votes … It is known that the best nations 
have always been those which concede the greatest amount 
of liberty to women. This is true of the barbarians and the 
savages as well as of the civilized … As a general proposition: 
Social progress and changes of period are brought about by 
virtue of the progress of women toward liberty, and social 
retrogression occurs as a result of a diminution in the liberty 
of women. Other events inl uence these political changes; but 
there is no cause which produces social progress or decline 
as rapidly as a change in the condition of women. I have 
already said that the simple adoption of closed harems would 
speedily turn us into barbarians, and the mere opening of the 
harems would enable the barbarians to advance to civilization. 
In summary, the extension of the privileges of women is the 
fundamental cause of all social progress. 1 
 When Charles Fourier delivered the manuscript of his i rst book,  Théorie des quatre mouvements et des destinées générales (1808), the publisher 
expressed stupefaction. ‘This title seems strange to you,’ said Fourier. ‘It has 
to be. Some day you will know why.’ Upon encountering a similar reaction 
from his bookseller in Paris, Fourier replied only that the book’s title, like 
its contents, was a ‘riddle’ that he would explain later. 2 A riddle: so the book 
must surely have seemed to its few contemporary readers, and so it has 
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seemed to subsequent generations of readers. The riddle of  Théorie des quatre 
mouvements begins with its title page. The author’s name is not given; the 
place of publication (which we know to be Lyon) is identii ed as Leipzig; and 
the book is identii ed in its subtitle as the ‘prospectus and announcement’ of 
an unidentii ed ‘discovery’. Things get even more confusing when one opens 
the book and starts to read. The ‘four movements’ of the title are not helpfully 
dei ned. And the book itself is an outlandish mixture of preambles, notes and 
epilogues in which shrewd criticism of contemporary commercial practices, 
of marriage and the family system, and of the French Revolution, appear side 
by side with speculations on the copulation of the planets and the imminent 
transformation of sea-water into ‘a sort of lemonade’. Fourier later wrote that 
the strangeness of the book was calculated: it was an intentional travesty, 
a work of ‘studied bizarreness’. His purpose in publishing so strange a book 
had been, he explained, to confuse potential plagiarists and, at the same time, 
to test the reactions of the public – to note which of his ideas were scoffed at 
and which taken seriously. 3 
 In 1808, Charles Fourier was thirty-six years old. For the previous decade 
he had been living a double life. Employed as a travelling salesperson and 
clerk for silk merchants at Lyon, he saw himself as an ‘inventor’ who had 
improved upon the work of Isaac Newton. Newton had determined the laws of 
gravitational attraction, but it had been left to Fourier, ‘a scientii c pariah … an 
almost illiterate shop clerk’, to discover the means to gratify and harmonize all 
the human passions. His law of ‘passionate attraction’ completed Newton’s 
work and was destined to ‘conduct the human race to opulence, sensual 
pleasures, and global unity’. 4 His book was indeed the prospectus to this great 
discovery and he hoped to follow it with a complete treatise in six volumes. This 
would include, among many other things, a detailed plan for the organization 
of a community made up of small ‘passional’ groups whose members would 
be inspired to work at socially useful tasks by ‘rivalry, self-esteem, and other 
stimuli compatible with self-interest’. 5 
 Not surprisingly, Fourier’s book sold poorly. In January 1809 his Paris agent 
wrote to inform him that exactly nine copies had been purchased. In the end 
most of the copies were destroyed – or simply lost – after gathering dust for 
decades in booksellers’ basements. Only much later was the book recognized 
as a pioneering exploration of the social question and a founding document of 
both socialist and feminist thought. 
 What makes  Théorie des quatre mouvements so interesting in retrospect is 
that it can be seen as one of the i rst great utopian socialist writings. Not only 
did it announce a remarkable utopian vision, a utopia in which the full and free 
expression of the passions would serve to promote concord and social unity, it 
was also one of the i rst major works to dei ne both ‘the social question’ and 
‘the woman question’ as the nineteenth century came to conceive of them. 
The fraud, duplicity and ‘industrial anarchy’ promoted by the system of free 
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competition; the endemic poverty of the most advanced ‘civilized’ societies; 
the irrelevance of the rights of man without the right to work – these issues, 
which were the stuff of subsequent discussions of the social question, were all 
forcefully raised in  Quatre mouvements . So were issues that only later became 
central to feminist social criticism: the l ourishing of prostitution and ‘conjugal 
slavery’ in a world made by and for men; the deception and hypocrisy that 
were the underside of modern marriage; and the repression of the instincts of 
women not inclined by nature to child-rearing and domesticity. 6 
 Théorie des quatre mouvements also offered ‘glimpses’ of a better world – a 
world organized according to the ‘dictates’ of the passions. This was a world of 
abundance, in which all work would be gratifying, even the humblest individual 
would eat sumptuous meals in agreeable company, and the poorest village in 
the Alps or the Pyrenees would have an opera ‘similar to that of Paris’. In such 
a society, imagined Fourier, women would enjoy social, economic and sensual 
opportunities unthinkable in the male-dominated world to which he referred 
derisively as ‘civilization’. 
 In unfolding his vision of a free and wholly non-repressive society, Fourier 
began with a critique of marriage and the family system. If poverty was the 
prime source of physical suffering in civilization, Fourier wrote, the most 
intolerable psychic constraints of civilized society were those imposed by the 
institutions of marriage and family life. Thus, he attacked these institutions 
on all fronts and with all the weapons at his disposal. His critique ranged 
from tirades against the moral vices inherent in the family system to satirical 
invocations of the ‘joys’ of domestic life, from dry commentaries on the defects 
of the family as an economic unit and as an instrument of childrearing to 
pseudoscientii c enumerations of the drawbacks of marriage for both partners 
and a taxonomy of types of cuckoldom. However, through all of this ran a 
recurrent theme: civilization was an order built on the repression of instinct, 
and its cornerstone was the institution of monogamous marriage. 
 Since the institution of marriage symbolized the failure of civilized man to 
devise institutions capable of satisfying the most basic human needs, Fourier 
never tired of pointing out its drawbacks. Sometimes, as in his ‘Hierarchy 
of Cuckoldom’, he focused on the plight of husbands. But he insisted that 
the principal victims of marriage were women. He described marriage as a 
‘mercantile calculation’ in which the woman was no more than ‘a piece of 
merchandise offered to the highest bidder’. 7 Once the transaction was 
concluded, she became in the eyes of the law her husband’s exclusive property. 
Until that time, civilized society obliged her to remain chaste. If her dowry or 
her looks failed to attract a suitable purchaser, she was left to wither on the 
vine. ‘Just what are the means of subsistence of impoverished women?’ asked 
Fourier. ‘Prostitution, more or less prettied up, is their sole means of support, 
and philosophy even begrudges them that. This is the state to which they have 
been reduced by civilization with its conjugal slavery.’ 8 
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 Fourier’s discussion of ‘the woman question’, which was most fully 
developed in this, his i rst work, is one of the aspects of his thought for which 
he was and is best known. He was the i rst of the early European socialists 
to put a thoughtful and rigorous analysis of the situation of women at the 
centre of a comprehensive critique of his society. His writings on ‘the woman 
question’ were greatly admired by Flora Tristán and Désirée Véret (both of 
whom knew Fourier in his old age), and other pioneer French feminists; and his 
disciples did much to give currency within the socialist movement to the idea 
of the emancipation of women. 9 This being the case, it is worth emphasizing 
one distinction. Unlike the socialists of the 1840s, who argued for women’s 
emancipation on moral grounds, Fourier’s argument was utilitarian. He saw 
the servitude of women as a ‘blunder’ that victimized society as a whole 
and retarded its development, most conspicuously in the economic sphere. 10 
Thus he concluded his analysis of ‘the debasement of women in civilization’ 
by asserting that there could be no real social progress until women were 
emancipated, both in their private lives and in the workplace. 
 Social progress and changes of historical period take place in proportion to the 
advance of women toward liberty, and social decline occurs as a result of the 
diminution of the liberty of women … The extension of the privileges of women 
is the fundamental cause of all social progress. 11 
 Fourier went on to argue that ‘there is in every historical period a trait that 
forms the PIVOT OF THE MECHANISM and whose absence or presence 
determines changes of period. This trait is always drawn from love.’ 12 Thus 
in the period of barbarism, immediately preceding civilization, the essential 
trait was ‘the absolute servitude of women’ in the harem; in civilization the 
key institution was ‘exclusive marriage’. The main cause for the transition 
from barbarous to civilized societies was the breakup of the harem and the 
shift from the ‘absolute servitude of women’ to the granting of some civil 
rights to women under the system of monogamous marriage. Had the French 
revolutionaries seriously attacked the institution of marriage, further progress 
would have been made. 
 There was very little that prevented the vandalism of 1793 from suddenly 
producing a second revolution as marvelous as the i rst was horrible. The whole 
human race was approaching its release; the civilized, barbarian and savage order 
would have disappeared forever if the Convention, which trampled down all 
prejudices, had not bowed down before the only one that had to be destroyed, the 
institution of marriage … This is the i nal blow that the French Convention failed 
to deliver because of its timidity. How could an Assembly that was so strongly 
hostile to half-measures have limited itself to a half-measure like divorce? 13 
 Looking towards the future, Fourier suggested various proposals for the 
gradual emancipation of women that could open the way for the transition 
from civilization to the ideal society that he called Harmony. Women might 
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simply be granted full sexual liberty at the age of eighteen; groups of eighty to 
100 men and women might live together in ‘progressive households’ in which 
members of both sexes would benei t from l exible arrangements concerning 
lovemaking and the performance of domestic chores. The point in any case 
was that women should enjoy rights and privileges comparable to those of 
men – equal educational opportunities, freedom from the tedium of housework, 
freedom in the choice of sexual partners. Only when these rights were granted, 
and when the long struggle for women’s emancipation was complete, could 
both sexes i nally enter the new amorous world. 14 
 The publication of  Théorie des quatre mouvements apparently won Fourier 
a moment of local celebrity. In May 1808, a friend wrote to him ‘with pleasure 
that women are encouraged by your work. I hear that the ladies of Lyon 
are wild about it.’ 15 But if the women of Lyon were enthusiastic about 
 Quatre mouvements, their husbands ignored its existence. It was not reviewed 
in the local press, mentioned in the annals of any of Lyon’s numerous learned 
societies, or even included among the acquisitions of the public library. 
In Paris a few reviews eventually appeared, but they simply ridiculed Fourier’s 
‘absurdities’ and raised questions about his sanity. 
 During the years that followed, Fourier was to be haunted by the rejection of 
 Quatre mouvements by ‘the Parisians’. When he sat down to write, it was only 
to catalogue the ‘litany of jeers’ which had greeted his book, to inveigh against 
the spirit of sarcasm and raillery dominant in France, and to console himself 
with fantasies of revenge and ultimate triumph. For six years he abandoned 
serious intellectual work and remained at Lyon, eking out a modest living in 
‘the jailhouse of commerce’. In 1815, however, he was able to retire to the 
countryside to devote all his efforts to the composition of the great treatise 
heralded by  Quatre mouvements . 
 The i ve years that Fourier spent in the countryside – in the village of Belley, 
to the east of Lyon – marked the most fruitful period of his entire intellectual 
life. He at last found the time and energy to set down on paper a comprehensive 
exposition of his doctrine. Its rudiments had been clear in his mind since his 
initial ‘discovery’, but what Fourier managed to do at Belley was rei ne his 
earlier speculations and explore new branches of the doctrine. He devoted 
particular attention to problems relating to love and sexuality. In i ve thick 
notebooks, collectively entitled  Le Nouveau monde amoureux , he elaborated 
the vision of sexual harmony hinted at in  Quatre mouvements . Here Fourier 
described in detail the institutions and activities of a totally non-repressive 
society, a society which would ensure for all men and women an emotional 
and erotic life immeasurably freer and richer than a repressive civilization 
could ever provide. In such a society, Fourier argued, human relations would 
take on a new character, and the passion of love would necessarily undergo 
an extraordinary metamorphosis. No longer a diversion or a private affair, 
love would instead become an essential part of the collective life, a force for 
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social harmony whose binding power would be felt throughout the ideal 
community. 16 
 Fourier stipulated three conditions for the realization of his amorous 
utopia. The i rst condition was the full emancipation of women, on which 
he had nothing to add to the arguments made in  Quatre mouvements . 
The second condition was the recognition of the sheer diversity of human 
sexual inclinations. According to Fourier, the failure of civilization to devise a 
tolerable ‘amorous regime’ resulted in large part from the belief that all men 
and women were essentially the same in their sexual wants. This belief, which 
Fourier described as ‘erotic Jacobinism’, was generally accompanied by the 
claim that the ‘natural’ form of sexual grouping was the heterosexual couple. 
But Fourier insisted that to force everyone into a single mould could only result 
in pain and frustration. In devising an erotic hierarchy for his new amorous 
world, he maintained that the highest ranks would be open only to individuals 
with a passionate attraction to members of both sexes. 
 The third condition for the realization of Fourier’s amorous utopia was the 
granting of a ‘sexual minimum’. In Harmony, he wrote, every mature man 
and woman must be guaranteed a satisfying minimum of sexual pleasure. 
Whatever his or her age, and no matter how bizarre their desires, no one would 
go unsatisi ed. Fourier maintained that this sexual minimum would play a role 
in the amorous world similar to that played by his ‘social minimum’ in the 
world of work. Labour could become an instrument of human freedom and 
self-expression only when people were freed from the obligation to work by 
a guaranteed income. Similarly, love could become the liberating and binding 
force that it was meant to be only when its expression had been purged of 
every tinge of coercion and constraint. For Fourier the important thing about 
the sexual minimum was that it removed the fear of sexual deprivation that 
corrupted and falsii ed amorous relations in civilization. 17 
 Fourier never tried to publish  Nouveau monde amoureux in anything like 
its complete form. Partly owing to i nancial difi culties, partly because of 
new discoveries, and primarily out of fear of alarming his readers by too full a 
revelation of his sexual utopia, he decided to issue an abridged and expurgated 
treatise in two volumes instead of the projected six. Fourier’s shortened 
version of the theory appeared in 1822 in two 700-page volumes under the 
intentionally modest title,  Traité de l’association domestique-agricole . Nowhere 
in this volume, nor in his subsequent works, did Fourier publish any detailed 
account of the radical transformations that amorous relations would undergo 
in his ideal community. And in all of this later work Fourier simply elided 
the view of history premised on the assumption that improvements in the 
status of women are the key to all social progress. Instead, he argued in his 
later work for the priority of economic relations as catalysts of historical 
change. Did this rel ect a change in Fourier’s thinking? Probably not. It is more 
likely that Fourier withheld his rel ections on the historical importance of 
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the liberty of women because of the same fear that kept him from publishing 
 Nouveau monde amoureux : the fear that he could never i nd a i nancial backer 
if he presented himself too explicitly as a prophet of sexual liberation. 
 Only in 1967 – 150 years after its composition – was  Nouveau monde 
amoureux i nally published. 18 But Fourier’s rel ections on ‘the woman question’ – 
and especially his critique of the position of women in civilization – had been richly 
developed in his very i rst work. Not surprisingly, some of his i rst followers 
were women who had been drawn to Fourier by his understanding of and 
sympathy for the plight of women in contemporary society. Oddly, some of 
these i rst female Fourierists – notably Clarisse Vigoureux and Zoé Gatti de 
Gamond – were women of conventionally puritanical moral standards who 
would have been shocked by the baroque sexual fantasies of  Nouveau monde 
amoureux . 19 But they were excited by Fourier’s assertion that ‘the extension of 
the privileges of women is the fundamental cause of all social progress’. And 
this declaration was taken up by more radical feminists and socialists in the 
1840s. It remained for later generations to recognize the full extent of Fourier’s 
commitment to an ideal of sexual liberation, one which had only been hinted 
at in  Théorie des quatre mouvements . 
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 16 
A Tale of Two Cities: Robert Owen 
and the Search for Utopia, 1815–17 
 Gregory  Claeys 
 Every society which exists at present, as well as every society 
which history records, has been formed and governed on a belief 
in the following notions, assumed as i rst principles: 
 1st. That it is in the power of every individual to form 
his own character. 
 Hence the various systems called by the name of religion, 
codes of law, and punishments. Hence also the angry passions 
entertained by individuals and nations towards each other. 
 2nd. That the affections are at the command of the individual. 
 Hence insincerity and degradation of character. Hence the miseries 
of domestic life, and more than one half of all the crimes of 
mankind. 
 3rd. That it is necessary that a large portion of mankind should 
exist in ignorance and poverty, in order to secure to the 
remaining part such a degree of happiness as they now enjoy. 
 Hence a system of counteraction in the pursuits of men, 
a general opposition among individuals to the interests of 
each other, and the necessary effects of such a system-ignorance, 
poverty, and vice. 
 Facts prove, however, 
 1st. That character is universally formed for and not by, the individual. 
 2nd. That any habits and sentiments may be given to mankind. 
 3rd. That the affections are not under the control of the individual. 
 4th. That every individual may be trained to produce far more than 
he can consume, while there is a sufi ciency of soil left for him to 
cultivate. 
 5th. That nature has provided means by which population 
may be at all times maintained in the proper state to give the 
greatest happiness to every individual, without one check 
of vice or misery. 
 6th. That any community may be arranged, on a due 
combination of the foregoing principles, in such a manner, 
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as not only to withdraw vice, poverty, and, in a great degree, 
misery, from the world, but also to place every individual 
under circumstances in which he shall enjoy more 
permanent happiness than can be given to any individual under 
the principles which have hitherto regulated society. 
 7th. That all the assumed fundamental principles on which 
society has hitherto been founded are erroneous, and may be 
demonstrated to be contrary to fact. And 
 8th. That the change which would follow the abandonment of 
those erroneous maxims which bring misery into the world, 
and the adoption of principles of truth, unfolding a system 
which shall remove and for ever exclude that misery, may be effected 
without the slightest injury to any human being. 1 
 Students of early socialism, and of Robert Owen in particular, will be familiar with the ‘two Owen’ problem. After he assumed management 
of the New Lanark mills in early 1800 Owen became an enormously successful 
and wealthy manufacturer. He was a kind rather than a ruthless manager, 
but there was little indication that around 1815–17 he would shift from 
paternalistic management to proposing ‘villages of co-operation’ in which 
property would be shared in common – an enterprise to which he would 
devote the rest of his life. How should we account for this alteration, and 
Owen’s invention of ‘the social system’, as it was i rst termed, shortly, by the 
mid-1820s, to become ‘socialism’? The question of Owen’s motive for this 
momentous shift in opinion has never been adequately explained. We know, 
of course, that his outlook from the mid-1790s onwards was dominated by 
the doctrine that circumstances determined character; that he believed that 
producing a more charitable type of personality was possible; and that the 
industrial working classes provided, at least in the setting of New Lanark, the 
prospect of performing such an experiment. That an obsession with competition 
and private property generally generated the opposite type of character to that 
Owen sought to instil he had clearly believed for some years. Yet Owen could 
easily have rested with the paternalist system introduced at New Lanark, where 
food was secured at nearly cost price, morals and cleanliness were policed, and 
education provided for children, without embracing the communist system. 
Such was his starting-point in public life, as announced in  A New View of 
Society; Or, Essays on the Principle of the Formation of the Human Character 
(1813–16). Here he placed himself beside Elizabeth Fry, William Wilberforce 
and other great philanthropists of the age – none of whom would embrace the 
social system. Why then did Owen shift his position so dramatically? 
 There are at least four, to some degree interrelated, ways of explaining this 
change. The i rst is that Owen’s system of education, as epitomized in the 
founding of the Institute for the Formation of Character in 1815–16, persuaded 
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him that the optimal character he sought to produce – epitomized by the word 
‘charity’ – could only be created where private property had been largely 
eradicated. 2 To crave property engendered seli shness, which undermined all 
genuine charity. Since forming his new partnership in 1813 Owen had had more 
complete control over the educational process than previously. He genuinely 
believed – and there is enough auxiliary evidence to lend coni dence to his 
view – that his educational system and other reforms had done much to improve 
the behaviour of the inhabitants of New Lanark. His grand conclusion from 
the experiment may have been that even greater benei ts would be derived 
from sharing the rewards of labour much more equally. 
 A second, and related, hypothesis might be termed ‘creeping socialism’. 
Owen had begun his experiment at New Lanark with a limited degree of 
collective activity, but gradually expanded the public sphere, eventually opening 
a public kitchen and dining room in 1819 in order to reduce cooking costs 
by some £4,000 to £5,000 per year. The social system might be understood 
as gradually evolving out of the New Lanark model of 1800. Owen had 
created a manufacturing village in which ‘order, good government, tranquillity 
and rational happiness’ prevailed more than anywhere else, according to 
one American visitor, Mr Griscom. If these had been achieved by marginal 
collectivization, an extension of the principle on a grander scale might attain 
even more wondrous results. 
 A third hypothesis might be termed ‘ideological conversion’. Although 
Toryish in his practical politics in the 1790s, Owen had been exposed from at 
least 1813, through his connections with the most important radical philosopher 
writing in the 1790s, William Godwin, to collectivist proposals like the famous 
‘pantisocracy’ ideal of settlement in the United States contemplated for a time 
by Robert Lovell, Samuel Taylor Coleridge and Robert Southey. 3 He knew of 
the land nationalization proposals of Thomas Spence, with whom he was once 
famously confused. 4 He was aware in addition of many strands of Christian 
communalism, including that associated with Thomas More, with whom 
Southey would later compare him at great length. 5 In addition he became 
familiar with the more practically driven communal schemes for organizing the 
poor, such as John Bellers’ ‘Colleges of Industry’ proposals, which he reprinted 
in 1818 with the help of Francis Place (who also opposed community of goods 
in principle). 6 He gradually became acquainted with successful communal 
experiments in Britain, in continental Europe, and in the new world; Certainly 
Melish’s description of the Rappite community in Pennsylvania was a source 
of this enthusiasm as early as 1815; Podmore was ‘tolerably certain’ that Owen 
had read the review in the  Philanthropist if not the book itself. 7 In 1824 he 
would acquire George Rapp’s Harmony community in Indiana, renaming it 
New Harmony. The attractions of one or several of these schemes may have 
persuaded Owen that only full-scale communalism would produce a genuinely 
‘social’ humanity. 
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 Finally, we may consider that Owen underwent something like a religious 
conversion in the years preceding 1820, driven perhaps in part by the 
enormous exasperation of advocating his plans  ad ini nitum to hundreds of 
possible supporters, and failing to achieve a substantial measure of factory 
reform, which was a key initial goal in widening the successes of New Lanark. 8 
Owen would of course both attack established religions, most publicly in 
August 1817, and advocate his own alternative ‘New Religion’ based upon the 
charitable ideal. 9 By 1816 he spoke of hoping to see ‘universal love prevail’. 
His language in 1817 in particular, and most notably at the City of London 
Tavern meeting of 21 August, became stridently millenarian, as has often 
been noticed. 10 Indebtedness to Quakerism in many aspects of his thought is 
undoubted. This would help to account for the fact that the communal property 
proposals he now advocated had historically been associated with religious 
orders in particular, if not indeed Christ’s own apostles. But many believed that 
they were practicable on a wider scale, if at all, only in the City of God, not in 
the fallen City of Man. 
 It is fairly evident that Owen’s decision to embrace the ‘social system’ 
doubtless stemmed from some complex combination of these factors. Let us 
now look chronologically at Owen’s development to see what evidence exists 
for prioritizing these hypotheses. 
 Owen’s espousal of socialism – although the term itself of course was not yet 
in use – has traditionally been dated from 1817. 11 It was at this time that Owen, 
reporting to the Committee on the Poor Laws, attributed the great increase 
in pauperism to the effects of machinery. Large-scale unemployment could be 
solved only be employing the poor on the land, on farms of 1,000 to 1,500 acres 
suitable for about 1,200 people, set up by local authorities. The parallelogram 
model was introduced at this time, with proposals for children to be housed 
in dormitories in order to train them more effectively. Meals would be taken 
in common, and all would share equally in the proi ts of the enterprise. 
Competition and seli shness would be replaced by association. Shortly 
afterwards, Owen proposed that such plans might eventually be extended to 
the entire society. Communities might, he supposed, be subdivided according 
to wealth, religion and political outlook, in order to enhance their attractiveness, 
the wealthy bringing capital to employ the poorer. But the ultimately 
communistical bent of the whole scheme was quite evident. Some supporters led 
by the Duke of Kent and David Ricardo, tried in 1819 to insist that community 
of goods was not crucial to the success of Owen’s plans. But he was evidently 
wedded to the ideal, and Owen was a man unlikely to retreat once his mind was 
made up. Instead, in  Report to the County of Lanark , of 1820, he announced 
his embracing of a labour standard of value, and his wish to supplant the system 
of competition entirely. There was no turning back after this point. 
 A focus on these proposals and Owen’s millenarian language in 1817 must 
be balanced by evidence of the drift of Owen’s ideas in the several preceding 
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years. His lament in 1815 that the progress of the manufacturing system had 
introduced ‘a fondness for essentially injurious luxuries among a numerous 
class of individuals who formerly never thought of them’, and had ‘generated 
a disposition which strongly impels its possessors to sacrii ce the best feelings 
of human nature to this love of accumulation’ indicates that the loss of the 
‘comparatively happy simplicity of the agricultural peasant’ weighed heavily 
upon him. 12 This shows that Owen had already embraced a  systematic rejection 
of competition and heavy factory labour. However, there is some evidence to 
suggest that Owen had already embraced some form of collectivist ideal. At the 
time that William Hazlitt was caricaturing Owen as a pale shadow of Godwin, 
preaching a doctrine ‘as old as society itself’, in August 1816, 13 Owen visited 
Robert Southey, who shared his worries about the manufacturing system 
and described his judgement and feelings as ‘entirely with him’. 14 Southey 
was surprised to i nd during an hour-long conversation that Owen was 
‘neither more or less than such a Pantisocrat as I was in the days of my 
youth. He is as ardent now as I was then, & will soon be cried down as a 
visionary.’ He described Owen’s plans as including wanting the poor and 
unemployed to ‘live in community’, but warned that the plan for employing 
paupers in agriculture ‘ought not to be confounded with his metaphysics’. 15 
When he visited New Lanark in 1819, however, he worried that Owen had 
not contemplated the difi culties of a system that ‘took for its foundation the 
principle of a community of goods’, which he feared could only be maintained 
‘by absolute power’ – indeed he likened New Lanark to a plantation. 16 The 
real, long-term division between them was that Owen, Southey thought, did 
not appreciate that building on any foundation other than religion, is ‘building 
upon sand’. 17 He would elaborate on this theme at length some ten years later, 
still noting that ‘Owen’s views tend to an entire community of goods’ – a 
scheme he rejected on the basis of both ‘theory and experience’. 18 
 The Owen–Southey encounter sheds light on various aspects of our key 
question here. First, it is clear that Owen had embraced a communitarian 
ideal before 1817. Whatever Southey may have remembered by the term 
‘pantisocracy’, it certainly implied an emphasis upon voluntary communal 
living and shared property. 19 Second, it is entirely possible that Southey’s 
insistence (among others) upon a religious basis for any such practice led Owen 
to concoct his ‘new religion’ of charity, upon which he lectured extensively 
in 1830, but which was chiel y a restatement of his original necessitarian 
principles. 20 This does not assist us in ascertaining the source of Owen’s 
communitarianism, except to discount a religious conversion in 1817 as such. 
We can, however, probably exclude Thomas Spence as a source here, for 
Spence’s schemes were not communitarian as such. Yet neither, on the scale 
proposed by Owen, were William Godwin’s ideas, the source of Southey’s own 
pantisocratic enthusiasms. As is well known, Owen met Godwin at least thirty 
times in 1813, eight times in 1814, seven times in 1816, i ve times in 1817, and 
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less often thereafter. Doubtless Godwin helped clarify Owen’s philosophical 
necessitarianism, particularly the doctrine that ‘the characters of men originate 
in their external circumstances’. But he is an unlikely source for the pauper relief 
schemes of 1816–17; the thrust of Southey’s objections about the eradication 
of individuality in such communities would have been Godwin’s i rst line of 
objection as well. More likely models, as Podmore has indicated, were Bellers’ 
schemes, and reports of the Shaker communities in the United States. Bellers 
deserves priority here, as Owen would claim in 1817 that the ‘combinations 
of these principles’ had i rst been proposed by him in 1696. 21 Yet Owen added 
that ‘on discovering it, I had it reprinted’; the reprint was in September 1817. It 
would seem, then, that Bellers proved a point Owen wished to enforce, but he 
was not the source of Owen’s communitarianism as such, even if, as Podmore 
suggests, Owen was indeed led to ‘still further develop his Plan upon the lines 
laid down by Bellers’. 22 
 Given the paucity of correspondence and other evidence about Owen’s 
opinions before 1817, and his own extraordinary coyness about the origins of 
some of his views, we cannot ascertain with any degree of certainty when his co-
operative and communitarian ideals originated, and what their precise source 
was, indeed if there was one. There is no reason to doubt Owen’s own view 
that the cumulative experience of his management of factories in Manchester 
and at New Lanark had led him to believe that he knew how ‘ultimately to 
make the human race good, wise and happy’. 23 But it is equally beyond dispute 
that New Lanark was not conducted upon ‘pantisocratic’ principles – that it 
was not a proi t-sharing enterprise based upon community of goods. Yet we 
also have no reason to doubt Southey’s description of Owen’s sympathy for 
such a scheme in 1816, even if the details of what he proposed did not become 
clear until 1817–18. 
 So there remains a mystery respecting Owen’s ‘pantisocratic’ opinions, for 
Owen was doubtless well aware of the distance between New Lanark and 
utopia (a term Southey used with reference to Owen’s plans). Podmore may 
have been right in supposing that New Lanark was for Owen ‘the microcosm 
in which the discerning eye might trace the outlines of the larger cosmos’, 24 
but New Lanark was not Paraguay, not Harmony, not Sparta nor indeed Utopia. 
In New Lanark, proi ts were not shared, and it was not governed democratically 
by a committee of those of a certain age, as Owen would propose by 1817. 
It was, to all intents and purposes, Owen’s personal i efdom, less perhaps the 
City of Man than the kingdom of one man; and the fact that he governed it so 
benevolently was of course greatly to his credit. But all his achievements there 
paled beside the ‘Plan’, as it was usually termed around 1817. Self-educated, 
sometimes insufferably self-coni dent, Owen was nonetheless no fool, and 
knew what the communistical ideal stood for. The City of God was that of 
communal sharing; the City of Man stood for seli shness and private property. 
So had the Christian dualism run since time immemorial; yet there were many 
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instances where the City of God had been transformed on earth. Well might 
Owen in 1817 trumpet salvation by introduction of the language of the 
millennium. This rel ected his acknowledgement that the ‘Plan’ had a 
sacred pedigree he had not formerly wished to associate with his proposals. 
The language of 1817, then, did not rel ect Owen’s ‘conversion’ to a 
millenarian outlook, but the recognition that the ‘Plan’ formed at least by 
1815 was ideologically closer to the tradition of utopian communitarianism 
than the experimental developments at New Lanark had been. Owen now 
acknowledged that ‘pantisocratic’ opinions were not like piecemeal social 
engineering. Socialism lay closer to Utopia than to New Lanark by far, 
but a long journey lay ahead for Owen before the i nal shipwreck of the 
great Queenwood community in 1844 i nally put paid to his most cherished 
ideals. 
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How to Change the World: Claude-Henri 
De Rouvroy, Comte De Saint-Simon 
 Neil  McWilliam 
 European society is no longer made up of children whose interests 
require that they be subject to strong and active supervision; it is 
composed of men whose education has been completed, and who seek 
only instruction. Politics should no longer be anything other than the 
science of obtaining for the masses the greatest possible quantity of material 
goods and moral benei ts [jouissances]. Leaders, though dominated by old 
prejudices and subject to the empire of illusions, by their conduct nonetheless 
pay homage to the power of opinion; they are beginning to show, if not by 
their acts, at least by the form in which they couch them, that they no longer 
hide from themselves that they are dealing with reasonable men, who do 
not wish to live to be governed, but who consent to be governed in order 
to live better. They favour, I know (insofar as they can in the present 
state of things), the arts, the sciences and industry; but why do these three 
great classes [capacités], who could survive unaided, and without whom 
nothing could survive, need to be favoured? Could they not say to the 
leaders: ‘What is there in common between us and you? Why is it that 
we are at your mercy? To whom does the nation owe its wellbeing? Who 
upholds the throne, us or you? It is in our breasts, from the depths of our 
studies, our workshops, our factories, and not from your ofi ces and dining 
rooms, that everything useful to society emerges. If we imagine a project 
useful to the common good, we are obliged to request that you take it into 
account. Since your talents [capacités] are inferior to ours, since the only 
talent you possess is for surveillance and policing, which must every day 
become less important, how is it that you are placed so much above us, 
that you wish to reduce us to your passive instruments – we, without 
whom you would i nd it impossible to accomplish the slightest act? Isn’t 
your arrogance as inappropriate, as ridiculous as that of a coachman 
whose pride in being seated high on his box leads him to imagine he is 
above his master, who pays him and feeds his horses?’ 
 Just imagine if one of us made such a speech to a leader, his 
response would be quite simple: ‘I have nothing to say to you’, 
he would reply. ‘You are divided; we are united.’ 
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 This reproach, gentlemen, would be justii ed. Unity, which is a virtue 
and safeguard of the weak, is also one of the duties of the strong. 
Yet far from harmony reigning amongst us, there is, between scientists, 
industrialists and artists, a sort of permanent hostility. I would not claim 
that the fault lies with one party; it is reciprocal. 1 
 T he words are those of an artist, opening up a vigorous dialogue with two other protagonists who, like him, are dei ned simply in terms of their 
occupations: a  savant represents the scientii c community, while an  industriel 
speaks on behalf of the manufacturing interest. All, in turn, expound ideas that 
are rooted not only in their individual activities, but also in the personalities 
and preconceptions that ostensibly accord with their respective social roles. 
All three, and the artist above all, are animated by an impatience with the 
shortcomings of the post-Restoration (1815–30) political order; all three call 
for its replacement with a system of governance attuned to the needs of society 
at large and administered by individuals possessing real skills rather than 
inherited titles or honorii c positions. The result, they agree, would be a world 
in which peace and progress l ourish, and the material well-being of the masses 
enjoys unprecedented priority. 
 The  Dialogue was published in December 1824 as the ‘Conclusion’ to a 
collection of essays ranging over questions of philosophy, physiology and social 
and industrial organization produced by Claude-Henri de Rouvroy, comte 
de Saint-Simon (1760–1825) and a group of young followers dedicated to 
promoting his ideas. The  Dialogue’s authorship is subject to dispute: 2 although 
commonly attributed to Saint-Simon himself, working with his assistant 
Léon Halévy, it may be the work of another disciple, the mathematician and 
banker Olinde Rodrigues, an inl uential defender of the master’s doctrine in 
the turbulent years following his death. Whoever actually composed the text, 
it seems entirely consistent with the overall tenor of Saint-Simon’s thought on 
the eve of his death, and represents an important moment in the evolution of the 
doctrine for a number of reasons. As Saint-Simon’s ideas had developed since 
his emergence as a political thinker during the Empire, so his early commitment 
to guaranteeing social stability through intellectual reform had been eclipsed 
by an increasing interest in industry and particularly its capacity to advance 
popular well-being. With his last major work,  Le Nouveau Christianisme , left 
incomplete at the time of his death, Saint-Simon sought to devise mechanisms 
for overcoming social division and the individualism that nurtured it, and for 
laying the foundations of a world in which brotherly love would promote 
altruism and mutuality. Religion, he believed, provided an effective means of 
strengthening the bonds between individuals and social classes by appealing 
not to rational interests in a dry, expository fashion, but to something more 
visceral that could be mobilized through an appeal to feeling and imagination. 
The belief that emotion and not reason held the key to fostering a desire for 
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change amongst people underlies the artist’s promotion as a sort of secular 
equivalent to the priest in  Dialogue . It is he who takes the lead in addressing 
representatives of the two other productive classes, and it is he who most 
fully expounds the nature of far-reaching social reform and the means of 
achieving it. 
 The artist’s remarks echo Saint-Simon’s belief that a central goal of political 
change was to ‘replace the government of men by the administration of 
things’ – future societies, in other words, would consist of self-regulating 
groups of individuals united around a common goal of industrial production. 
As such, current notions of government as an essentially coercive directing 
body would become redundant, since individuals’ commitment to collective 
well-being would eradicate the need for control. For the artist, a crucial 
distinction is to be drawn between an anachronistic ruling class of politicians, 
aristocrats and churchmen, whom he likens to prefects in a school charged 
with maintaining order, and the three classes who participate in  Dialogue . 
All bring to bear a skill essential for the prosperity of society and as such, he 
argues, are as vital to its effective functioning as teachers are to the operation 
of a school. Yet, as he concludes, divisions amongst this group have prevented 
them from assuming their pivotal role and ushering in a new era of equity and 
prosperity. 
 These divisions relate to Saint-Simon’s understanding of the relationship 
between social groupings ( capacités ) and psycho-physiological difference. 
From his earliest published writings, Saint-Simon revealed a particular 
interest in physiological theory – indeed, his early work is predicated on a 
belief that once physiology matured into a positivist science, it would provide 
the epistemological foundations for a scientii cally objective understanding 
of social phenomena. Saint-Simon followed contemporary medical theorists 
such as P.J.G. Cabanis and Xavier Bichat in emphasizing innate individual 
difference – a break with Enlightenment ideas, which had followed Locke 
in arguing that most of what rendered individuals distinct one from another 
could be attributed to the impact of sensory experience accumulated over 
the course of a lifetime. Cabanis, in his lectures to the Institut, broke with 
this dominant model, and in so doing stimulated considerable interest among 
liberal thinkers associated with the Idéologue group. 3 His ideas were expanded 
with the publication in 1800 of Bichat’s  Recherches physiologiques sur la vie et 
sur la mort , which argued that humans could be differentiated into three broad 
groups: ‘sensory’, ‘cerebral’ and ‘motor’. It was this division that provided the 
basis for Saint-Simon’s own tripartite division between artists, scientists and 
 industriels . 
 Because of his reading of contemporary political theory, as well as through 
his understanding of physiology and his observations of post-Revolutionary 
France, Saint-Simon was acutely aware of the threat that individualism posed 
to social cohesion. His hostility to contemporary liberal theorists, and his 
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disdain for  oisifs – wealthy idlers who exploited society for personal gain – 
led to increasing frustration at the obstacle that individual interest posed to 
social reform. As he argued in 1821: ‘The decadence of old general doctrines 
has allowed the development of egotism, which invades society every day and 
is i rmly opposed to the formation of new doctrines.’ 4 The only solution, he 
maintained, was to oppose individualism with philanthropic altruism. And, as 
he quickly came to realize, the most effective means of achieving such change 
was by an appeal to the imagination, which would overcome the obstacle 
of self-interest erected by reason, and carry society forward on a wave of 
enthusiasm. Hence, later in  Dialogue , the artist famously (and controversially) 
proclaims: 
 It is we artists who will serve as your vanguard [avant-garde] since art’s power 
has greater immediacy and rapidity … Since we speak to man’s imagination and 
sentiments, we must always exert the strongest and most decisive effect. If today 
we seem to have no role, or only a very minor one, this is because the arts lack 
what they must need for their energy and success: a common impulse and a ruling 
idea. 5 (341)
 The artist’s diagnosis of art’s failure to realize its social potential brings us 
back full circle. Its current impotence is itself the consequence of individualism: 
in his opening remarks, the artist recognizes that he and his kind have been too 
inclined to disdain reality and isolate themselves in an ‘ideal world … that offers 
us the sweetest pleasures and the purest consolation’ (339). His confession 
encourages his interlocutors to engage in similar self-criticism: the scientist 
acknowledges that he too cuts himself off from society in ‘solitary meditation’, 
while the  industriel recognizes that his class’s ‘love of money’ overcomes more 
general interests (371, 383). Each, then, suffers from a form of individualism 
that is intrinsic to the physiological types that they embody; their inclination 
is thus to isolate themselves in ways that their innate characteristics actively 
promote. It is for this reason that the artist observes the need for an act of will 
to bring them together in an alliance that will overcome their present isolation 
and the sense of frustration that it promotes (322). 6 Such an alliance is thus 
conceived as advancing art, science and industry at the same time as it promises 
a radical re-ordering of society. 
 Divisions within the three  capacités are symptomatic of a more pervasive 
individualism that the proposed alliance between the artist, the scientist and the 
 industriel is intended to rectify. The objective is to institute a social system in 
which industrial production offers the means for promoting a more equitable 
distribution of wealth in a society which nonetheless remains hierarchized 
and, as the artist emphasizes, ‘is hostile only to idleness, and is essentially 
favourable to royalty, to religion, to the sciences, arts and industry – in a word, 
to everything that is useful to men’ (361). Despite these apparent concessions 
to the status quo, the three interlocutors regard their union as effecting a 
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fundamental change of values as science and the arts effectively become the 
new spiritual power and industry acquires supreme temporal authority (366). 7 
Thus, the scientist proposes that future responsibility for public education 
should be shared between his class and that of the artist in order to promote 
popular sympathy for industry and for peace. Such an educational alliance, 
he suggests, will enhance not only the popular intellect but also encourage the 
development of ‘social feeling [ sentiments sociaux ]’ (374) – altruistic impulses 
that foster cohesion and to which the artist is supremely able to appeal. 
 Achieving such a change had long seemed particularly challenging to 
Saint-Simon. Although he had taken a sympathetic stance towards the 
revolutionary upheaval of the 1790s, in many ways his early work was inspired 
by a desire to forestall any recurrence of civil unrest. As he became increasingly 
committed to fundamental social and political reform, he was confronted by 
the question of how best to effect radical change while avoiding internecine 
violence – a problem that had proved sufi ciently intractable for him to propose 
a mass petition to the king in order to persuade the authorities to take up 
his ideas. Announcing in  Dialogue , with greater optimism than accuracy, that 
‘[h]enceforth, insurrection is impossible in France’ (364), the artist offers 
to direct his talents towards this process of mass conversion. The power of 
imagination, he claims, will usher in far-reaching social transformation in a 
peaceful and comprehensive manner. According to the artist, past failure 
to appreciate the masses’ limited responsiveness to reasoned argument, has 
handicapped the ability of innovators to win popular enthusiasm for their ideas. 
As he points out to the scientist: ‘reasoning merely convinces, whilst feelings 
[ les sensations ] persuade and excite’ (337–8). The artist himself is described, 
in a footnote at the beginning of  Dialogue , as ‘a man of imagination’, whose 
i eld of action covers ‘everything that has sensation as its object’ (331, note). 
In a way that sets the tone for subsequent Saint-Simonian discourse; the artist 
is thus identii ed not with a specii c medium but with a particular means of 
address, an ability to transcend reason and appeal to more instinctual aspects 
of human response. Yet the artist qualii es his claim to appeal to this impulsive, 
visceral and potentially wayward side of the personality by arguing that in 
the future his creative talents will be directed to useful ends, as opposed to 
‘retrograde’ work that appeals to ‘imagination without an object’ (343). 
 Saint-Simon’s rehabilitation of imagination as a transformative social 
force i nds its roots in the eighteenth century, when theorists such as Diderot 
emphasized the value of emotion both as a source of aesthetic pleasure and as a 
powerful moral catalyst. 8 The revolutionary era’s recourse to popular festivals 
drew upon an analogous sense of the arts’ capacity to enthuse spectators who 
would otherwise be resistant to the reasoned exposition of civic virtues that 
dramatic spectacle was able vividly to bring to life. 9 Such initiatives offered 
a recent precedent for the way in which, in  Dialogue , the artist presents 
imagination as an infallible spur, propelling society towards a glorious future 
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of concord and solidarity. Yet, for all his inspiring words,  Dialogue ends on 
a rather anti-climactic note. As the three protagonists agree on the need to 
join forces to relieve society of its currently dysfunctional form of government, 
the only proposal that the artist can come up with is the production of an 
encyclopaedia, drawing on the celebrated eighteenth-century example that 
he argues precipitated the 1789 revolution, and a journal, in which the three 
 capacités will set out their ideas for change (386). 10 Such modest ambitions 
suggest the extent to which, at this point, Saint-Simon and his circle remain 
tied to a predominantly rationalist perspective and have only a limited sense 
of how the imagination’s potential as a transformational force might actually 
be mobilized. 
 The artist’s proposal is inspired by his contention that society itself is on 
the brink of an epochal change: ‘the great work of Christianity is coming to 
fruition [ s’accomplit ]’, ‘fraternity reigns amongst men and nations’, ‘society is 
becoming increasingly positivist’ (342). No evidence is offered to support these 
assertions, and it is clear that Saint-Simon was unsure as to how to promote 
his ideas for social reform in a climate that, in actuality, showed only limited 
potential for change. For many post-Revolutionary commentators, including 
Saint-Simon himself, one of the most conspicuous features of national life was 
a pervasive sense of uncertainty, articulated in 1825 in Théodore Jouffroy’s 
assertion that ‘[a] new generation is growing up, born in the midst of 
scepticism’ 11 . It was in response to this sense of doubt and drift that a band 
of young intellectuals, many of whom had been trained in the elite Parisian 
engineering school, the  Ecole polytechnique , congregated around Saint-Simon 
in his later years, and developed his legacy in the school that they established 
in France before leaving on mission to Egypt in 1833. 
 With the emergence of Prosper Enfantin as the dominant force within the 
group in the late 1820s, the positivist element of Saint-Simonian doctrine 
was steadily overshadowed by the emphasis on religiosity that Saint-Simon 
himself had begun to sketch out in his later writings. The emergence of 
a  Religion saint-simonienne in 1828 and the adoption of a quasi-monastic 
group existence in the Parisian suburb of Ménilmontant in 1832, 12 indicate 
a growing commitment to sentiment, as opposed to reason, as the bedrock 
of the new doctrine. Yet, just as the  Dialogue ’s artist remained hidebound 
by the authority of the written text in his allegiance to the journal and the 
encyclopaedia, so the Saint-Simonians of the July Monarchy tended to favour 
purely discursive means of propaganda that privileged the cognitive power of 
the word. The group’s celebrated  prédications – doctrinal lectures that seem to 
have relied on verbal histrionics to underscore their effect – and quasi-liturgical 
ceremonies during the Ménilmontant retreat seem relatively timid in their 
recourse to traditional discursive formats. Yet, behind closed doors, the group 
allowed their imaginations to run riot in ways that the  Dialogue ’s artist could 
scarcely imagine. As the i gure of the priest increasingly usurped the artist’s 
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role as principal minister to the popular imagination, so members of the group 
confected a new gospel,  Le Livre nouveau , in which they speculated about 
the affective power of language, sound and colour, and envisioned a cathedral 
of the future which would enthral the faithful through a panoply of sensual 
effects. 13 Although social solidarity and industrial progress remain central to 
these speculative excursions, under Enfantin emotion takes on an ecstatic force 
that, rather than surpassing the power of reason, seems altogether to suppress 
its restraining power in the interests of spontaneous allegiance. As Enfantin 
remarks in 1831, in a chilling echo of future totalitarian sloganeering: ‘Man is 
FREE when he loves what he MUST DO’. 14 
 If such an assertion compromises the value of sentiment by envisaging 
its implicit regulation, it points to an authoritarian current in Saint-Simonian 
thought that seems to contrast most markedly with the ostensibly libertarian 
perspective of the Saint-Simonians’ main rival, Charles Fourier. Fourier’s 
indictment of modern  civilization for repressing the free-play of sentiment, and 
thus bringing about crime, deviation and misery, envisions a  nouveau monde 
industriel et sociétaire in which individual feeling would be in perfect harmony 
with collective interest. Here again, however, freedom is more apparent than 
real, as Fourier’s obsessively detailed, baroque vision of future happiness 
gradually expels any sense of spontaneity or idiosyncrasy from a world where 
even the most eccentric impulse has been anticipated, and catered for, by a 
social vision of suffocating inclusiveness. In common with the communist 
paradise sketched out during the same years in Etienne Cabet’s  Voyage en 
Icarie of 1842, the utopian vision of these early nineteenth-century theorists 
is ultimately rooted in a highly qualii ed understanding of individual liberty. 
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 18 
The Utopian Organization 
of Work in Icaria 
 David  Leopold 
 I went back to join Valmor, who was meeting me in the clock-making 
workshop where one of his cousins worked … 
 How amazing it was! Everything is together there, from the raw materials 
lined up in the i rst storehouse to the clocks, pendulums, watches, 
and devices of all sorts set out in a i nal warehouse that resembles a 
brilliant museum. The special clock-making workshop is a three-storied 
building of a thousand square feet, held up by iron columns instead 
of thick walls, which make each l oor into one big room, perfectly 
illuminated by a very simple system of light diffusion. On the bottom 
l oor are enormous, heavy machines for cutting the metals and roughing 
out the pieces. On the top l oor are the workers, divided into as many 
groups as there are different pieces to make; each one always makes 
the same piece. You would think you were seeing an army regiment; 
such is the high degree of order and discipline there. 1 
 The life and work of Étienne Cabet (1788–1856) challenges the familiar but lazy contrast often drawn between utopian ‘dreamer’ and effective 
political actor. Cabet was both the author of a classic literary utopia – in which 
a visitor from the author’s own world discovers a superior civilization in a 
(geographically) distant location – and an effective political organizer who 
played a signii cant role in the nascent workers’ movement in France. 
 Born into a republican and artisan family in Dijon, Cabet subsequently 
pursued a legal and political career in Paris. He joined the  charbonnerie (a secret 
society based on freemasonry) in the 1820s, and was elected to the National 
Assembly following the 1830 Revolution. Cabet also launched  Le Populaire , 
a hugely successful republican newspaper, with an artisan readership (but 
cross-class ambitions), which sold 12,000 copies per issue in Paris alone, in 
1833. 2 Indicted for publishing seditious articles, he took the legal option of 
exile for i ve years to avoid being imprisoned for two years in France. 
 Exiled in London, Cabet wrote prolii cally, kept radical company, and added 
a commitment to ‘community of goods’ to his republicanism. Cabet would 
later claim that the idea for  Voyage en Icarie had come to him whilst perusing 
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More’s  Utopia (1516) in the British Museum. Other inl uences on the work 
are much contested, but include: an early exposure to Fénelon’s  Telemachus 
(1699); the egalitarianism (but not the violence or secrecy) of Babouvism; and 
the gradualism and communitarianism of Robert Owen. 3 
 Cabet returned to France in 1839, resurrecting  Le Populaire as a monthly 
advocating ‘Icarian communism’ alongside descriptive accounts of contemporary 
social and economic conditions. The Icarian movement developed strong 
provincial support, especially in Reims, Lyon, Nantes, Périgueux, Toulouse and 
Toulon. 4 However, after 1845, the movement took on some of the characteristics 
of a sect; Cabet increasingly portrayed communism as ‘true’ Christianity, and in 
1846 announced his ambition to found a communitarian settlement in America. 5 
This move fractured the Icarian movement and damaged  Le Populaire , since 
many supporters neither wanted, nor could afford, to ‘abandon’ France. 6 
 Having failed to sustain his initial impact on the revolutionary events of 
1848, Cabet joined the supporters he had encouraged to migrate. (He returned 
to France, from May 1851 to July 1852, to answer legal charges concerning 
the emigration, but otherwise spent the rest of his life in America.) After a 
series of difi culties and a false start in Texas, the Icarians took over a Mormon 
settlement at Nauvoo in Illinois. In 1856, a long-germinating schism saw 
Cabet expelled by a (small but stable) majority unhappy with his i nancial 
(mis)management, divisive policies and growing authoritarianism. Cabet took 
124 adult loyalists with him, but died before they reached the site of their new 
settlement (Cheltenham, Missouri). 7 
 Voyage en Icarie was i rst published (pseudonymously) in 1840, although it was 
the second (1842) edition which adopted that now familiar title and abandoned 
the conceit that it had been written by the i ctitious English nobleman who was 
its central protagonist. Part One provides an account of the main political and 
social institutions of Icaria. Part Two is concerned with its imagined history, is a 
reply to certain objections, and is an appeal to a bewildering selection of (often 
unlikely) authorities on equality and community (running from Apollonius to 
Zoroaster). Part Three rehearses the ‘Doctrine Communitaire’ of its author, and 
emphasizes the importance of transitional arrangements. 
 Voyage en Icarie could not be called a literary masterpiece. Its programmatic 
and romantic threads – the pill and its sugar coating – barely hold together. 
(The visible join is reproduced in miniature within Cabet’s book, when 
Lord Carisdall reads an overly didactic novel elucidating Icarian marriage 
arrangements (139/114)). Nor is the sugar coating well made; most characters 
can barely muster one dimension, and the melodramatic romance is contrived 
and dated. 8 However, the literary form might have had some protective 
function – complicating Cabet’s liability under increasingly strict press laws in 
France. 
 Voyage en Icarie has some interesting formal features. Not least, it contains 
an account of the historical emergence of Icaria – a narrative involving 
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revolutionary origins, a benevolent ‘dictator’ and a lengthy period of transition 
to communism – confounding those who (mistakenly) claim that utopias never 
explain their own origins. 9 However, I focus here on its social and political 
content, and especially the discussion of work. 
 Cabet holds that all of the evils familiar from human history (war, disorder, 
torture, crime and more) are the result of poor social organization, and 
especially the result of inequality. Consequently, we should not hesitate to 
re-organize society in order to eradicate them, and Icaria, he suggests, can 
give us ‘an example’ (to be modii ed and perfected by others) of how that might 
be done. 10 
 The central values of Icarian society are equality and community; the 
‘duties and benei ts’ of association are shared equally, and ties of ‘fraternity’ 
turn society into a single ‘family’ (35/31). These central values i nd institutional 
embodiment (economically) in the community of property, and (politically) 
in a democratic republic. ‘Democracy’ is identii ed with popular sovereignty 
and a high degree of participation (there are no political parties and only a 
single national newspaper). Icaria is a rule-governed and non-liberal society; 
the legislature, for example, regulates ‘everything pertaining to their persons, 
actions, goods, food, clothing, lodging, education, their work, and even their 
amusements’ (37/33). Yet this highly regulated egalitarian communism still 
constitutes something of a ‘half-change’ (to borrow an expression from William 
Morris). For example, family structures and gender roles are modii ed rather 
than transformed; women, for instance, appear to be excluded from political 
decision-making yet retain a monopoly on housework. Moreover, whilst there 
are huge republican festivals (worthy of the imagination of Rousseau), the 
Icarians mainly spend their leisure time in gentle bourgeois pursuits – concert-
going, promenades, horseback riding, the theatre and picnics. 
 As for productive activity, Icaria is not Cockaygne (the mythical land of 
plenty where ready-roasted pigeons l y onto your plate). Work remains 
necessary, and the moderate abundance is hard won. Icarian productivity is 
portrayed as the result of the eradication of idlers, the absence of unproductive 
occupations, the extensive use of machinery, the application of a detailed 
technical division of labour, and widespread technological innovation. 
 First, in Icaria everyone ‘is a national worker and works for the republic’ 
(100–1/82). In particular, there are no idle rich. Dukes, marquises and 
barons have become locksmiths, printers and architects; although a stray 
‘us’ and ‘them’ in the mouth of one such Icarian suggests that the historical 
memory of class origins has not yet entirely waned (28/25). Women are 
also now part of the republican workforce, although Cabet’s imagination 
limits them to certain kinds of gendered (and segregated) production. 11 
The women’s workshop visited by Carisdall is devoted to millinery, and 
overl ows with ‘brightly colored silks and velvets, laces and ribbons, l owers 
and feathers’ (136/112). Other women’s workshops are said to involve 
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‘the seamstresses, the l orists, the makers of undergarments, the laundresses, 
and so forth’ (138/113). 
 Second, certain ‘unproductive’ occupations have disappeared. Gun and 
dagger manufacturers, notaries and stockbrokers, for example, have gone 
the way of the nobility. Most importantly we are told, the ‘curse of domestic 
service’ has been eradicated (except, the sceptic will suggest, for women) 
(28/25). In one revealing case, the occupational role survives but is no longer 
occupied exclusively; Valmor (Carisdall’s host) dismisses the suggestion that 
the role of the police force has disappeared, remarking that ‘nowhere on 
earth’ are there more police ofi cers, since ‘all our citizens’ are required to 
enforce the law, and pursue miscreants (132/108). 
 Third, much human labour has been replaced by machinery. Non-agricultural 
production mainly occurs in huge, heavily mechanized, communal workshops 
devoted to particular branches of industry. In one print shop, for example, 
a variety of machines do ‘almost everything themselves’, replacing ‘almost 
i fty thousand workers’ (32/29). And in the republican bakery, ‘ingenious 
machines knead the dough, cut it, and carry it to the ovens’ (48/42). Initially, 
machinery was adopted to perform ‘all the dangerous, tiring, unhealthy, dirty, 
or disgusting work’ (101/83). However, mechanization has clearly progressed 
much further; at a wedding, for example, we discover a ‘mechanical orchestra’ 
without ‘a single musician’ (205/167). 
 Fourth, in the work that remains, a detailed technical division of labour is 
applied. In the women’s millinery workshop, for example, ‘each worker is used 
to doing the same operation all the time, and this repetition doubles yet again 
the speed of the work, while making it perfect’ (137/112). In a letter home, one 
of the visitors coni rms the savings and perfection resulting from ‘machines 
or workers’ performing the same operation (60/50). It is a revealing elision; 
reduced to simple repetitive tasks, human and mechanical labour look to be 
largely interchangeable. 
 Lastly, Icaria is an innovative society, with constantly advancing technology. 
We are shown a dazzling array of new products: smokeless fuels; submarines; 
dust-resistant furniture; odourless gas lighting; steerable air balloons; and so on. 
More entertaining breakthroughs include adumbrations of astro-turf – ‘a sort 
of wetted mastic that turns neither to mud nor to dust’ covers an arena – and 
of muzak – ‘soft music produced by an invisible machine’ plays in a hospital 
(112/92, 256/211). 
 Many questions remain. Not least, one might wonder how the decisions to 
produce are made in the absence of markets. Predictably, it is the republic which 
decides what will be made (providing the necessary resources and gathering up 
the resulting product) (100/82). The same is true of foreign trade decisions, 
since Icaria is not autarchic and imports materials and products where it is 
efi cient to do so (164/134). Domestic production follows a deceptively simple 
(and never fully elucidated) priority rule, making: i rst, those things that 
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are ‘necessary’ (for survival); second, those things that are ‘useful’; and last, 
those things that are ‘pleasing’ (100/82). (Where feasible, all three categories 
of product are made.) The resulting output is distributed equally, and time-
rationed if it cannot be given to everyone outright (subject to everyone being 
able to enjoy it alike). Thus, since there are only enough horses for a tenth of 
the population, each family gets to go riding on every tenth day (221/180). 
Much here depends on the statistical and information-gathering expertise 
of the republic, and those cognisant of the informational function of market 
mechanisms are likely to remain sceptical. 
 Readers might also wonder about the Icarian work ethic. It is one thing to 
recognize that society requires production, but quite another to understand 
what motivates the individual workers to turn up for their shift and pull their 
weight. This concern is magnii ed by the distributive principle emblazoned on 
the frontispiece of  Voyage en Icarie in its 1845 edition: ‘ A chacun suivant ses 
besoins. De chacun suivant ses forces [To each according to their needs. From 
each according to their powers].’ (The anticipation of Karl Marx’s so-called 
‘needs principle’ will be apparent.) Crucially, this principle breaks the link 
between the size of an individual’s contribution to social production and the 
size of their material reward. Icarians, we learn, instead receive goods according 
to ‘sex, age, and a few other circumstances provided by law’ (36/32). Moreover, 
whilst coercion is not ruled out, it is seemingly not needed in order to elicit 
the required contribution. The necessary productive effort is generated in two 
steps: by lightening the burden of work, and increasing the moral motivation 
to bear that lightened load. 
 The burden of productive activity is reduced by its being made shorter, safer, 
cleaner, physically undemanding and pleasurable. The working day begins 
at 6 a.m. and lasts for only six or seven hours depending on the season (the 
shortness here would be more striking to Cabet’s contemporaries). Workplaces 
are subject to the Icarian preoccupation with safety: protective barriers are 
widespread (by riversides, for instance), the air is purii ed, large wild animals 
have been eradicated, and so on. Cleanliness is also an obsession; in the stone 
mason’s workshop, for instance, every precaution is made to avoid dirt, and 
even the workers’ clothes are free of dust and mud (104/85). Work is physically 
undemanding; thus masons never have to carry a load, but simply direct the 
machinery that replaces human physical force (104/85, 154/126). Finally, work 
is made pleasurable. However, it is clear that Cabet views work as an intrinsically 
burdensome activity, and the pleasures here are external to productive activity 
as such. In particular, Icarian workers are seemingly invigorated and entertained 
by engaging in, and listening to, periods of communal song (interspersed with 
periods of silence and periods of conversation). Readers might be doubtful, 
but Carisdall trembles when, in the women’s workshop, ‘those 2,500 pretty 
mouths opened to sing a magnii cent hymn, far too short, in honor of good 
Icar’ (the founding father of the republic) (137/113). As a cumulative result 
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of these arrangements, work has become ‘so untiring, and even pleasant’ that 
many Icarians ignore the nominal retirement ages (of i fty for women and 
sixty-i ve for men) (101/82). 
 The lightened burden of productive activity still needs to be carried, and 
in the absence of either material incentives or coercion, Icaria utilizes what 
might be called moral motivations. Negatively, ‘laziness and idleness’ are 
‘stigmatised’ at least as i ercely as theft and robbery are condemned elsewhere 
(102/84). Positively, ‘the honour with which all forms of work are treated by 
public opinion’ plays a crucial motivational role. From an early age, Icarians 
are taught to ‘love and value’ their work as a form of public service owed to 
the community as a whole (101/83). Moreover, Icarians happily discharge this 
civic duty out of ‘republican passion and feeling’ (270/222). 
 The satisfactions of public service may be sufi cient, but there are additional 
honorii c incentives to encourage even greater technological innovation. 
Citizens are encouraged from an early age to make themselves ‘even more 
useful to society’ by making a discovery or invention, and those who succeed 
earn ‘special esteem, public recognition, or even national honours’ (102/84). 
Icaria is littered with material tributes to those who have made discoveries or 
won competitions (such as that to design the model city of Icara). Perhaps the 
most ubiquitous is the charming little statue found above the toilet door in 
every Icarian home, immortalizing the woman who invented a procedure for 
expelling ‘ les odeurs fétides’ (89/73, 66/55). 
 Work also plays a symbolic role in  Voyage en Icarie , representing the 
identity and character of Icarian citizens and society more generally. It is in 
the huge communal workshops, Valmor tells Carisdall, that the ‘intelligence 
and reason’ of the people and government really ‘shine forth’ (103/84). The 
dominant images of productive activity always involve order and discipline. 
Icarian work, like Icarian society, functions in precise and regimented ways, 
which can initially appear to leave individuality with no space to emerge 
(let alone develop and l ourish). In the clock-making workshop, workers are 
said to form a ‘little army’, and Carisdall remarks that you ‘would think you 
were seeing an army regiment; such is the high degree of order and discipline 
there’ (60/51). And in the masons’ workshop, Valmor uses the language of 
clockwork, observing that ‘this ensemble forms but a single vast machine in 
which each cog fuli ls its function without irregularity’ (105/86). 
 Military and mechanical images might predominate but individuality does 
have some place. In particular, at the age of seventeen (women) and eighteen 
(men), Icarians get to choose the occupations they will enter. There are some 
constraints here; for example, the republic calculates which jobs are needed, 
and women are restricted to the ‘industries that are particular to women’ 
(106/87). However, given certain features of Icarian occupations – that 
material rewards are independent of individual performance, that all jobs are 
held in the same esteem, that no job is burdensome, and so on – the choices 
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that remain would seem to rel ect individual preferences and proclivities. 
(If a particular occupation is oversubscribed, the places are allocated by 
means of ‘a competition, examinations, and the judgment of the competitors 
themselves who make up a jury’) (106/86–7). Whatever one’s views about the 
feasibility and desirability of such arrangements, Cabet is acknowledging issues 
of individuality here (just as elsewhere he tries, albeit not entirely successfully, 
to explain how the sumptuary laws allow variety as well as uniformity) 
(56–9/48–50). 
 Cabet appears not to recognize that (some) work might (potentially) 
be an  intrinsically pleasurable activity. He is unsympathetic to the idea – 
emphasized elsewhere in the socialist tradition – that organized in the right 
way, productive activity could be creative and fuli lling in itself. Given that the 
enthusiasts for Icarian communism were craft workers (tailors, shoemakers, 
weavers, cabinetmakers, hatters, locksmiths, and so on), modern readers are 
liable to be puzzled by their apparent willingness to abandon artisanal skills 
in favour of machine-tending and the mindless repetition of small mechanical 
tasks. Modern concerns about alienation are noticeably absent. In the present 
context, any explanation must remain tentative, but from the vantage-point 
of artisans (not proletarians) in a largely pre-industrial France, the costs of 
de-skilling were largely unknown, whilst the march of mechanization could 
easily seem inevitable, and the compensations of association overwhelming. 
Negatively, Icaria promised to release artisans from the grip of commercial 
middlemen, the dangers of downward social mobility, the threat of grinding 
poverty and the burden of over-work. Positively, it promised to provide them 
with a heady cocktail of egalitarianism, community, material plenty, bourgeois 
culture, compatibility with Christianity and republican virtue. 
 In such circumstances, it is perhaps not so surprising that parts of Cabet’s 
audience found themselves identifying so fully with the i ctitious visitors to 
Icaria who were ‘dazzled by so much reason and so much happiness’ (161/51). 
One of the latter concludes a long descriptive letter home, by imagining the 
recipients’ likely reaction: ‘I believe I can hear you exclaiming, along with me: 
Fortunate Icarians! Unfortunate Frenchmen!’ (48/42). 
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 19 
The Horror of Strangeness : Edward 
Bellamy’s  Looking Backward 
Matthew  Beaumont  
 I think it must have been many seconds that I sat up thus in bed 
staring about, without being able to regain the clew to my personal 
identity. I was no more able to distinguish myself from pure being 
during those moments than we may suppose a soul in the rough to 
be before it has received the ear-marks, the individualizing touches 
which make it a person. Strange that the sense of this inability should 
be such anguish! but so we are constituted. There are no words for 
the mental torture I endured during this helpless, eyeless groping for 
myself in a boundless void. No other experience of the mind gives 
probably anything like the sense of absolute intellectual arrest from 
the loss of a mental fulcrum, a starting point of thought, which 
comes during such a momentary obscuration of the sense of one’s 
identity. I trust I may never know what it is again. 
 I do not know how long this condition had lasted – it seemed an 
interminable time – when, like a l ash, the recollection of everything 
came back to me. I remembered who and where I was, and how I had 
come here, and that these scenes as of the life of yesterday which had 
been passing before my mind concerned a generation long, long ago 
mouldered to dust. Leaping from bed, I stood in the middle of the 
room clasping my temples with all my might between my hands to 
keep them from bursting. Then I fell prone on the couch, and, burying 
my face in the pillow, lay without motion. The reaction which was 
inevitable, from the mental elation, the fever of the intellect that had 
been the i rst effect of my tremendous experience, had arrived. 1 
 Looking Backward 2000–1887 (1888) is of almost incalculable importance to the history of the utopian form. Edward Bellamy’s socialist romance 
was by far the most popular and ideologically inl uential utopia produced 
in the late nineteenth century, a time when novels about the future probably 
appeared in greater numbers than at any other period in Western history. At 
the  i n de siècle , utopian i ction suddenly seemed to be an intellectually and 
commercially viable medium for communicating political ideas, especially 
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oppositional ones, on both sides of the Atlantic. Ordinary middle-class readers 
as well as socialists of one stripe or another were electrii ed by the possibilities 
of the form.  Looking Backward – which was only the second novel published 
in the United States to sell a million copies – was chiel y responsible for this 
state of affairs. Everyone interested in the so-called ‘social question’ debated 
the book, ‘down to the boot-blacks as they s[a]t on the curbstones’. 2 
 Bellamy’s utopia caused a sensation in part because of its eloquent and 
quietly furious indictment of capitalist society. It was published at a time 
of rising unemployment and deepening industrial disputes, when people 
throughout the industrialized nations started to lose that supreme sense of 
coni dence in the capitalist system which had characterized the third quarter 
of the century. At bottom, this was because of a sustained economic crisis 
that had seen capitalism slide in and out of recession since the early 1870s. If 
capitalist society for the i rst time seemed disconcertingly unstable, however, 
its collapse did not seem imminent. The working-class movement was inspired 
to an unprecedented extent by visions of a post-capitalist society; but, as 
the century reached its end, and inter-imperial rivalries intensii ed, breeding 
conl icts that i nally climaxed in 1914, these visions started to dissolve into the 
distance. The explosion of utopianism at the  i n de siècle was an expression of 
the disappointments as well as the achievements of socialists in this epoch. On 
the Left, the popularity of utopian dreaming was partly the effect of a historical 
situation in which socialists were incapable of exploiting in practical terms the 
political opportunities that had opened up to them. 
 In this climate,  Looking Backward became a  cause célèbre because, in 
addition, its innumerable readers used it a kind of guidebook to the possibilities 
of a post-capitalist society. As such, it inspired others to offer blueprints for the 
future. Some were openly motivated by fear of its mass appeal. Alfred Morris, 
for example, attacked  Looking Backward from the Right in  Looking Ahead! 
(1892), which complained, not completely inaccurately, that ‘Socialist leaders, 
when pressed to formulate their policy, were in the habit of referring enquirers 
to [Bellamy’s] book, as affording a complete and unanswerable solution’. 3 
William Morris, for his part, attacked it from the Left in  News from Nowhere 
(1891), a utopian romance that promoted the peaceful pastoral vision of a 
communist society formed in the aftermath of violent socialist revolution. 
Some contemporary readers, in contrast, were motivated to compose utopias 
by devoted enthusiasm for Bellamy’s secular vision of the heavenly city. 
Others simply lifted plot devices from the book, like H.G. Wells in  When the 
Sleeper Wakes (1899). Bellamy himself published a sequel,  Equality , in 1897. 
According to Krishan Kumar’s calculations, at least sixty-two novels directly 
indebted to Bellamy’s utopian model were published in the United States and 
Europe between 1889 and 1900. 4 
 The utopian tradition that commenced with Thomas More’s  Utopia (1516) 
had generally located the ideal society about which it dreamed in unmapped 
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space. Bellamy’s main formal contribution to the utopian tradition was instead 
to cement its association with unmapped time, by relocating the ideal society 
to a relatively far-distant future. In this respect, he built on polemical, often 
dystopian, narratives from the second half of the nineteenth century, like 
George Chesney’s  The Battle of Dorking (1871), which depicted dramatic social 
alternatives to the present unfolding in the immediate future.  Looking Backward 
therefore conjoined the utopian genre to the so-called imaginary history. And 
this suited an epoch shaped both by an acute sense of historical expectation 
and a deepening suspicion that, under the impact of imperial expansion, the 
amount of unmapped space on the planet was rapidly diminishing. As Bellamy 
declared in the Postscript to the second edition of  Looking Backward , the book 
 ‘ was written in the belief that the Golden Age lies before us and not behind us, 
and is not far away’ (197). The i nal clause of that sentence seems ambiguous, 
for if it denotes that the origins of the Golden Age lie in the nineteenth century 
rather than some far-distant future, then it connotes that it can be found in the 
United States rather than some far-distant island. Bellamy’s protagonist, Julian 
West, who suffers from acute insomnia, falls into a deep sleep one night in 
1887, thanks to the assistance of a professional mesmerist, and wakes up one 
day in the year 2000; in both epochs, then, he i nds himself, or loses himself, in 
Boston. He is a time-traveller. 
 In his review of  Looking Backward , William Morris claimed that ‘it is the 
serious essay and not the slight envelope of romance which people have found 
interesting’. 5 Like a number of subsequent critics, he implied i rst that the 
utopia’s essayistic and romantic elements are its sole formal components; and 
second that the latter can be dismissed as of merely incidental importance. 
More recently, Kumar has for example remarked that, of all the utopian 
i ctions he discusses in  Utopia and Anti-Utopia in Modern Times , ‘Bellamy’s 
is in fact the least interesting, considered as literature’. 6 Bellamy himself seems 
to have sanctioned this assumption, in spite of his comparative commercial 
success as an author of ghost stories and romances prior to the late 1880s. In 
an article of 1890, he observed that, in recasting the manuscript of  Looking 
Backward after devising the idea of the ‘industrial army’, which he identii ed 
as ‘the destined corner-stone of the new social order’, he retained ‘the form of 
romance’ only reluctantly, including it ‘with some impatience, in the hope of 
inducing the more to give it at least a reading’. 7 Kumar has pointed out that, 
in adopting this attitude, Bellamy was ‘rejecting his own past as a romancer 
and story-teller’: ‘He was self-consciously taking on a new, more purposive 
role, as social critic and prophet,’ he concludes; ‘but in doing so he ensured 
that, once his ideas had been generally absorbed, or were no longer considered 
interesting, there was little to attract a later generation to the book’. 8 This 
is I believe a misrepresentation of  Looking Backward , a novel that is in fact 
possessed of considerable psychological depth, as I hope to demonstrate 
through a close reading of the extract cited above. It seems to me that Bellamy’s 
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i nest achievement is his portrait of the protagonist’s psychology, the aspect 
of the book that has probably been most consistently overlooked in scholarly 
accounts of it.  Looking Backward , I argue, is a kind of case history in the 
psychology of the utopian imagination. 
 In spite of Kumar’s claim, Bellamy’s utopia is therefore continuous rather 
than discontinuous with his previous i ction – novels like  Doctor Heidenhoff’s 
Process (1880) and  Miss Ludington’s Sister (1884), as well as several short 
stories – in which he speculatively explores abnormal psychological states. In 
 Miss Ludington’s Sister , for instance, Bellamy speculates about ‘the immortality 
of past selves’, imagining an alternative state of being in which one’s ‘past 
and future selves’ are both immediately, perpetually present: ‘The idea of an 
individual, all whose personalities are contemporaneous, may there be realized, 
and such an individual would be by any earthly measurements a god.’ 9  Looking 
Backward is also a meditation on the idea of a personality consisting of both past 
and future selves; and rethinking it in these terms might help us recapture some 
of the excitement that it inspired in Bellamy’s contemporaries. Fredric Jameson 
has commented on the difi culty of understanding this novel’s initial impact, 
rel ecting that ‘the enigma of desire remains, and we are no longer very well 
placed to appreciate Bellamy’s secret’. 10 In some respects, we are better placed to 
understand the ‘enigma of desire’, I suspect, than the book’s i rst readers. 
 So the critical consensus about  Looking Backward , which insists that, like 
most utopian i ction of the late nineteenth century, it is emotionally l at and 
lacking in affect, falsii es it. Bellamy’s protagonist, to take the example that most 
interests me, does not, as most accounts of the book assume, make an untroubled 
transition to the society of 2000. In fact, West suffers something like a trauma 
in time-travelling to the future. His psychology is a disturbed one that raises 
fascinating questions about the stability of the human subject under the peculiar 
existential conditions of utopian imagining. Bellamy reinvented the utopian 
form in part by conceptualizing it as the psychological portrait of an individual 
who effectively becomes dislocated from time; from both the present he half 
escapes and the future to which he is half assimilated. ‘That story of another 
world,’ writes the narrator of one of Bellamy’s short stories, ‘has, in a word, put 
me out of joint with ours’. 11 Throughout his i ction, Bellamy is fascinated by the 
psychology of disjointedness, of divided consciousness.  Looking Backward is a 
study of time out of joint, and of a subject that is out of joint too. 
 In an interesting article on ‘The Insomnia of Julian West’, Tom Towers once 
argued that the ‘chronic insomnia’ from which Bellamy’s protagonist suffers in 
the late nineteenth century ‘becomes the comprehensive symbol of the totality 
of Julian’s sense of social and psychic disturbance’. His emphasis on the hero’s 
damaged psyche is original, but the article makes a misleading assumption that 
the damage is spontaneously repaired once West has appeared in the utopian 
society of the twenty-i rst century: ‘Julian seems reborn into a new selfhood, 
making him for the i rst time at peace with himself and his world.’ 12 In fact, the 
CH019.indd   123 13/01/12   11:34 AM
124    UTOPIAN MOMENTS
opposite is the case: old neuroses cling to him and new ones emerge. Sleep, for 
example, remains a problem even after his reappearance in utopia. On his i rst 
night in 2000, it is in a state of ‘dread’ that he anticipates the moment at which 
he must be alone in the bedroom he has been allotted by the Leetes, his hosts 
in this socialist society, because he fears that the ‘mental balance’ that he has 
maintained in the presence of these ‘friendly strangers’ will collapse. 
 Even then, however, in the pauses of the conversation I had had glimpses, vivid as 
lightning l ashes, of the horror of strangeness that was waiting to be faced when 
I could no longer command diversion. I knew I could not sleep that night, and as 
for lying awake and thinking, it argues no cowardice, I am sure, to confess that I 
was afraid of it.  (28)
 West is poised above a psychological abyss, and he fears that it is when 
he has to confront his existential situation alone that he will plummet into 
it. Terrii ed that the ‘horror of strangeness’ will i nally overwhelm him, he 
consequently defers the moment when he must go to bed, questioning Dr Leete, 
his chief interlocutor, until three o’clock in the morning. At that point, Leete 
prescribes him a ‘dose’ that will ensure ‘a sound night’s sleep without fail’ (28); 
and West does indeed sleep deeply.    
 It is when he wakes up the next morning that he experiences an acute 
psychological crisis. At i rst, West lies quite contentedly in bed, because he has 
no recollection of the fact that he has travelled through time. But when he 
realizes that he is in an unfamiliar bedchamber he starts up from the couch and 
stares crazily about the apartment. Momentarily – though it seems to him to last 
‘an interminable time’ – he loses completely his sense of ‘personal identity’, and 
i nds himself adrift in a state of ‘pure being’. He is being reborn, and this process 
of parturition, as he is assimilated to the conditions of this utopian society, is a 
laborious and painful one. West struggles to explain this in retrospect. 
 There are no words for the mental torture I endured during this helpless, eyeless 
groping for myself in a boundless void. No other experience of the mind gives 
probably anything like the sense of absolute intellectual arrest from the loss 
of a mental fulcrum, a starting point of thought, which comes during such a 
momentary obscuration of one’s identity. (45)
 As he gropes in the ‘boundless void’, West is I-less as well as ‘eyeless’. 
 But the sudden recollection that he has time-travelled to 2000, which succeeds 
this sense that his identity has been all but abolished, is no less devastating. In an 
instant, he realizes that all those he loved have been dead for almost a hundred 
years: he leaps from his bed, clasping his temples, and then l ings himself back 
onto it, burying his face in the pillow. This psychic melodrama immediately 
precipitates him back into the boundless void he hopes instead to evade. 
 The emotional crisis which had awaited the full realization of my actual position, 
and all that it implied, was upon me, and with set teeth and laboring chest, 
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gripping the bedstead with frenzied strength, I lay there and fought for my sanity. 
In my mind, all had broken loose, habits of feeling, associations of thought, ideas 
of persons and things, all had dissolved and lost coherence and were seething 
together in apparently irretrievable chaos. There were no rallying points, nothing 
was left stable.  (46)
 In a state of severe mental dissociation, he rel ects on the likelihood that he 
has suffered a schizoidal split: ‘The idea that I was two persons, that my identity 
was double, began to fascinate me with its simple solution of my experience’ 
(46). But this solution, which is actually not an inaccurate one, offers little 
consolation. On the contrary, he becomes conscious that he is ‘on the verge of 
losing [his] mental balance’ (46). 
 In order to escape a complete psychological collapse, West quits the Leetes’ 
apartment and races into the utopian city’s empty streets. Like an agoraphobic 
adrift in the metropolis, he desperately scrambles about in Boston’s unfamiliar 
quarters for some two hours. In this scene, the city itself effectively functions 
as an objective correlative for the boundless void. Finally, he races back to 
the apartment and collapses in a state of ‘actual nausea’, his brain apparently 
melting because of his sense of ‘abjectness’ and anguish: ‘Throwing myself into 
a chair, I covered my burning eyeballs with my hands to shut out the horror of 
strangeness’ (47). Again: the horror of strangeness. It is at this point that Leete’s 
daughter reappears and coaxes West out of his psychotic state. However, the 
descriptive intensity of the passage I have cited above is such that, in spite of 
his assimilation to the Boston of the future thereafter, he never fully seems to 
escape the threat of some relapse. 
 The novel’s poetic as opposed to political force depends on the idea 
established in this scene that West’s identity is in some sense doubled; and that, 
as someone who is simultaneously a product of the nineteenth and the twenty-
i rst century, he is doomed to inhabit the historical equivalent of what Bellamy 
once described in another context as a ‘Jekyll-Hyde existence’. 13 Doubleness 
is indeed something like an obsession in the shorter i ction, where the past 
and future are often placed in unsettling tension with the present: stories like 
‘The Old Folks’ Party’ (1876) and ‘A Midnight Drama’ (1877), in spite of 
the quaintness of their romance plots, are probing, experimental investigations 
into what he describes in the latter as the ‘odd feeling of being double’. 14 In the 
former, six young friends stage a fancy-dress party at which they must make 
themselves up as their future selves; that is, as they imagine they will look in 
i fty years’ time. This game produces ‘a singular effect’: ‘They began to regard 
every event and feeling from a double standpoint, as present and as past, as 
it appeared to them and as it would appear to an old person.’ 15 As in  Miss 
Ludington’s Sister , past, present and future selves are rendered co-existent in 
 Looking Backward .   
 Read from the perspective of these examples of Bellamy’s speculative i ction, 
 Looking Backward can be interpreted as an attempt to infuse the utopian form 
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with psychological realism. It is a laboratory test of what, in ‘The Old Folks’ 
Party’, he had called ‘the fragile tenure of the sense of personal identity’. 16 
West does not become magically adjusted to the conditions of Boston in 2000; 
plausibly enough, he remains maladjusted. Bellamy therefore dramatically 
redei nes the narrator of utopian i ction, presenting him as someone almost 
terminally troubled by psychic uncertainty. In Bellamy’s socialist romance, time-
travelling to the future entails an existential struggle. In thus psychologizing the 
utopian imagination, or even psychopathologizing it, he decisively modernizes 
utopian i ction. In this respect,  Looking Backward anticipates the concerns of 
twentieth-century science i ction more strikingly even than Wells’s novels, which 
it is generally assumed inaugurate the genre; for, as Jameson has observed, it 
is ‘one of the grand and dramatic merits of SF as a form that it can thus win 
back from the sheerly psychological or subjective such expressive powers of 
pathology – depression, melancholy, morbid passion – and place this material 
in the service of collective drama’. 17 
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‘The Incompatibility I Could Not Resolve’: 
Ambivalence in H.G. Wells’s 
 A Modern Utopia 
 Richard  Nate  
 The Utopia of a modern dreamer must needs differ in one fundamental 
aspect from the Nowheres and Utopias men planned before 
Darwin quickened the thought of the world. Those were all perfect 
and static States, a balance of happiness won forever against the forces 
of unrest and disorder that inhere in things. One beheld a healthy and 
simple generation enjoying the fruits of the earth in an atmosphere of 
virtue and happiness, to be followed by other virtuous, happy, and entirely 
similar generations, until the Gods grew weary. Change and development 
were dammed back by invincible dams forever. But the Modern Utopia 
must be not static but kinetic, must shape not as a permanent state but as 
a hopeful stage leading to a long ascent of stages. [...] That is the i rst, 
most generalised difference between a Utopia based upon modern 
conceptions and all the Utopias that were written in the former time. 1 
 When H.G. Wells published  A Modern Utopia in 1905, the book’s very title indicated its ambivalent nature. Since it described an ideal 
community, it could be viewed as a part of the utopian tradition that had 
begun with Plato’s  Republic in the i fth century BC. At the same time, however, 
the epithet ‘modern’ signalled that it was also intended as a departure from 
this tradition. In contrast to the ideal communities described so far, Wells’ 
utopia was not set on some remote island but rather represented a political 
structure of a global nature. In order to understand this change, one has to 
take into account the context of the late nineteenth century when European 
expansion had reached its i nal stage and a  terra incognita to be populated with 
an imaginary community no longer existed. ‘Time was when a mountain valley 
of an island seemed to promise sufi cient isolation for a polity to maintain itself 
from outward force’, Wells declared in the i rst chapter of his book, concluding 
that a world state was the only model which now remained for outlining an 
ideal society (8). In addition, the philosophical basis of his utopia also meant a 
break with tradition. In contrast to the timeless character that had still dei ned 
William Morris’  News from Nowhere (1891), the ‘kinetic’ world state was 
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conceived of as a transitory state within a never-ending process of change. 
After the idea of a God-given ‘chain of being’ had been challenged by Darwin’s 
theory of evolution, the static vision of traditional utopias seemed no longer 
acceptable. What was needed was a new model of society that respected the 
dynamism inherent in the new biological outlook. 
 In order to get an idea of the nature of Wells’s utopia, however, it is 
important to realize that his subscription to evolutionary theory also had an 
impact on the mode of textual presentation. The emphasis on the transitory 
quality of all natural phenomena had two implications. On the one hand, it 
implied a rejection of the creationist view of nature; on the other it pointed 
to the limitations of the utopian vision itself. Rather than creating a coherent 
utopian model, Wells aimed at testing the potentials of the utopian imagination 
under the constraints of a Darwinian view of the universe. On the textual level, 
this resulted in a degree of openness that perfectly corresponded to the author’s 
enthusiasm for all kinds of experimentalism. 2 Adopting the experimental 
method in utopian writing meant that the vision of an ideal state functioned 
as a hypothesis open to both verii cation and falsii cation. In the case of the 
 Modern Utopia , the outcome was a critical rel ection on the status of utopian 
writing rather than a blueprint for an ideal society. 3 
 If Wells intended his work as an experiment on utopian writing, he had 
to make sure that his readers were not carried away by the charms of his 
i ction. In a ‘Note to the Reader’, he explained that he had spent a considerable 
amount of time on the question of how to construct his text. Rejecting the form 
of an ‘argumentative essay’ as well as that of a ‘straightforward story’, he had 
i nally decided on a ‘sort of shot-silk texture’, that is a combination of both 
forms of presentation (xlvii). 
 What distinguishes  Modern Utopia from Wells’s earlier scientii c romances 
is the fact that the reader is continually made aware of its status as a literary 
artefact. 4 Instead of lulling his audience into pleasant visions of an ideal society, 
Wells employed strategies of defamiliarization which bore a conspicuous 
resemblance to modernist modes of writing. 5 There are various elements which 
are likely to irritate the reader rather than satisfy their curiosity. Not only 
does Wells add a frame text in which he distances himself from the ‘owner of 
the voice’ whom he mockingly describes as a ‘rather too plump little man ... 
laboriously enunciating propositions’ (4), but he also allows his narrator to 
make remarks which are liable to qualify the entire utopian project. When 
the utopian ‘voice’ refers to his model as the ‘monster state my Frankenstein 
of reasoning has made’ (140), for instance, he not only professes his higher 
education by simultaneously alluding to Thomas Hobbes’  Leviathan (1651) 
and Mary Shelley’s  Frankenstein (1818), but he also hints at the possibility 
that his vision may even contain some dystopian elements. A qualifying effect 
is also achieved through the introduction of a character who acts as the voice’s 
antagonist. The ‘botanist’, as he is called, turns out to be a representative of 
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the pre-Darwinian biology that Wells rejected. Like his eighteenth-century 
precursor Carl Linnaeus, the botanist is convinced of the timeless quality 
of classii catory models. Signii cantly, it is his conservative outlook which 
produces the collapse of the voice’s utopian vision at the end of the narrative. 
Caught in the web of a philosophical determinism in which the ‘scars of the 
past’ make any attempt at creating a new social reality appear like a waste 
of time, he i nally forces the narrator to redirect his attention to the bleak 
reality of contemporary London. As the latter i nds himself disillusioned by the 
botanist’s fatalist attitude, the only thing that is left for him is his coni dence 
in the utopian imagination itself. ‘There will be many utopias’, he concludes, 
and adds rather vaguely: ‘Each Generation will have its new version of Utopia, 
a little more certain and complete and real, with its problems lying close and 
closer to the problems of the Thing in Being’ (220). 
 The negative depiction of the botanist cannot be understood without 
taking into account Wells’s profound distrust in the reliability of classii catory 
models. On the one hand, this distrust had its roots in Darwin’s refutation 
of the stable categories of creationism; on the other, it sprang from an 
epistemological scepticism the author had expressed early on. When Wells 
prepared the Atlantic Edition of his works in the 1920s, he took care that his 
epistemological essay ‘Scepticism of the Instrument’ was appended to  Modern 
Utopia. 6 Given the author’s nominalist standpoint, it is not surprising to i nd 
the utopian narrator also regarding all classii catory models with suspicion and 
insisting on the primacy of the individual. ‘Until you bring in individualities, 
nothing comes into being’, he declares in the i rst chapter, and for this reason he 
also rejects the utopian models of Plato and Thomas More. Instead of paying 
respect to the ‘blood and warmth and reality of life’, these authors had merely 
presented ‘generalised people’ (7). With regard to his own textual experiment, 
it is noteworthy that the voice rejects generalizations for aesthetic as well 
as political reasons. Aesthetically, they make a presentation appear ‘jejune’; 
politically, they prove dangerous by not taking into account the complexities 
of social life. The narrator’s concern for personal liberties shows that he is 
well aware of the dangers which can result from placing the demands of the 
community above those of the individual. In a chapter which harshly criticizes 
the typologies used in contemporary racial anthropology, he even characterizes 
‘crude classii cations and false generalisations’ as the ‘curse of all organised 
human life’ (191). 
 Set against the typological schemes employed in the social discourse of 
Wells’s time, the narrator’s arguments appear like an exercise in deconstruction. 
Although he is ready to acknowledge that every human being is naturally 
inclined to generalize from his or her singular experiences, he points to the 
dangers inherent in this approach. As far as social phenomena are concerned, the 
complementary processes of inclusion and exclusion which often accompany 
the process of generalizing are seen as a major problem. ‘The natural man 
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does not feel he is aggregating at all, unless he aggregates  against something’, 
the narrator states in a chapter on ‘Race in Utopia’ and explains that general 
categories are often based on binary distinctions in which one element is 
preferred to the other: ‘The Anti-idea, it would seem, is inseparable from the 
aggregatory idea; it is a necessity of the human mind. When we think of the 
class A as desirable, we think of Not-A as undesirable’ (189). Signii cantly, 
the narrator points to the botanist to illustrate how the human drive to 
generalize can produce prejudices which lack any rational basis. As he explains, 
the botanist 
 has a strong feeling for systematic botanists as against plant physiologists ... but 
he has a strong feeling for all ... biologists, as against physicists and those who 
profess the exact sciences ... but he has a strong feeling for all who profess what 
is called Science as against psychologists, sociologists, philosophers, and literary 
men ... but he has a strong feeling for all educated men as against the working man ... 
but so soon as the working man is comprehended together with those others as 
Englishmen ... he holds them superior to all other sorts of European.  (190)
 Remarks such as these prove that Wells was very sensitive towards the ways 
in which classii catory models could be employed to petrify existing social 
prejudices. What disturbed him most were the typological schemes used by 
nationalists and racial anthropologists. Using the narrator as his voice, he 
warned that national and racial prejudices could be ‘responsible for a large 
proportion of the wars, hardships, and cruelties the immediate future holds in 
store for our earth’ (194). As we know today, it was a warning which would 
become prophetic within less than a decade. 
 What proved difi cult, however, was the attempt to harmonize the critique of 
generalizations with the plan of sketching an ideal society. The problem lay in 
the fact that, by dei nition, utopian writing had to deal with social categories. As 
Justin Busch has remarked recently: ‘[U]topian thought is, of necessity, thought 
which deals in political generalities, however important the individuals as 
individuals may be seen as being within the i nal structure.’ 7 Accordingly, Wells’s 
narrator i nds himself caught between his distrust of classii catory models and 
his simultaneous desire to outline the general characteristics of his ideal society. 
If one compares those passages which outline his epistemological scepticism 
with those which describe the social structure of the utopian society, his 
dilemma becomes obvious. Trying to avoid the pitfalls of a naïve essentialism, 
the narrator argues that his social classes are based on pragmatic rather than 
philosophical principles. ‘It is not a classii cation for Truth, but a classii cation to 
an end’, he explains in the hope of not violating his own philosophical premises 
(160). What comes out of this can only be called a rhetorical manoeuvre. While 
on the one hand he professes a regard for ‘humanity as a multitude of unique 
individuals in mass’, on the other, he suggests that ‘one may, for practical 
purposes, deal with it far more conveniently by disregarding its uniqueness 
and its mixed cases altogether’ (160). The ensuing ‘pragmatic’ classii cation is 
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a rigid one, consisting of just four temperaments – the ‘poietic’, the ‘kinetic’, the 
‘dull’ and the ‘base’ (157). The i rst group consists of highly talented individuals 
who also make up the ‘Order of the Samurai’ – an intellectual and moral elite 
which calls to mind Plato’s ‘guardians’ as well as contemporary concepts of 
a ‘new aristocracy’. 8 The second comprises administrators who carry out the 
plans of the ‘poietic’. While the i rst two groups meet the requirements of the 
utopian society, the third and the fourth fall short of its demands. The ‘dull’ lack 
sufi cient intellectual capacities; the ‘base’ are characterized by their criminal 
energy and anti-social behaviour. Although the narrator maintains that the 
four temperaments are not hereditarily determined but of such a nature that 
people ‘drift’ to them ‘of their own accord’ (157), it is difi cult to see how his 
classii cation could ever be brought in line with his belief in the primacy of 
the individual. Even more disturbing, the narrator’s dei nition of four social 
classes betrays the very characteristic which, on another occasion, leads him 
to ‘regard all generalisations with suspicion’, namely their function to separate 
a desirable class ‘A’ – the ‘poietic’ and ‘kinetic’ – from an undesirable class 
‘Not-A’ – the ‘dull’ and the ‘base’. 
 That the narrator’s classii cation of social types based on strategies of 
inclusion and exclusion becomes clear by looking at another chapter entitled 
‘Failure in a Modern Utopia’. Here, the voice argues in favour of ‘a kind of 
social surgery’ to ensure that the number of undesirable individuals be held in 
check (84). The reader is informed that the utopian state is active in preventing 
the ‘dull’ from propagating, thus adhering to a kind of negative eugenics. 
The ‘base’ are segregated from the rest of society by being deported to remote 
islands which lie ‘apart from the highways of the sea’ (85). If such policies offend 
the modern reader, they are still fairly moderate if compared to Wells’s earlier 
writings. In contrast to the grim forecasts he had made in his  Anticipations 
(1901), the setting up of ‘lethal chambers’ is now explicitly dismissed. 9 
Still, the narrator’s ‘social surgery’ included practices which clearly violated the 
principle of human rights that Wells would defend in his later years. Although 
the narrator professes that ‘even for murder Utopia will not ... kill’, he explicitly 
excludes from this practice ‘deformed and monstrous and evilly diseased births’ 
who still receive as little mercy as they did in Plato’s  Republic (84). 
 Given its rigid social policies, it is hardly surprising that the  Modern Utopia 
has met with some negative criticism. 10 It must be noted, however, that those 
readers who have taken Wells’s book as a blueprint for a perfect society have 
failed to acknowledge its status as a textual experiment. A closer look at the 
text reveals the outcome of this experiment is anything but clear. Interestingly, 
it is the increasing complexity of the narrator’s vision – a complexity which 
results from his intention to ‘bring in individualities’ – which is responsible for 
the fact that his imagination i nally fails him. Towards the end of his narrative, 
he has to admit that ‘a Utopia is a thing of the imagination that becomes more 
fragile with every added circumstance, that, like a soap-bubble, it is most 
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brilliantly and variously coloured at the very instant of its dissolution’ (209). 
In the i nal chapter, the botanist’s unwillingness to shake off the past turns 
out to be the decisive factor in making the utopian ‘bubble’ burst. After the 
experiment has failed, the narrator falls silent and Wells himself takes over. 
Rel ecting on the tensions which result from the divergent tasks of drafting 
a social scheme and accepting the unique character of every single item, 
he confesses: ‘In that incongruity between great and individual inheres the 
incompatibility I could not resolve, and which, therefore, I have had to present 
in this conl icting form’ (222). 
 Indeed, what remains of the utopian vision is little more than this ‘conl icting 
form’ which only corroborates the Darwinian outlook the author has subscribed 
to from the beginning. If the ending betrays a loss of coni dence in the concrete 
utopian model, this does not diminish the value of the utopian imagination. 
When the narrator concludes that ‘each generation will have its new version 
of Utopia’ (19), this statement can be interpreted as an acknowledgment 
of both the futility of any utopian programme and also as an expression of 
his unbroken belief in the ‘principle of hope’ which Ernst Bloch declared to 
be the driving force behind all utopian thought. 11 Wells’s future career as a 
writer suggests that the latter reading is the more appropriate one. If there 
is a common characteristic detectable in all his works, it is his readiness to 
permanently reshape his political visions and to adapt them to the changing 
conditions of the twentieth century. Although it seems that he was not always 
aware of the problematic implications of some of his proposals, his readiness 
to revise his schemes clearly distinguished him from those contemporaries who 
succumbed to the charms of totalitarian ideologies. If viewed in this way, the 
bursting of the narrator’s ‘bubble’ does not necessarily signify a failure of the 
experiment; it could equally be viewed as indicative of the author’s awareness 
that the only utopia which made sense in the modern world was one which was 
sufi ciently l exible to question and able to adapt itself. 
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 21 
Utopian Journeying : Ursula K. Le Guin’s 
 The Dispossessed 
Laurence  Davis and  Peter  G. Stillman  
 True Journey is return 1 
 One of the most persistent criticisms of the literary utopia is that it is radically anti-historical, in the sense that it depicts distant times or places qualitatively 
different and cut off from the useless burdens of the present and past. From this 
perspective, the spirit of the utopian is in essence Platonic rather than Heraclitian, 
because it denies the essential l ux inherent in all being. Whereas Heraclitus 
famously believed that you cannot step twice into the same river, because both 
you and the river waters l ow in continual change, Plato’s  Republic inaugurated 
a tradition of ideal societies based on timeless and absolute standards occupying 
a i xed space outside of history. As a result, so the argument goes, literary utopias 
are either politically irrelevant fantasies or potentially dangerous expressions of a 
despotic desire to re-shape reality according to an impossible ideal. 
 To some extent, these criticisms of utopia have merit. Many early modern 
European utopian writers from More to Bacon and Campanella did indeed 
imagine qualitatively different futures bereft of historical roots and devoid of 
processes tending to upset them or change their design. Although the formation 
of utopian expectations, values and norms was historically embedded in the 
background of utopian thinking, history as a continuing concern for the past 
was rejected because of a belief that the new ideal world had to emanate from 
reason, nature or morality. 2 
 Inl uenced no doubt by ever-accelerating processes of capitalist globalization, 
the dominant trend of subsequent Enlightenment and Industrial era utopian 
thinking has been to postulate a break between the dynamic present of modernity 
and its comparatively ‘primitive’ static past. One thinks, for example, of the 
many so-called ‘progressive’ or ‘dynamic’ utopias of the nineteenth century, 
which acknowledge the extent to which utopian ideals are bound up with time 
and history, but only insofar as history is conceived in linear, law-like and 
necessarily progressive terms as a set of i xed and hierarchical stages leading 
ultimately to a future perfection. 
 Ursula K. Le Guin discusses her departure from this dominant trend of 
anti-historical utopia in an exceptionally thought-provoking paper on literary 
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utopias that she delivered at the University of California in 1982, eight years 
after publication of her i rst utopian novel  The Dispossessed and three years 
prior to the publication of her second utopian novel  Always Coming Home . 
Le Guin signalled that her chief focus was the theme of ‘returning’. 3 While this 
may seem an unusual theme for an essay on utopias, its rationale becomes clear 
once Le Guin identii es the primary target of the essay’s critical commentary: 
namely, what she refers to as the ‘Euclidean’ or rationalist utopia. 
 According to Le Guin, it is the very essence of this utopia that it is, as More 
said in naming it, nowhere. A reaction of will and reason against, away from, 
the here and now and the fetters of the past, the Euclidean utopia is pure 
model and goal. Like capitalism and industrialism and colonial ‘development’, 
it is able to speak only in the future tense, the language of progress, and is 
thus inherently uninhabitable. Like them as well, it is also potentially highly 
destructive of what is, insofar as it blinds us to the ini nite meaning and beauty 
hidden in the everyday, and propels us forward in an ever more breathless and 
desperate pursuit of the unattainable. It aims for a goal of static perfection, in 
which the variegated diversity of life is regulated by principles of reason that 
are embodied in structures. 
 The focus of the non-Euclidean utopia, by contrast, is on the temporally 
extended present, the ‘right here, right now’ inhabited by living, breathing 
human beings. Paradoxically, it is such that if it is to come, it must exist already. 
Indeed, according to Le Guin, it has existed already, as a feature of many of 
the so-called ‘primitive’ societies crushed under the wheels of technological 
‘progress’. It has also l ourished in literary form in a relatively small number of 
utopian works, such as Robert Nichols’s four-volume  Daily Lives in Nghsi-Altai 
(1977–9) and Austin Tappan Wright’s  Islandia (1942), which explicitly rejected 
the dominant ideology of endless material progress. Clearly associating herself 
with this tradition, Le Guin urges her listeners and readers to pay heed to the 
Taoist advice to return to roots, and the Cree counsel to emulate the porcupine 
in going backwards while looking forward. Again recalling Native American 
lore, she recalls that Coyote country was not mapped, and suggests that perhaps 
the utopist would do well to ‘lose the plan, throw away the map’, 4 and pay far 
greater attention to the  communitas implicit in the landscape of the present. 
 In  The Dispossessed , Le Guin breaks radically from this rootless utopian 
tradition and explores the characteristics of the non-Euclidean utopia. Her 
novel begins and ends with the chief protagonist Shevek travelling between 
the worlds of Urras and Anarres, a neighbouring planet or moon settled some 
170 years prior to the start of the story by anarchist syndicalist revolutionaries 
from Urras. A brilliant physicist working on a unii ed theory of time, Shevek 
grows up on Anarres and gradually becomes aware of its shortcomings; he 
journeys to Urras, witnesses i rst hand its inequalities and injustices, supports 
a revolutionary movement there that is violently repressed, and returns home 
to Anarres. 
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 One of the most distinctive features of Le Guin’s utopian narrative is that 
it is grounded 5 in a rich landscape of time and place that is the antithesis of 
ideologies of perpetual progress and human perfectibility. Early in the novel 
Shevek rel ects that ‘you shall not go down twice to the same river, nor can you 
go home again’ (54). But from this acceptance of transience he also develops a 
sophisticated theory of time wherein what is most changeable is the fullest of 
eternity, and in word and deed he demonstrates that ‘you  can go home again … 
so long as you understand that home is a place where you have never been’ (55). 
 In this chapter we elaborate on Le Guin’s creative development of the utopian 
tradition by exploring ways in which she narrates utopia without assuming 
unchanging utopian frameworks, linear progress, or human perfectibility. 
Specii cally, we focus on the themes of change, freedom and initiative, promises, 
and utopian journeying. 
 Unlike utopias of perfectibility and stasis, Le Guin’s utopia foregrounds 
change at both a societal and an individual level. The anarchist utopian society 
on Anarres originates in revolutionary change. But it ossii es and decays over 
time, suggesting that even in a good society individuals may pursue power and 
fear the opinions of their neighbours. Utopia cannot transform human nature: 
the will to dominate is as ‘central to human beings as the impulse to mutual aid 
is’ (168). At the same time, Shevek and his friends create counter-tendencies, 
new ways to re-invigorate anarchist society. The ‘close’ of the novel is open-
ended, stopping just before Shevek’s landing on his return to Anarres. So Le 
Guin does not tell her readers whether he will be greeted with open arms, with 
violence or with some other change-making response. Neither static nor rigid, 
Anarres is constantly evolving. 
 Individuals also change. For instance, Shevek is transformed by signii cant 
life episodes, such as his enduring partnership with Takver and his fraught 
working relationship with Sabul, who accrues power and privileges as leader 
of the physics syndicate. Contrasts with other characters emphasize Shevek’s 
changes and transformations. His critically astute friend Bedap fails to i nd a 
fuli lling direction to life; and Tirin, an imaginative playwright, cannot move 
beyond his i rst play. Unlike perfect – and insipid – characters who live in a 
structurally well-organized utopia and who simply choose or live within the 
coni nes of those structures, and unlike visitors to utopia who are converted to 
a belief in the utopia, for Shevek life is a process of change. 
 Change occurs because individuals make decisions and undertake initiatives 
that alter their lives and the lives of others. A perfected utopia, a utopia without 
change, or a utopia characterized (like  Looking Backward or  A Modern Utopia ) 
by a rational structure within which people live – these types of utopias cannot 
encompass human actions that change the society; they can at most allow 
choices that do not disturb the utopia’s order. In  The Dispossessed Le Guin 
explores important dimensions of human freedom beyond the standard sense 
of freedom as choice. 
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 On Anarres individuals do have freedom as choice. But they can also question 
existing social principles and practices, and act contrary to them, by individual 
or group initiative. In the face of Anarres’s decay, Shevek and his friends decide 
to form a ‘Syndicate of Initiative’, which publishes material refused by existing 
syndicates and eventually undertakes other initiatives, such as communicating 
with Urras and advocating for Shevek to go to Urras. These initiatives involve 
‘the power of moral choice – the power of change, the essential function of life’ 
(333) and can transform the basic principles and practices of society. 
 Arguing before the PDC, an anarchist coordinating system for all the 
syndicates, Shevek asserts that it is the ‘right of the Odonian individual to 
initiate action harmless to others’ (357), whatever that action might be – even 
if it is the novel action of travelling to Urras and returning, and even if some 
PDC members advocate Anarres’s continuing isolation from Urras. But after 
the debate, Shevek decides to act on his own initiative by travelling to Urras. 
In a free society each person, alone or with others, acts on his or her own 
initiative. Individuals must themselves generate the circumstances in which they 
live. And individual freedom and initiative in turn undermine i xed structures 
and linearity. 
 In a world of change, neither nature nor logic provides stability. Takver loves 
the organic cycles in the i sh she studies, but human beings are not i sh, for 
‘whom the present is eternal’ (187). Humans remember the past and can act to 
try to bring about a future. Humans also cannot rely on nature as a standard, a 
criterion, or basis for action: Shevek, feeling tremors, knows the ‘earth itself was 
uncertain, unreliable’ (314), a thought with particular resonance as we write 
this chapter, only months after the earthquake and tsunamis that devastated 
Japan. Nor can logic, interpretation, reason or constitutions provide stability: 
the intense argument at the PDC about Shevek’s journeying to Urras and back 
indicates that reason provides a plurality of possible answers. In the face of 
nature’s restlessness and reason’s indeterminacy, ‘the enduring, the reliable, is a 
promise made by the human mind’ (314). 
 A promise intervenes in the cycles and movements of life, creating a new 
path to follow. A promise originates in freedom and is a self-imposed limitation 
on freedom: ‘I promise’ is to undertake that there are some things I shall 
do, and others I shall refrain from doing. Individuals themselves freely limit 
their freedom by committing to specii c actions, and thus make possible the 
establishment of trust, union and community. 
 An individual can make a personal promise, as Shevek does when he 
promises himself that ‘he would never act again but by his own free choice’ 
(8). A couple can undertake mutual promises to create a small community 
of trust and commitment, as do Shevek and Takver. Larger groups are also 
built on promises and l ourish with trust. The syndicates are built on the 
promise that everyone will be treated equally and fairly, and that no one will 
usurp administrative work into political power – a promise certainly broken 
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by Sabul with the physics syndicate. Anarres was started by Odonians who 
committed to live together in an Odonian fashion on their new planet, and 
whose revolutionary song, sung by the protestors on Urras during Shevek’s 
stay, refers hopefully to ‘the promise kept’ (299). 
 Promises are commitments made about the future by individuals speaking 
and acting in the present, whose commitments carry weight because of their 
past reliability. Building on their pasts, individuals create their futures by 
the act of promising. Those who live only in the present – such as hedonistic 
pleasure-seekers, or those who know only denial (378) – live within a recurring, 
unchanging cycle, or (in a different metaphor) the locked room of a present 
without past or future: ‘Outside the locked room is the landscape of time, in 
which the spirit may, with luck and courage, construct the fragile, makeshift, 
improbable roads and cities of i delity: a landscape inhabitable by human 
beings’ (335). 
 In that fragile landscape shaped by promises, individuals freely engage in 
new undertakings. They make journeys. They set out with a project, a direction, 
a wish to work towards some different condition or state. But that aim is 
constantly revised as new constraints or possibilities arise and as intermediate 
directions are attained or change. For Le Guin, there is ‘no end’ or goal: ‘There 
was process; process was all’ (334). Moreover, the ‘separation of means and 
ends’ is ‘false’, as all means are ends (296, 334). So for Le Guin journeying is a 
process, an interplay in which means and ends are intermixed, interchangeable 
and continually changing. 
 In the process of the journey, travellers are transformed by their aims and 
activities, and their activities transform the landscape through which they travel. 
But the meanings of the changes do not become clear until the travellers return 
home; an action requires completion in order for it to be intelligible. (Indeed, 
because lives are made up of multiple journeys, any action’s completion is but 
temporary, and its meanings subject to change in the light of future journeys.) 
 The journey to establish a rationalist or Euclidean utopia is a journey into 
a static and structured future with a set goal, a journey that leaves home 
and the past behind. For Le Guin, ‘true journey is return’, a return home 
to a new present transformed in unpredictable ways by the journey. The return 
home can prompt an awareness of what might be called ‘the living present’, 
an on-going, continuous present binding past experiences to present aims and 
directions for the future. In this living present, Tao-like, the present stretches 
through past and future, sameness includes change, and living involves activity 
without striving and motion with stillness. Grasping the wholeness of the living 
present requires not talk or reason but ‘hand’s touch. I touch the wholeness, 
I hold it’ (190). 
 So Le Guin invites us, her readers, to explore dimensions of the living present. 
A train engineer takes journeys of i fteen days and then goes ‘home’ (310–11) 
to his partner of eighteen years, because for him the same partner means the 
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most novelty and variety. After a breakdown from working too intensely and 
narrowly on physics with Sabul, a recovering Shevek meets Takver again, and 
they promise to bond with each other. The narrator observes: 
 It was now clear to Shevek … that his wretched years in this city [with Sabul] 
had all been part of his present great happiness, because they had led up to it, 
prepared him for it. Everything that had happened to him was part of what was 
happening to him now.  (183)
 He has returned home from his journeys and can now see their meaning 
as he looks backwards, and i nds himself able to inhabit a living present with 
Takver. By means of their enduring love for one another they create a small 
community of trust that is rooted in the past and open to a shared future. 
In this living present of activity without striving, Shevek and Takver become 
central to the social life of their friends simply by being themselves (188–9), 
and in Shevek’s work in physics he creates a theoretical structure ‘that seemed 
nothing of his own but a knowledge working through him’ (187). 
 ‘True journey is return’ also because the return to a changed home inhabited 
by other, changed travellers is an invitation to future journeys that respond 
to the changes in self, home and others. Euclidean utopias assume an end to 
journeying when the utopia is attained. But Odonians have no ‘expectation of 
ever stopping’ (334) and every expectation of doing what they do best (333); 
so Shevek journeys to Urras and returns to Anarres. 
 As individuals journey and return so too do societies. As one commentator 
on the novel has observed, ‘Shevek’s individual journey out (away from home 
and to a foreign planet) is part of a homeward journey for his society (toward 
claiming the past, in the interest of continuing to build a future)’. 6 Anarres has 
been – and continues to be – a future of Urras. The existence of Anarres is a 
constant reminder that Urras can be different (295), and the renewed activities 
of revolutionaries hold out hope that Urras, a paradise in some ways and a 
hell in others, can change. Similarly, Shevek hopes that direct and meaningful 
engagement with the continuing reality of oppression and injustice on Urras 
will remind the Anarresti of why they must be eternally vigilant in testing, 
protecting and renewing their anarchism. 
 The promise of Anarres is that its revolution can be ‘a permanent one, an 
on-going process’ (176).  The Dispossessed ends just as Shevek is returning 
home to an uncertain welcome on Anarres. With him is Ketho, an inhabitant 
of another planet, who is beginning his own journey. He is travelling to Anarres 
on his own initiative to study anarchy in action, to experience for himself its 
distinctive way of life, and ultimately to return home with ‘an idea, a promise, 
a risk’ (385) of social renewal. 
 The true journey is thus a creative venture into the unknown, linking past, 
present and future in an open circle. The utopian element in  The Dispossessed 
is not so much Anarres as a society but Anarres as an open-ended promise, a 
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‘potential permanent source of renewal of thought and perception’, 7 which 
ensures that the past never assumes a i nal shape and the future never shuts its 
doors. 
 Stepping back from the text of  The Dispossessed to return to the question of 
its signii cance in the context of the utopian tradition as a whole, we conclude 
that Le Guin’s utopia differs from so many previous literary utopias by refusing 
to separate sharply past, present and future; is and ought; means and ends. 
Whereas the dominant rationalist utopia is a reaction of reason and will against 
and away from the here and now and the fetters of the past,  The Dispossessed 
is an achieved example of a grounded utopia rooted in a rich landscape of time 
and place. It depicts utopian aspirations not as a star in the heavens or a i xed 
point on the horizon towards which we sail, but as an ever-present home to 
which we are continually returning. 
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 Conclusion 
 Lyman Tower  Sargent  
 In everyone’s life there will be times when one is hopeful that one’s personal life or the world in which we live is getting better or will get better. There 
will also be times of despair and times of resignation. In the hopeful times 
everything is just a bit brighter; we are aware of possibilities of personal and 
social betterment that elude us at other times, and those possibilities seem to be 
within reach. These moments have a history in that some people have chosen 
to write down the possibilities they see in those moments, and when the texts 
are primarily about social hope, we can call them utopian moments. 
 Such moments are immensely important because both individuals and 
societies need hope, need the sense that things do not have to be the way that 
they are, that things can be better. There are consistent elements in what we 
hope for, such as a full stomach, decent clothing and housing, and personal 
security, but beyond these elements what is included depends on time and place. 
 This book is about the social dreams or the utopian moments of a set of 
writers from Western Europe and the United States with seven British authors, 
seven French authors, two from the United States, and one each from Germany, 
Italy and Spain. The authors range from Thomas More who coined the word 
‘utopia’ in 1516 to Ursula K. Le Guin, who, although the text chosen is 
from 1974, is still publishing utopias in the second decade of the twenty-i rst 
century. All the works highlighted are positive utopias presenting distinctly 
better places, although some could have used Le Guin’s subtitle,  An Ambiguous 
Utopia , and  The Isles of Pines is more ambiguous than most of the utopias of 
its time period. Although all are important works within utopian literature and 
many are important in the history of political thought or intellectual or literary 
history, few are read today except by scholars and university students required 
to do so on their courses. This is unfortunate because they all have important, 
albeit very different, messages for their readers. 
 One is struck, but not really surprised, by just how different the better 
societies presented in these texts are. All utopias are written within multiple 
contexts, including the personal, the national, the cultural and the intellectual, 
and most are directed at debates that were current at the time they were written, 
and all those contexts are important for thoroughly understanding the utopias. 
Thus, the title of this collection,  Utopian Moments , implies that each work was 
produced at a particular moment in time. 
 Thus, given the specii city, can something be said about utopianism? To what 
extent are these works, individually and collectively, contributions to something 
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bigger? That is what I attempt here. In 1961, the Dutch sociologist F.L. Polak 
published his  Images of the Future in which he argued that utopias or ‘positive 
images of the future’, as he called them, are essential for the continuation of 
civilization. In 1969, R. Buckminster Fuller published a book entitled  Utopia 
or Oblivion: The Prospects for Humanity and in 2005 the University of Porto 
published a book entitled  Utopia Matters and in 2011 published a book 
entitled  Dystopia Matters . Fuller and Polak were making strong statements 
about the importance of utopias and  Utopia Matters included a number of 
short essays by a variety of scholars (myself included) saying why they think 
utopias are important. 
 At the same time, and particularly throughout much of the twentieth century, 
there have been consistent dire warnings about the dangers of utopia. While 
much of the anti-utopian literature was directed at the utopia of communism, 
which became a dystopia in practice, there have been similar attacks on the 
utopia of the free market as also producing a dystopia in practice. The twentieth 
century has been called the dystopian century and so far the twenty-i rst century 
seems to be following in its footsteps. But, even though the dystopia has been 
the dominant form in the literature, and there are only two twentieth-century 
positive utopias discussed in the book (Wells and Le Guin), positive utopias were 
published throughout the century and continue to be published in the twenty-
i rst. Thus, an insistence on the importance of a positive view of utopianism and 
recognition of that view continues in both public debate and literature. 
 Why should something as seemingly harmless as imagining a better society 
be so threatening? Part of the answer can be seen in the distinction that Karl 
Mannheim drew between ideology and utopia. Simply put, Mannheim said 
that ideology is a system of beliefs that keeps those in power from seeing the 
weakness of their position and utopia is a system of beliefs held by those out 
of power that allows them to see themselves as overturning the existing order. 
For Mannheim, both ideology and utopia falsify the real positions, and he also 
says: ‘The representatives of a given order will label as utopian all conceptions 
of existence which  from their  point of view can in principle never to realized. 
According to this usage, the contemporary connotation of the term ‘utopian’ is 
predominantly that of an idea which is in principle unrealizable.’ 1 
 Although there are exceptions, it is hard to see most utopias, including most 
of those discussed in this book, as threatening anybody. One partial exception 
is Edward Bellamy’s  Looking Backward , which produced movements in many 
countries with the goal of implementing Bellamy’s ideas, or at least parts of 
them, and a number of the other authors were perceived by those in power 
to be threats, even though in most cases they probably were not. Still, specii c 
examples aside, the whole idea of imagining a signii cantly better society is 
regularly thought of as bad because  signii cantly better means different, 
probably different in major ways, and that frightens many people, both in and 
out of power. 
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 One problem that leads people to see utopias as threatening when they 
are not is misunderstanding what utopias do. This misunderstanding, which I 
expect is at times not a misunderstanding but a deliberate misrepresentation, is 
to contend that utopias present pictures of societies that their authors believe to 
be perfect. Very, very few do, and none of the authors included in this book, who 
are exemplars of the mainstream of utopian writing, thought of their creations 
as representing perfection. The word ‘perfect’ implies i xed, permanent and 
unending and that contradicts our understanding of how people behave. But 
most utopias are like the one in H.G. Wells’s  Men Like Gods (1923), in which 
Wells says that the protagonist: 
 had always thought of Utopia as a tranquillity with everything settled for good. 
Even to-day it seemed tranquil under that level haze, but he knew that this 
quiet was the steadiness of a mill race, which seems almost motionless in its 
quiet onrush until a bubble or a l eck of foam or some stick or leaf shoots along 
and reveals its velocity. 2 
 For many the issue is just the changes, slow or rapid, that Wells refers to. 
A signii cantly better society will be a signii cantly different society, and many 
people, including those expected to benei t from the changes, worry about their 
position in an unknown situation. The familiar, even a familiar in which one is 
not very secure, can be more comfortable than the unknown. And, of course, 
those who are secure in the present are even more likely to be nervous about the 
unknown. But for others, and obviously that includes those writing utopias, 
the possibility of improvement, bettering lives, is what counts. 
 One way to consider the larger question of utopianism is to return to 
the specii city of the texts in their contexts and to see if, given their radical 
differences, there are commonalities. The i rst thing that any reader of a utopia 
is likely to notice is that the author is addressing problems in the period in 
which they are living. But, although there are differences in degree, the central 
problem of all utopias is that there are people living miserable lives through no 
fault of their own; and thus the fundamental utopia of adequate food, clothing, 
housing and personal security. The i rst question for the utopia writer is what 
causes the human misery and how to overcome it. Obviously, the causes will be 
seen differently by different people, as will the means of bringing about change. 
And a solution that seems utopian at one time or to one author may appear 
dystopian at another time or to another author. 
 When someone chooses to write a utopia a question that must be faced is 
whether to change institutions in the hope that better institutions will produce 
better people or change people who will then create the institutions that are 
right for them. The second choice leads anti-utopians to say ‘you can’t change 
human nature’. Perhaps for that reason, the second approach is rarely chosen 
except where religious conversion is the mechanism of change, and it is not the 
approach taken by any of the authors discussed in this book. Of course the 
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choice is not as stark as I have put it here; the relationship between institutions 
and people is essentially dialectical with any change in one producing changes 
in the other. 
 But, given that one has chosen to change institutions, where does one start? 
The two most common answers are law and education, with law the most 
common choice from More’s  Utopia through the eighteenth century, and most 
of the works discussed here are based on law. At the same time, it is striking that 
a standard refrain found in utopias, including More’s  Utopia , is that there will 
be no lawyers. This relates to another standard refrain, that the laws should be 
few, simple and easy to understand, which means that there should be no need 
for lawyers to argue about how to interpret them. 
 While some reform utopias only change a few laws, the more common 
approach is widespread or wholesale change, often through a new constitution. 
The i rst written constitutions were in the American colonies, with The 
Fundamental Orders of Connecticut adopted in 1639 most commonly described 
as the i rst. It and many of the constitutions adopted by other American colonies 
and then in the United States from the Articles of Confederation, which was 
in use from 1771 but not ratii ed until 1781, the Constitution of 1789 and the 
i rst amendments to it known as the Bill of Rights (ratii ed 1791), can be read 
as parallel to the constitutions found in explicitly utopian texts like Thomas 
Northmore’s  Memoirs of Planetes, Or a Sketch of the Laws and Manners 
of Makar (1795) in that they are designed not just to codify procedure but 
to change behaviour. And it is interesting that there are late twentieth and 
early twenty-i rst century US utopias that propose revising or replacing the US 
Constitution in order to change both procedures and behaviour. 
 All law that is not simply procedural is a statement about what is acceptable 
behaviour and what is unacceptable. In the Anglo-American tradition, 
the emphasis is on what is unacceptable with the assumption that what 
is not prohibited is permitted. An alternative approach of specifying what is 
acceptable with the understanding that what is not permitted is prohibited 
is at least implied in some, mostly religious, utopias. 
 However, law is about something, so it is not just the fact that law is used 
to produce a better society that is important. The content of the law is crucial, 
and the content is embedded in the culture of the times so that a work that 
presents a clear improvement for its time will appear considerably less positive 
at another time. For example, More’s  Utopia and Bacon’s  New Atlantis are 
hierarchical, paternalistic and patriarchal while providing a better life for their 
inhabitants than was available to all but a few at the time. And More’s  Utopia , 
for all its inegalitarianism, is, in fact, quite egalitarian on some dimensions. 
 One thing that characterizes most law-based utopias, and reinforces my 
point that perfection is not the goal, is that even in utopia some people will 
break the law. As a result, there are procedures in place for determining that a 
law has actually been broken and punishments for those who are determined 
CONCLUSION.indd   143 17/01/12   4:28 PM
144    CONCLUSION
to have done so. Most utopias are designed to reduce law-breaking, but they 
recognize that some will still be broken, and in the early utopias punishment 
is harsh but generally less harsh than the actuality of the time when death was 
the punishment for many crimes. 
 Over time utopian punishment became less harsh and more educative and 
law-breaking is often treated as a curable illness, although in the twentieth-
century USSR we saw how that approach can be perverted. In his  Erewhon; 
Or, Over the Range (1872), Samuel Butler satirized the whole process by 
depicting a society in which criminals are treated by ‘Straighteners’ and illness 
is severely punished. 
 As suggested by the evolution of punishment in law-based utopias, education 
became more and more important as the basis for utopias. Robert Owen made 
this argument very strongly, writing: ‘ Any general character, from the best to 
the worst, from the most ignorant to the most enlightened, may be given to any 
community, even to the world at large, by the application of proper means; 
which means are to a great extent at the command and under the control of 
those who have inl uence in the affairs of men. ’ 3 Furthermore, he said that 
children ‘can be trained to  acquire any language, sentiments, belief, or any 
bodily habits and manners, not contrary to human nature ’. 4 
 Utopians were at the forefront of the expansion of education. In the 
New Harmony community established by Robert Owen in the United States, 
education was intended to be for both males and females and to begin with 
kindergarten and extend through university. These plans were not fuli lled, but 
people who came from Europe to join the community stayed in the United 
States and helped establish a number of U.S. public universities and Owen’s 
son, Robert Dale Owen, was elected to the U.S. Senate and wrote the legislation 
that established the Smithsonian Institution. 
 There are three issues that face utopias based on education: who to teach; 
what to teach; and how to teach. These issues can be combined, such as 
different classes and genders being taught different subjects depending on what 
is considered appropriate to their position in life. In the earliest utopias the 
lower classes and women were simply excluded. 
 A fourth issue was added in the nineteenth century: who pays. This was 
included because it began to be proposed that education needed to reach more 
people and that to do so required public funding. Initially even public funding 
provided education for a limited number of people; the idea of mass public 
education came later as an educated population was seen to be an essential 
condition for modern societies. 
 Although its importance waxed and waned and varies from country to 
country, utopia emerged as a literary genre embedded in religion, and, although 
it is much less important elsewhere in the West, religion continues to be central 
to much US utopianism. Most religious utopias are concerned with changing 
people, either through mass religious conversion or, more commonly, although 
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the cause varies, through people coming to actually practice the precepts of 
Christianity. As a result, good people then create good institutions. Of course, 
both institutions and people change in all utopias, it is simply that in all but the 
religious utopias, institutions change i rst. 
 While there are simple, even simplistic utopias, the best ones, and most of 
those discussed here, recognize the complexity of human relations and are 
themselves complex works. In a number of instances, most notably in the case 
of More’s  Utopia , there are serious disagreements, after 500 years, over how to 
read them. While few of the other texts discussed here produce quite the same 
level of disagreement, none of them is simple, and that is one of the reasons 
they should still be read. They provide messages not just for their own time 
and place but ones that are relevant for our time and place. They still say it is 
important to hope that the conditions in which we live can be improved and, 
while the specii c proposals may be dated, each work suggests that a better life 
is possible and provides ideas about how to bring about such a better life. 
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